Moore v. Texas

• Decision Date: 28 March 2017
• Docket Number: No. 15–797.,15–797.
• Citation: Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 197 L.Ed.2d 416 (2017)
• Parties: Bobby James MOORE, Petitioner v. TEXAS.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

137 S.Ct. 1039

197 L.Ed.2d 416

Bobby James MOORE, Petitioner

v.TEXAS.

No. 15–797.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 29, 2016.

Decided March 28, 2017.

Clifford M. Sloan, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General, Austin, TX, for Respondent.

Alex Blaszczuk, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Luke Varley, New York, NY, Clifford M. Sloan, Lauryn K. Fraas, Donald P. Salzman, Michael A. McIntosh, Brendan B. Gants, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Jeffrey C. Mateer, First Assistant Attorney

General, Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General, Matthew H. Frederick, Deputy Solicitor General, Rance Craft, Michael P. Murphy, Assistant Solicitors General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Respondent.

Justice GINSBURGdelivered the opinion of the Court.

Bobby James Moore fatally shot a store clerk during a botched robbery.He was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.Moore challenged his death sentence on the ground that he was intellectually disabled and therefore exempt from execution.A state habeas court made detailed factfindings and determined that, under this Court's decisions in Atkins v. Virginia,536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335(2002), andHall v. Florida,572 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007(2014), Moore qualified as intellectually disabled.For that reason, the court concluded, Moore's death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription of "cruel and unusual punishments."The habeas court therefore recommended that Moore be granted relief.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals(CCA)¹ declined to adopt the judgment recommended by the state habeas court.²In the CCA's view, the habeas court erroneously employed intellectual-disability guides currently used in the medical community rather than the 1992 guides adopted by the CCA in Ex parte Briseno,135 S.W.3d 1(2004).SeeEx parte Moore,470 S.W.3d 481, 486–487(2015).The appeals court further determined that the evidentiary factors announced in Briseno"weigh[ed] heavily" against upsetting Moore's death sentence.470 S.W.3d, at 526.

We vacate the CCA's judgment.As we instructed in Hall, adjudications of intellectual disability should be "informed by the views of medical experts."572 U.S., at ––––, 134 S.Ct., at 2000;seeid., at ––––, 134 S.Ct., at 1993.That instruction cannot sensibly be read to give courts leave to diminish the force of the medical community's consensus.Moreover, the several factors Briseno set out as indicators of intellectual disability are an invention of the CCA untied to any acknowledged source.Not aligned with the medical community's information, and drawing no strength from our precedent, the Briseno factors"creat[e] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed,"572 U.S., at ––––, 134 S.Ct., at 1990.Accordingly, they may not be used, as the CCA used them, to restrict qualification of an individual as intellectually disabled.

I

In April 1980, then–20–year–old Bobby James Moore and two others were engaged in robbing a grocery store.Ex parte Moore,470 S.W.3d 481, 490–491(Tex.Crim.App.2015);App. 58.During the episode, Moore fatally shot a store clerk.470 S.W.3d, at 490.Some two months later, Moore was convicted and sentenced to death.Seeid., at 492.A federal habeas court later vacated that sentence based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel, seeMoore v. Collins,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22859, *35(SD Tex., Sept. 29, 1995), and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, seeMoore v. Johnson,194 F.3d 586, 622(1999).Moore was resentenced to death in 2001, and the CCA affirmed on direct appeal.SeeMoore v. State,2004 WL 231323, *1(Tex.Crim.App., Jan. 14, 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 931, 125 S.Ct. 312, 160 L.Ed.2d 233(2004).

Moore subsequently sought state habeas relief.In 2014, the state habeas court conducted a two-day hearing on whether Moore was intellectually disabled.SeeEx parte Moore,No. 314483–C (185th Jud. Dist., HarrisCty., Tex., Feb. 6, 2015), App. to Pet. for Cert. 129a.The court received affidavits and heard testimony from Moore's family members, former counsel, and a number of court-appointed mental-health experts.The evidence revealed that Moore had significant mental and social difficulties beginning at an early age.At 13, Moore lacked basic understanding of the days of the week, the months of the year, and the seasons; he could scarcely tell time or comprehend the standards of measure or the basic principle that subtraction is the reverse of addition.Id., at 187a.At school, because of his limited ability to read and write, Moore could not keep up with lessons.Id., at 146a, 182a–183a.Often, he was separated from the rest of the class and told to draw pictures.Ibid.Moore's father, teachers, and peers called him "stupid" for his slow reading and speech.Id., at 146a, 183a.After failing every subject in the ninth grade, Moore dropped out of high school.Id., at 188a.Cast out of his home, he survived on the streets, eating from trash cans, even after two bouts of food poisoning.Id., at 192a–193a.

In evaluating Moore's assertion of intellectual disability, the state habeas court consulted current medical diagnostic standards, relying on the 11th edition of the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities(AAIDD) clinical manual, see AAIDD, Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports (2010)(hereinafter AAIDD–11), and on the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association(APA), see APA, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2013)(hereinafter DSM–5).App. to Pet. for Cert. 150a–151a, 202a.The court followed the generally accepted, uncontroversial intellectual-disability diagnostic definition, which identifies three core elements: (1) intellectual-functioning deficits (indicated by an IQ score "approximately two standard deviations below the mean"—i.e., a score of roughly 70—adjusted for "the standard error of measurement,"AAIDD–11, at 27); (2) adaptive deficits ("the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances,"Hall v. Florida,572 U.S. ––––, ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1994, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007(2014) ); and (3) the onset of these deficits while still a minor.SeeApp. to Pet. forCert. 150a(citingAAIDD–11, at 1).See alsoHall,572 U.S., at ––––, 134 S.Ct., at 1993–1994.³

Moore's IQ scores, the habeas court determined, established subaverage intellectual functioning.The court credited six of Moore's IQ scores, the average of which (70.66) indicated mild intellectual disability.App. to Pet. for Cert. 167a–170a.⁴

And relying on testimony from several mental-health experts, the habeas court found significant adaptive deficits.In determining the significance of adaptive deficits, clinicians look to whether an individual's adaptive performance falls two or more standard deviations below the mean in any of the three adaptive skill sets (conceptual, social, and practical).SeeAAIDD–11, at 43.Moore's performance fell roughly two standard deviations below the mean in all three skill categories.App. to Pet. for Cert. 200a–201a.Based on this evidence, the state habeas court recommended that the CCA reduce Moore's sentence to life in prison or grant him a new trial on intellectual disability.Seeid., at 203a.

The CCA rejected the habeas court's recommendations and denied Moore habeas relief.See470 S.W.3d 481.At the outset of its opinion, the CCA reaffirmed Ex parte Briseno,135 S.W.3d 1(Tex.Crim.App.2004), as paramount precedent on intellectual disability in Texas capital cases.See470 S.W.3d, at 486–487.Briseno adopted the definition of, and standards for assessing, intellectual disability contained in the 1992(ninth) edition of the American Association on Mental Retardation(AAMR) manual, predecessor to the current AAIDD–11 manual.See135 S.W.3d, at 7(citing AAMR, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports (9th ed. 1992)(hereinafter AAMR–9)).

Briseno incorporated the AAMR–9's requirement that adaptive deficits be "related" to intellectual-functioning deficits.135 S.W.3d, at 7(quotingAAMR–9, at 25).⁵To determine whether a defendant has satisfied the relatedness requirement, the CCA instructed in this case, Texas courts should attend to the "seven evidentiary factors" first set out in Briseno .470 S.W.3d, at 489.⁶No citation to any authority, medical or judicial, accompanied the Briseno court's recitation of the seven factors.See135 S.W.3d, at 8–9.

The habeas judge erred, the CCA held, by "us[ing] the most current position, as espoused by AAIDD, regarding the diagnosis of intellectual disability rather than the test ... in Briseno ."470 S.W.3d, at 486.This Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia,536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335(2002), the CCA emphasized, "left it to the States to develop appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction" on the execution of the intellectually disabled.470 S.W.3d, at 486.Thus, even though "[i]t may be true that the AAIDD's and APA's positions regarding the diagnosis of intellectual disability have changed since Atkins and Briseno, " the CCA retained Briseno 's instructions, both because of "the subjectivity surrounding the medical diagnosis of intellectual disability" and because the Texas Legislature had not displaced Briseno with any other guideposts.470 S.W.3d, at 486–487.The Briseno inquiries, the court said, "remai[n] adequately ‘informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework.’ "470 S.W.3d, at 487(quotingHall,572 U.S., at ––––, 134 S.Ct., at 2000 ).

Employing Briseno, the CCA first determined that Moore had failed to prove significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.470 S.W.3d, at 514–519.Rejecting...