Moore v. The Superior Court Of Los Angeles County

Decision Date19 August 2010
Docket NumberNo. S174633.,S174633.
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
PartiesArdell MOORE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

[114 Cal.Rptr.3d 200]

Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Karin King and Jack T. Weedin, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.

Alan A. Abrams and Maheen Patel for American College of Forensic Psychiatry as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Michael J. Aye, Sacramento, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Norton & Melnik and Todd L. Melnik, Los Angeles, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

[114 Cal.Rptr.3d 201]

No appearance for Respondent.

Steve Cooley, District Attorney, Irene Wakabayashi, Head Deputy District Attorney, Phyllis Asayama and Roberta T. Schwartz, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.

BAXTER, J.

Defendant Ardell Moore was convicted of forcible oral copulation against a teenage girl he abducted in 1978. He was imprisoned and then paroled in 1981. In 1984, he kidnapped and sexually assaulted another female victim he did not know, and served a lengthy prison term following his conviction for those crimes. Upon his release from prison in 2000, defendant was tried and committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA or Act). (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6600 et seq.) 1 such commitment involved confinement and TREATMENT IN A SECURE hospital setting.

This case arises from a proceeding to extend defendant's commitment as an SVP. Between the time the trial court found probable cause that he would likely reoffend ifreleased and the time the recommitment petition was set to be tried, defendant moved to stay the proceedings and to determine his mental competence to stand trial. The court denied the motion on the ground such procedure was not statutorily authorized or constitutionally compelled under the SVPA. Defendant sought mandate in the Court of Appeal. He claimed due process prevented him from being tried as an SVP if he could not understand the proceedings or cooperate with counsel. The Court of Appeal agreed. It relied heavily on People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 183, 187 P.3d 1018 ( Allen ), which recognized the due process right of an alleged SVP to testify over counsel's objection at his commitment trial.

We granted the People's petition for review to decide whether the defendant in an SVP proceeding has a due process right not to be tried or civilly committed while mentally incompetent. Consistent with the conclusion reached by every out-of-state decision to consider the issue, the answer is “no.” Allen focused on the extent to which the defendant, as to whom no competence issue was raised, could testify at his trial to explain his own conduct and dispute the foundation of expert opinion about his mental disorders and dangerousness. There, to the extent such testimony was even relevant, it arguably enhanced the reliability of the SVP determination, allowed commitment under the Act, and imposed no significant impediment to enforcement of the SVPA's legitimate goals in an appropriate case.

Here, however, we confront a wholly different situation, which is likely to arise in countless other cases. Defendant insists that the diagnosed mental disorders that allegedly make him a sexually dangerous predator also impair his mental competence to stand trial, and that the state therefore cannot try or commit him as an SVP unless or until his competence is restored. Thus, unlike in Allen, recognition of the due process right claimed here could prevent an SVP determination from being made at all. Such a scenario, which could often recur, would undermine the purpose and operation of the Act. The State could not confine and treat some of its most dangerous sex offenders under conditions targeting their disorders, and public safety could suffer as a result.

[114 Cal.Rptr.3d 202]

For these reasons, courts in other states with similar statutes have uniformly held that due process does not prevent the trial and commitment of SVP's while mentally incompetent. The same approach is followed under at least one other civil commitment scheme in this state. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeal.

I. Case History

On February 11, 2005, the State Department of Mental Health (DMH), in a letter signed by the acting medical director at Atascadero State Hospital (Atascadero), asked the Los Angeles County District Attorney to seek an extension of defendant's commitment as an SVP. The letter said that he continued to meet the criteria for commitment, and that his term would expire soon.

Attached to the DMH letter were “Recommitment Evaluations” prepared in January 2005 by Shoba Sreenivasan, Ph.D. and Elaine Finnberg, Ph.D. Both evaluators were licensed psychologists, apparently retained by the DMH. They began their reports by describing defendant's two criminal cases, as follows. 2

First, a jury convicted defendant of forcible oral copulation against Maria M. in 1978, when she was 16 years old. (See Pen.Code, § 288a, subd. (c)(2).) Defendant (who was then age 21) forced the victim, a stranger, from a public bus into a residence. He grabbed her by the neck, told her to suck his penis, and made her strip from the waist down in order to rape her.

The victim screamed and managed to flee when someone interrupted the attack. Defendant served athree-year prison term and was paroled in 1981. 3

Second, a jury convicted defendant of kidnapping (see Pen.Code, § 207, subd. (a)), forcible rape ( id., § 261, subd. (a)(2)), and forcible rape in concert ( id., § 264.1) against Genetta S. in 1984. Defendant offered a car ride to the 26-year-old victim, a stranger he met late one night. He forced her to enter an abandoned building in which other men were lurking. Defendant beat and bound the victim, after ordering her to undress. He then orally copulated, raped, and sodomized her. At least one other man sexually assaulted her too. She later escaped. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years in prison. 4

[114 Cal.Rptr.3d 203]

The recommitment evaluations described defendant's behavior while imprisoned for the Genetta S. crimes, as follows: He often broke prison rules by exposing his penis and masturbating in the presence of female staff. Such sexual misconduct occurred in addition to numerous other rule violations, including possessing makeshift weapons, destroying state property, assaulting an inmate, resisting staff, and refusing to provide required DNA samples.

The reports by Drs. Sreenivasan and Finnberg noted that defendant's misdeeds continued after he first entered Atascadero as an SVP in April 2000, upon his release from prison. In October 2001, his parole was revoked and he was returned to prison for indecent exposure in Atascadero. He was recommitted as an SVP and readmitted to the hospital in April 2003. Throughout his time in Atascadero, both before and after the parole revocation, defendant frequently committed rule violations-sometimes more than once a day. He verbally abused and threatened male and female staff, sexually propositioned other patients, and subjected female staff to a wide range of sexually inappropriate and hostile acts (e.g., staring at them, soliciting and discussing sex, walking around nude, and masturbating).

Both experts diagnosed defendant with a multidimensional mental disorder under the “DSM-IV-TR.” 5 First, he suffers from paraphilia, involving intense and recurrent sexual fantasies, urges, or acts against nonconsenting persons. Dr. Sreenivasan explained that the condition has spanned defendant's adulthood and has involved sadistic tendencies. Dr. Finnberg concurred, and found evidence of exhibitionism due to defendant's indecent exposure and masturbation in custody. Second, the experts tendered a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder with bipolar and psychotic components. Symptoms included paranoid and persecutory thoughts (e.g., people wanting to hurt or annoy him), delusions (e.g., his victims sexually tempting him), hypomania (e.g., pressurized and rambling speech, and tangential thought processes), and florid psychosis (e.g., auditory hallucinations). Third, both evaluators diagnosed defendant with antisocial personality disorder, manifested by his persistent disregard of societal norms and the rights of others. Dr. Finnberg noted that defendant has shown no remorse or empathy, and has denied committing any crimes or sexual misdeeds. 6

Regarding treatment for these conditions, both evaluators described the “Sex Offender Commitment Program” made available to SVP's at Atascadero. It involves five intensive phases of specialized education and behavior training, and includes ancillary therapies for anger management and substance abuse. Dr. Sreenivasan noted that defendant had declined to participate in any phase of the program and had resisted taking medications that would reduce his sexual impulses. Dr.

[114 Cal.Rptr.3d 204]

Finnberg opined that defendant's mental disorders made him both unwilling and unable to accept structured treatment, and that he refused to do anything that would reduce sexual arousal. Sometimes, however, he participated in group recreational activities, and met on an individual basis with a staff psychologist.

Finally, the experts agreed that defendant was likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal acts in the future without appropriate treatment and custody. They reviewed risk factors under the “Static-99” scale, and gave defendant a score of either nine (Dr. Sreenivasan) or 10 (Dr. Finnberg), placing him in the “high risk” range covering anyone who scores six orhigher. Many factors contributed to his risk of reoffense (e.g., nature and severity of psychiatric disorders, nonparticipation in treatment, willingness to blame his victims, refusal to show remorse or admit wrongdoing, and continued sexual misconduct in a structured setting)....

To continue reading

Request your trial
89 cases
  • People v. Thomas
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 14 Abril 2014
    ...408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)." (Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 334; see Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802, 819.) Appellant has not demonstrated that, in involuntary commitment proceedings, due process also gives a prospective committe......
  • People v. Tran
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 7 Mayo 2013
    ...377 ; Juarez v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 928, 931–932, 242 Cal.Rptr. 192 [same]; cf. Moorev. Superior Co urt (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802, 829, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 237 P.3d 530 [same re trial on SVP commitment].) As the court explained, "Angeletakis will be confined and receive treatm......
  • In re Butler
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 7 Octubre 2020
    ...by indefinite pretrial detention of an alleged SVP defendant. The district attorney relies on Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802, 815, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 237 P.3d 530, in asserting that "[t]he societal interest served by the SVPA is solely to confine alleged SVPs in a secure tr......
  • In re Morgan
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 8 Mayo 2014
    ...was provided Morgan. Courts in other states with similar statutes have uniformly held as much. See Moore v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.4th 802, 237 P.3d 530, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 (2010); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 583, 846 N.E.2d 379, 385–86 (2006); see also State ex rel. Nixon v. Kinder,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT