Moore v. Succession Moore

Decision Date10 April 2013
Docket NumberNo. 12–959.,12–959.
Citation116 So.3d 18
PartiesBobby C. MOORE v. Succession of Patricia Gay Bruce MOORE, et al.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Kenneth O. Privat, Privat & Privat, Crowley, LA, for Defendants/Appellants, Succession of Patricia Gay Bruce Moore, Robin Ray Huff, and Cory Huff.

Burleigh G. Doga, Burleigh G. Doga, Ltd., Crowley, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Bobby C. Moore.

Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, JIMMIE C. PETERS, MARC T. AMY, BILLY H. EZELL, and JOHN E. CONERY, Judges.

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

[3 Cir. 1]The defendants, Robin Ray Huff and her brother, Cory Huff, and the Succession of Patricia Gay Bruce Moore (“Succession” or “Estate”) appeal the judgment ordering the Succession to pay part of a tax lien and to reimburse the plaintiff, Bobby C. Moore, for federal and state taxes that he paid, or that were charged to him, on the separate income of the decedent, Patricia Gay Bruce Moore (Gay). The defendants also appeal the judgment denying their motion for a new trial. We affirm the judgment denying a new trial. As to the original judgment against the Succession, we affirm as to liability, and we revise and reform the judgment as to the parties cast in judgment.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether the trial court manifestly erred in ordering reimbursement to the surviving spouse for his payment of federal and state income taxes on the decedent's separate income;

(2) whether the trial court manifestly erred in ordering the defendants to pay part of the remaining balance of an IRS tax lien levied against the surviving spouse; and

(3) whether the trial court erred in finding La.R.S. 13:3721 inapplicable in this case, thereby denying the defendants' motion for a new trial.

[3 Cir. 2]II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 5, 1983, Bobby and Gay Moore signed a document entitled “MarriageContract.” The document stated that the couple intended to marry on October 8, that the “intended husband and wife shall be separate in property,” and that they “formally renounce[d] those provisions of the ... Civil Code which establishe[d] a community of acquets and gains between husband and wife.” Bobby was Gay's third husband, and Gay had retirement income, royalty and farm income, and immovable and inherited assets of her own when the couple was married. Bobby had no property other than his income.

Gay became ill with cancer and died intestate in July of 2007. Subsequently, her daughter from a previous marriage, Robin, filed a petition and was appointed administratrix of the Succession.

In August of 2007, before her appointment as administratrix, Robin signed jointly along with Bobby, a power of attorney authorizing CPA Julie Berry to represent them and file tax returns for 2005, 2006, and 2007. Robin signed the document, “Gay. B. Huff by Robin Huff with the title, executor.”

Julie Berry had been Bobby and Gay's CPA from the time of their marriage in 1983, and had prepared the couple's tax returns from 1983 until Gay's death in 2007. She was accepted at trial by the defendants as a licensed CPA in the State of Louisiana, and she was the only expert to testify at trial.

Ms. Berry testified that she filed joint returns for the couple, which reduced their tax liability every year, but that Gay had separate property, and she managed her own income. The couple had a pattern of obtaining an extension each [3 Cir. 3]year, delivering their paperwork to the CPA, and obtaining an installment loan to pay the taxes due on the return.

Ms. Berry was asked to calculate the taxes for the three years at issue and to provide a breakdown of the amounts due by Bobby on his income, and the amounts due by the Estate on Gay's income. Ms. Berry delivered faxes to Robin's attorney in August of 2008 requesting checks from the Estate totaling $69,563.58 for the decedent's share of the federal and state taxes on her separate income. Those checks were never delivered. In the meantime, Bobby had begun paying the taxes to the IRS in 2007. Ms. Berry's breakdowns showed that Bobby had paid $10,000.00 in 2007, over $15,000.00 in 2008, and over $11,000.00 in 2010 and 2011 on the federal taxes; that he had paid all of the state taxes for all three years, and had paid all CPA filing costs as well.

Robin hired a new CPA in 2009, who reported that the Estate only owed $54,968.00. Bobby, through his attorney, agreed to accept that amount, plus the Estate's share of the interest in order to avoid more penalties and interest. This payment did not occur.

The IRS transcripts indicate, and the court noted this fact, that the evidence showed that the Succession had paid a total of only $42,280.00 on the taxes for all three years, though it showed a tax lien of $49,500.00 on its final descriptive list when the Succession was closed in November of 2009. The defendants did not file any exhibits in this case.

In 2010, the IRS placed a $350.00 per month lien on Bobby's social security/retirement income. In April of 2010, Bobby filed formal proof of claim forms in the Succession, which included IRS statements showing $93,751.14 in federal taxes, interest, and penalties due from the parties for all three tax years.

[3 Cir. 4]In February of 2011, Bobby filed suit against Robin and Cory Huff and the Succession. At trial, Ms. Berry testified that Bobby had overpaid his portion of the taxes and that the balance on the lien against him was $20,000.00.

In July 2011, Robin and Cory Huff, filed a reconventional demand as plaintiffs, asserting that the Succession had paid the federal taxes due on Gay's separate income for all three years and that any remainder owed to the IRS in taxes, fees, or penalties, was Bobby's responsibility. The reconventional demand asserted that Bobby was liable to Robin and Cory Huff for all taxes paid by them or the Succession and asked the court to recognize that Robin and Cory Huff and the Succession had fulfilled their obligation in paying the federal income taxes. The trial court did not agree and rendered judgment in favor of Bobby Moore. While the trial court's judgment did not address the defendants' reconventional demand, it is well settled that when a trial court's judgment is silent with respect to a party's claim or an issue placed before the court, it is presumed that the trial court denied the relief sought. Dixie Roofing Co. of Pineville, Inc. v. Allen Parish School Bd., 95–1526 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/96), 690 So.2d 49.

Ultimately, the trial court ordered the Succession to reimburse Bobby $18,454.83 for his overpayments to the IRS and to the Louisiana Department of Revenue, and it ordered the Succession to pay $9,312.79 on the $20,000.00 balance on the tax lien. The court also ordered the Succession to reimburse and pay some of the CPA costs. All three defendants, the Succession, Robin Huff, and Cory Huff filed a motion for a new trial, which was also denied. While the judgments of the trial court were against the Succession only, all three defendants joined in filing this appeal.

[3 Cir. 5]III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court may not set aside a trial court's findings of fact in absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Stobart v. State, Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993); Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989).

A reviewing court must keep in mind that if a trial court's findings are reasonable based upon the entire record and evidence, an appellate court may not reverse said findings even if it is convinced that had it been sitting as trier of fact it would have weighed that evidence differently. Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d 973 (La.1991). The basis for this principle of review is grounded not only upon the better capacity of the trial court to evaluate live witnesses, but also upon the proper allocation of trial and appellate functions between the respective courts. Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973).

Questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute, are reviewed by the appellate court under the de novo standard of review. Land v. Vidrine, 10–1342 (La.3/15/11), 62 So.3d 36 (citations omitted).

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The defendants assert, in a conclusory manner and for the first time on appeal, the peremptory exception of no cause of action. They cite no code article and no jurisprudence in support of this assertion. In their four-page appellate brief, the defendants argue that Bobby Moore did not timely file his proof of claims or his suit against the Succession until after the Succession had closed. Without [3 Cir. 6]specifically pleading prescription, they reference La.Code Civ.P. art. 32451 in a footnote. To that extent, the issue of prescription is not properly before us.2

With regard to the exception of no cause of action, it is authorized by La.Code Civ.P. art. 927. Its function is “to question whether the law extends a remedy against the defendant to anyone under the factual allegations of the petition.” Industrial Companies, Inc. v. Durbin, 02–665, p. 6 (La.1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1207, 1213 (citations omitted). “The exception is triable on the face of the petition and, for the purpose of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true.” Id.

Here, Bobby Moore's petition asserted that he was married to Gay at the time of her death; that they were separate in property pursuant to the marriage contract; that she owed federal income taxes on her separate property for 2005, 2006, and 2007; that the IRS had erroneously assessed taxes due by the succession to him and were compelling payment by him. The petition named three defendants, the Succession of Patricia Gay Bruce Moore, Robin Ray Huff, and Cory Huff. It asserted that Robin was the independent administrator of the succession; that Robin and Cory Huff were the sole heirs of the decedent; that they were personally, jointly, and solidarily liable for the debts of the succession; that [3 Cir. 7]they had...

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