Moore v. Sun Oil Co. of Pennsylvania, 79-3158

• Decision Date: 22 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-3158,79-3158
• Citation: 636 F.2d 154
• Parties: 24 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1072, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,419 William MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUN OIL COMPANY OF PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 154

636 F.2d 154

24 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1072,

24 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,419

William MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUN OIL COMPANY OF PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 79-3158.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 13, 1980.

Decided Dec. 22, 1980.

James D. Shelby, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.

Ronald J. James, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Gregory B. Scott, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant-appellee.

Before WEICK, LIVELY and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

BAILEY BROWN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal primarily raises the question whether and to what extent a party to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ¹ is entitled to a jury trial.

Appellant, William Moore, a Black, brought this action against his former employer, Sun Oil Co. of Pennsylvania (Sun Oil), alleging racial discrimination. He alleged that, because of such discrimination, he did not receive a promotion to which he was entitled, received an assignment of duties which undercut his chance to be promoted, was not allowed to return to work with light duties after he was injured on the job, and was not, when he did return, assigned to work that would not aggravate his physical condition. Moore further alleged that, because of such discrimination, the timing of his retirement and the benefits he would receive were affected. Lastly, Moore alleged that Sun Oil acted wilfully and maliciously.

With respect to relief, Moore's amended complaint claimed, in addition to attorney's fees and costs, as follows:

A) Grant him back pay from defendant, which back pay should include any and all fringe benefits which plaintiff would have received but for defendant's actions in discriminatorily denying plaintiff a promotion and discriminatorily requiring him to retire early;

B) Grant compensatory damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00).

C) Grant punitive damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00).

Moore demanded a jury as to "issues so triable in this action."

Sun Oil moved to strike the jury demand, and after both parties had briefed the issue, the district court struck the jury demand.

The district court then conducted a bench trial and concluded that Moore had not made out a case of racial discrimination and dismissed the case. On appeal, in addition to contending that he was entitled to a jury trial on at least some of the issues, Moore also contends that the district court erred in dismissing his case on the merits.

In striking the demand for a jury trial, the district court concluded that "a demand for back pay and similar equitable relief will not support a demand for a jury trial in an action brought pursuant to ... 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ... because such relief is equitable in character." The district court further concluded that: "The thrust of plaintiff's claim in this case is for back pay and restitution of fringe benefits. In addition, plaintiff claims a right to compensatory and punitive damages. However, a plaintiff may not unilaterally alter the genre of the proceeding by making unsupported allegations for compensatory and punitive damages so as to mandate a jury trial." Sun Oil contends that the district court was correct in striking the jury demand for the reasons that it did so and when it did so. ²

We conclude that legal, as distinguished from equitable, relief may be obtained in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and that, to the extent a plaintiff is seeking legal relief, the parties are entitled to a jury trial. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975), the Court said at 459-460, 95 S.Ct. at 1720:

Title 42 USC § 1981, being the present codification of § 16 of the century-old Civil rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 144, on the other hand, on its face relates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. Although this Court has not specifically so held, it is well settled among the Federal Courts of Appeals-and we now join them-that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race. An individual who establishes a cause of action under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages. See, e. g., Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (CA1), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940, (89 S.Ct. 299, 21 L.Ed.2d 276) (1968); Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573 (CA5 1967). And a backpay award under § 1981 is not restricted to the two years specified for backpay recovery under Title VII (footnote omitted).

Moreover, in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974), the Court held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial where a plaintiff is seeking legal relief, either compensatory or punitive damages, even though the right to such relief is created by a federal statute. The Court said at 194, 94 S.Ct. at 1008:

Whatever doubt may have existed should now be dispelled. The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law.

In the instant case, Moore is seeking "back pay" although he is not seeking the equitable relief of reinstatement by means of an injunction. However, "back pay," under the law of this circuit, is equitable relief, and therefore the parties are not entitled to a jury trial with respect to such issue even though reinstatement is not sought. In Hildebrand v. Bd. of Trustees of Mich. State Univ., 607 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1979), which was an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985, this court stated at 708:

The above-cited authorities mandate that the...