Moore v. State of Missouri

• Decision Date: 25 November 1895
• Docket Number: No. 493,493
• Citation: 16 S.Ct. 179,40 L.Ed. 301,159 U.S. 673
• Parties: MOORE v. STATE OF MISSOURI
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

159 U.S. 673

16 S.Ct. 179

40 L.Ed. 301

MOORE

v STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 493.

November 25, 1895.

[Syllabus from pages 673-675 intentionally omitted] Charles T. Noland, for plaintiff in error.

R. F. Walker and Morton Jourdan, for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

Admitting that the first 10 articles of amendment to the constitution of the United States were adopted as limitations on federal power, it is argued for plaintiff in error that the fundamental rights secured thereby are protected by the fourteenth article of amendment from invasion by the states, in the prohibition of the abridgment of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, of the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and of the denial of the equal protection of the laws; and it is contended that section 3959 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889 is in violation of that amendment, in that persons are thereby subjected to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, and to cruel and unusual punishment, and deprived of the equal protection of the laws. That section, which is also to be found in the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1879 and the General Statutes of Missouri of 1865, is as follows:

'Sec. 3959. Second Offence, How Punished.—If any person convicted of any offence punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or of petit larceny, or of any attempt to commit an offence, which, if perpetrated, would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, shall be discharged, either upon pardon or upon compliance with the sentence, and shall subsequently be convicted of any offence committed after such pardon or discharge, he shall be punished as follows: First, if such subsequent offence be such that, upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, or for a term which, under the provisions of this law, might extend to imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, then such person shall be punished by imprisonment for life; second, if such subsequent offence be such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for a limited term of years, then such person shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for the longest term prescribed upon a conviction for such first offence; third, if such subsequent conviction be for petit larceny, or for an attempt to commit an offence which, if perpetrated, would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, the person convicted of such subsequent offence shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding five years.'

Similar provisions have been contained in state statutes for many years, and they have been uniformly sustained by the courts. In the opinion of the supreme court of Missouri it is said: 'The increased severity of the punishment for the subsequent offense is not a punishment for the same offense for the second time, but a severer punishment for the subsequent offense, the law which imposes the increased punishment being presumed to be known by all persons, and to deter those so inclined from the further commission of crime; and we are unable to see how the statute which imposes such increased punishment violates the provisions of our constitu- tion hereinbefore quoted. * * * The fact that the indictment charged a former conviction of another and entirely different offense is not in fact charging him with an offense with respect of the former offense in the case in hand. The averments as to the former offense go as to the punishment only.' And People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 133; Rand v. Com., 9 Grat. 738; Ross' Case, 2 Pick. 165; Plumbly v. Com., 2 Metc. (Mass.) 413; Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 647, 4 N. W. 785; Maguire v. State, 47 Md. 485; State v. Austin, 113 Mo. 538, 21 S. W. 31; and Reg. v. Clark, 6 Cox, Crim. Cas. 210,—are cited. And see People v. Butler, 3 Cow. 347; Johnson v. People, 55 N. Y. 512; Kelly v. People, 115 Ill. 583, 4 N. E. 644; Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N. E. 18; Sturtevant v. Com., 158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. 648.

The reason for holding that the accused is not again punished for the first offense is given in Ross' Case by Chief Justice Parker, that 'the punishment is for the last offense committed, and it is rendered more severe in consequence of the situation into which the party had previously brought himself'; in Plumbly v. Com., by Chief Justice Shaw, that the statute 'imposes a higher punishment for the same offense upon one who proves, by a second or third conviction, that the former punishment has been inefficacious in doing the work of reform, for which it was designed'; in People v. Stanley, that 'the punishment for the second is increased, because, by his persistence in the perpetration of crime, he has evinced a depravity, which merits a greater punishment, and needs to be restrained by severer penalties than if it were his first offense'; and in Kelly v. People, 'that it is just that an old offender should be punished more severely for a second offense, that repetition of the offense aggravates guilt.' It is quite impossible for us to conclude that the supreme court of Missouri erred in holding that plaintiff in error was not twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or that the increase of his punishment by reason of the commission of the first offense was not cruel and unusual. In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 10 Sup. Ct. 930. Nor can we perceive that plaintiff in error was denied...