Moore v. State
| Citation | 479 N.E.2d 1264 |
| Decision Date | 26 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 1082,1082 |
| Parties | Richard MOORE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). S 400. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Kenneth M. Stroud, Indianapolis, John Proffitt, Campbell, Kyle & Proffitt, Noblesville, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Ind., Joseph N. Stevenson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-Appellant Richard Donald Moore pleaded guilty to three counts of murder, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1985), and was sentenced by the Hamilton Superior Court to death pursuant to Indiana's death penalty statute, Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-9 (Burns 1979). Appellant now directly appeals and raises the following six consolidated issues which pertain only to his death sentence:
1. whether Appellant's death sentence is unconstitutional because this Court allegedly has failed to promulgate rules by which it can conduct a meaningful, to-wit: proportionality, review of Appellant's sentence;
2. whether certain aggravating circumstances established by Indiana's death penalty statute are unconstitutional as applied in Appellant's case, namely.
3. whether sufficient evidence supported the trial court in finding the aggravating circumstance in Appellant's case predicated upon the murder of a police officer;
4. whether the trial court erred by failing to find certain mitigating circumstances, namely;
(A) Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-9(c)(1),
(B) Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-9(c)(2), and
(C) Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-9(c)(7);
5. whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence during Appellant's sentencing hearing certain allegedly hearsay evidence adduced during Appellant's guilty plea hearing; and
6. whether Appellant's death sentence is invalid because Indiana's death penalty statute does not require this Court to find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
The record in this case reveals the following. On November 7, 1979, the Marion County Prosecutor filed an Information in the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division, charging Appellant in nine counts with the following crimes:
I. murder of Rhonda L. Moore by shooting her with a shotgun;
II. murder of John H. Caldwell by shooting him with a shotgun;
III. murder of Gerald F. Griffin by shooting him with a shotgun;
IV. attempted murder of Ruth B. Caldwell by shooting her with a shotgun;
V. attempted murder of Roy Potter by shooting him with a shotgun;
VI. attempted murder of Cicero Mukes by shooting him with a shotgun;
VII. criminal confinement of Rhonda L. Moore while armed with a shotgun;
VIII. criminal confinement of John H. Caldwell while armed with a shotgun; and
IX. criminal confinement of Ruth B. Caldwell while armed with a shotgun.
The Prosecutor also filed at that time a separate document styled "Information for DEATH SENTENCE" which alleged the following three aggravating circumstances:
1. Appellant murdered Gerald F. Griffin who was, at the time of his murder, a law enforcement officer acting in the course of his official duty [See Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-9(b)(6)(i) ];
2. Appellant committed another murder in addition to the murder of Gerald F. Griffin in that he murdered John H. Caldwell [See Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-9(b)(8) ]; and
3. Appellant committed still another murder in addition to the murder of Gerald F. Griffin in that he murdered Rhonda L. Moore [See Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-9(b)(8) ].
Appellant was arraigned on December 27, 1979, having been hospitalized ever since the Informations were filed. Two attorneys were appointed to represent Appellant and he pleaded not guilty at that time. Appellant's "Petition To Allow Marriage" was granted. Appellant filed for a change of venue from the county on January 7, 1980, which request was granted on January 10, 1980. All parties subsequently stipulated to a change of venue to Hamilton County and the Hamilton Superior Court, Division 2, assumed jurisdiction. On March 13, 1980, Appellant's original trial counsel withdrew and an attorney from Hamilton County was appointed to represent Appellant. An aggressive campaign of discovery thereafter ensued. On April 8, 1980, Appellant filed a motion captioned "Request to File Notice of Intent to Raise Defense of Insanity." The trial court apparently took said motion under advisement and appointed two disinterested psychiatrists, Dr. Dwight W. Schuster and Dr. John E. Kooiker, to examine Appellant as to "his competency at the time of the incident, his present competency to stand trial and his ability to assist in his defense." Dr. Schuster filed his written report on May 27, 1980. His report concluded:
Dr. Kooiker's report, filed on June 16, 1980, concluded:
The trial court allowed Appellant to be examined by the psychiatrists in their offices and allowed Appellant to visit his counsel's office twice a week even while still incarcerated in Marion County to be close to certain medical facilities. On May 19, 1980, the trial court granted Appellant's "Petition For Authority To Hire Research Assistant." The first pretrial conference was held on June 19, 1980, at which time the trial court formally allowed Appellant to file his "Notice Of Intent To Raise The Defense Of Insanity" and granted Appellant's motion for funds to hire Dr. Larry M. Davis, a psychiatrist, and Associate Professor Cathy S. Widom, Ph.D., a psychologist. Dr. Davis filed a written report on July 18, 1980, in which he concluded:
Dr. Widom never filed any reports in this case but did testify during Appellant's sentencing hearing.
On Appellant's trial date, August 25, 1980, Appellant appeared before the trial court and withdrew his pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity and entered pleas of guilty to Count I-murder, guilty to Count II-murder, and guilty to Count III-murder. The trial court thereupon conducted a hearing to determine the voluntariness of Appellant's guilty pleas. The trial court examined Appellant about his mental status and about his knowledge of the many constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. The trial court specifically informed Appellant of the minimum and maximum penalties he faced by pleading guilty as charged and reminded Appellant that the State was seeking a death penalty for him. The trial court also carefully advised Appellant that by pleading guilty he would waive his right to have a jury recommend to the trial court whether or not a death penalty should be imposed against Appellant. Appellant consistently stated, without equivocation, that he understood everything that the trial court was discussing with him and that he knew what he was doing. Appellant also stated his belief that he had been adequately and satisfactorily represented by his counsel and that he had not been forced, threatened or induced in any way to enter his guilty pleas. We note that there was no plea agreement in this case. A factual basis for Appellant's three guilty pleas was presented to the trial court by the State and Appellant confessed three different times to having committed the three murders charged in Counts I, II and III. Having carefully and comprehensively examined Appellant, the trial court accepted Appellant's guilty pleas and found Appellant guilty of the three murder counts. A pre-sentence report was ordered to be prepared and a sentencing hearing subsequently was scheduled. On August 29, 1980, the Marion County Prosecutor moved the trial court to enter a nolle prosequi to Counts IV through IX in Appellant's case.
Appellant's sentencing hearing commenced on October 22, 1980, and lasted approximately three days during which time a substantial amount of evidence was presented. Arguments also were made by both the State and Appellant as to whether or not a death sentence should be imposed. The evidence presented showed that at approximately 7:15 p.m. on November 6, 1979, forty-eight year old Appellant went to the house located at 4702 West 36th Street, Indianapolis, where his ex-wife, twenty-seven year old Rhonda Caldwell, was residing with her mother, Ruth Caldwell, and her father, John Caldwell. Appellant and Rhonda, Appellant's second wife, were officially divorced on October 29, 1979, just eight days before the instant murders. Appellant testified during his sentencing hearing and recalled, on direct examination, the events which transpired during the evening of November 6, 1979, as follows:
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