Moore v. Tartler
Decision Date | 01 March 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-1476,AM-2804,92-1476 |
Citation | 986 F.2d 682 |
Parties | Charles E. MOORE, #v. Hermann TARTLER, Board Secretary, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole; John P. Showronski, Director, Division of Hearing Review; Chapel, Parole Agent; Dougherty, Parole Agent; Marshall, Parole Agent at Sci-Graterford; Donald T. Vaughn, Superintendent, at Sci-Graterford; E.C. Burke, Culinary Manager, at Sci-Graterford; Gandy, Doctor, at Sci-Graterford Charles Moore, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 91-00423).
Angus R. Love (Argued), Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project, Philadelphia, PA, for appellant.
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Atty. Gen., Denise A. Kuhn (argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., Kate L. Mershimer, John G. Knorr, III, Office of Atty. Gen., of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, for appellees.
Before: MANSMANN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and RODRIGUEZ, District Judge. *
We are asked to decide whether a six month delay in an inmate's release from incarceration violates his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Because we find that the delay did not result from deliberate indifference to the inmate's liberty interest by parole board officials, the eighth amendment was not violated. We, therefore, will affirm the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the parole board officials.
On August 25, 1978, Charles E. Moore was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of 6 to 12 years in Pennsylvania state prison for a drug conviction. He began serving time on December 17, 1979, at the State Correctional Institute at Graterford. His minimum date for release was December 13, 1985 and his maximum date for release was December 15, 1991. Moore was paroled on his minimum date in 1985.
On May 4, 1989, while on parole, Moore was arrested and charged with burglary and related offenses. Upon arrest, Moore was confined to the Philadelphia County Jail. On May 5, 1989, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole lodged a detainer against Moore for violating parole on the drug conviction. On June 29, 1989, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas reduced Moore's bail on the burglary charge to Release on Own Recognizance and ordered Moore transferred to a state prison pursuant to the parole board's detainer. 1 On September 19, 1989, Moore was transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Graterford.
On June 27, 1990, Moore was convicted on the burglary charges in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and was sentenced to "time in to 23 months" in Philadelphia County Prison. 2
On September 20, 1990, Moore had a hearing before the parole board examiner at Graterford. On October 23, 1990, the parole board ordered that Moore be "recommit[ed] as a C.P.V. (convicted parole violator) to a State Correctional Institution when available to serve six months back time."
On November 5, 1990, Moore appealed this decision by filing a Request for Administrative Relief to Parole Board Secretary Hermann Tartler. On November 21, 1990 and December 31, 1990, Moore filed two additional requests that he be released immediately. 3 In all of these filings Moore contended that he had been available to serve his backtime since June 29, 1989, when he was released from the authority of the court on the burglary charge. Moore asserted that he had already spent 17 months at Graterford on a detainer and that he should be released immediately under Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 488 Pa. 397, 412 A.2d 568 (1980) ( ). Moore's contention was that the time spent between the date his bail was reduced and the date of his sentencing should be credited towards the six months backtime added by the parole board on October 23, 1990 to his original sentence.
On January 7, 1991, William Traister, Director of Pre-Parole Analysis and Records Management, denied Moore's request for release. Traister informed Moore that the parole board interpreted the county judge's order to mean that Moore was still serving time on the burglary charge and was not yet available to begin the six months backtime. He stated, "Since your sentencing order does not include parole, you are not considered available to the Board for service of backtime until the order is issued or you have served your entire maximum sentence."
The gravamen of Moore's request for immediate release was that the judge sentencing him on the burglary charges clearly intended by the words "time in" that Moore not serve any additional time in incarceration. Moore argued that the parole board erred when it concluded that he was not "available" to serve time under his original sentence as of October 23, 1990, and that the parole board erroneously interpreted the sentencing judge's order.
Meanwhile, prior to the parole board's denial of Moore's appeal, on October 16, 1990, Syed Ali, a Probation and Parole Staff Specialist from the central parole office in Harrisburg, sent a request to the Philadelphia office asking for a paroling order on Moore by October 30, 1990. A paroling order (from the burglary sentence) was needed before the six months backtime on the drug conviction could be calculated by the parole board. Mario Chapel, a supervisor for the parole board in Philadelphia, wrote Mr. Ali explaining that there was no paroling paper on Moore, only a sentencing sheet listing a sentence of "time in to 23 months."
For approximately two months, nothing further happened with respect to Moore's case. On January 8 and 9, 1991, Gerald Marshall telephoned the parole board's central office in Philadelphia inquiring about Moore's parole status. On January 14, 1991, Parole Agent Dougherty went, in person, to City Hall and discussed the matter with the judge who indicated that when he used the words "time in" in his sentencing order he meant "parole immediately." Dougherty then asked the judge to amend his June 29, 1990 order by writing "parole immediately" on it. The judge complied with this request on January 14, 1991. The Philadelphia office allegedly forwarded the amended order to the Harrisburg office. On March 1, 1991, the central office called Dougherty, saying it never received the amended order. Dougherty then mailed another copy to Harrisburg.
On March 6, 1991, the Harrisburg office received the judge's amended order and concluded that Moore was paroled as of January 11, 1991, the date of the amended order. It was further concluded that Moore was now available to the parole board and that he had already served 11 months and 28 days backtime, from June 29, 1989 through June 27, 1990. Upon this discovery, Moore was paroled immediately. Moore was ultimately released on March 29, 1991 after drug testing and approval of his parole plan.
On January 22, 1991, Moore, while still incarcerated, filed a complaint against Hermann Tartler, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, and Parole Board Agents Lawrence Dougherty and Gerald Marshall alleging that they violated his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 4 Moore requested civil rights damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moore alleged that Tartler, Dougherty and Marshall, acting in their official capacities, caused Moore to suffer at least three months of unjustified imprisonment as a result of their deliberate indifference to Moore's requests that they investigate the parole board's misinterpretation of a sentencing order. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On May 13, 1992, the district court granted the parole board official's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Moore's complaint with prejudice. Moore appeals to us, asserting that the investigation by the parole board's officers was so inept that it rose to the level of deliberate indifference.
Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment in the parole board officials' favor is plenary. American Lumber Corp. v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 886 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir.1989). Our standard of review with respect to a district court's dismissal of a complaint is, likewise, plenary. Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351 (3d Cir.1992). In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we are required to apply the same test the district court should have utilized initially. Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723, 728 (3d Cir.1990). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Moore, we must determine whether the parole board officials, Tartler, Dougherty and Marshall, as the moving parties, have met their burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). We turn now to Moore's assertion that parole board officials, Tartler, Dougherty and Marshall violated Moore's eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because of their ineptitude.
To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Moore must demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. In addition, he must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664-65, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Tartler, Dougherty and Marshall do not contest that their actions occurred under color of state law. They dispute,...
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