Moore v. Twin City Ice & Cold Storage Co., 12942.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
Writing for the CourtMAIN, J.
Citation159 P. 779,92 Wash. 608
Decision Date29 August 1916
Docket Number12942.
PartiesMOORE v. TWIN CITY ICE & COLD STORAGE CO.

159 P. 779

92 Wash. 608

MOORE
v.
TWIN CITY ICE & COLD STORAGE CO.

No. 12942.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 29, 1916


Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Benton County; O. R. Holcomb, Judge.

Action by Mary J. Moore against the Twin City Ice & Cold Storage Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and cause remanded, with direction to the superior court to dismiss the action. [159 P. 780]

Moulton & Jeffrey, of Kennewick, for appellant.

C. B. Hamblet, of Kennewick, and Lon Boyle, of Prosser, for respondent.

MAIN, J.

This action was instituted by the plaintiff for the purpose of securing the forfeiture of a lease of real estate, for possession of such real estate, and for damages on account of waste claimed to have been caused by the defendant as tenant. After the action had been pending for some time, a supplemental complaint was filed, claiming as an additional ground for forfeiture the failure to pay rent, which had become due subsequent to the time when suit was begun. After the issues were framed the cause was tried to the court without a jury, and resulted in a judgment decreeing the forfeiture of the lease, the possession of the premises to the plaintiff, and $10 damages. From this judgment the defendant appeals.

The facts are briefly these: On September 9, 1913, the respondent executed and delivered to the appellant a lease for lot A of Moore's First Addition to Kennewick, Wash. By the terms of this lease, the tenancy was to begin on September 15, 1913, and continue for a period of three years. The rent specified was $10 per year. The lot next adjacent on the west to that covered by the lease was owned by the appellant, and was used by it for a grape juice factory and cold storage plant. [92 Wash. 610] Prior to the execution of the lease, and for a period of about six or seven years, the appellant, with the consent of the owner of the lot covered by the lease, had used the same as a yard for its horses; but at no time had paid any rent therefor. Prior to the execution of this lease, the son of the respondent had tendered to the manager of the appellant a lease to be executed, with rent reserved in the sum of $1 per year. This lease the appellant refused to execute, the reason therefor not appearing in the record. The executed lease does not specify the purpose to which the lot may be devoted. Some time prior to the month of June, 1914, the appellant began the excavation for a cellar or basement under the building occupied by it as its cold storage plant and grape juice factory. In making this excavation the surface soil, sand, gravel, and rock were taken out on the east side of the lot, and temporarily placed upon the lot covered by the lease from the respondent. When the excavated material was placed upon the lot, the surface soil, gravel or rock, and sand, were separated, and placed in different piles. This was so that such of the sand as was necessary could be used in the concrete mixture for the cellar or basement walls, and that the gravel or rock could be readily moved, and the surface soil properly disposed of. Part of the rock and gravel had been removed from the lot owned by the respondent prior to the time when the suit was begun; and at the time of the trial it had all been removed, with the exception of approximately 12 yards on the northwest corner of the lot. This was left for the purpose of making a better driveway in approaching the building. The lot covered by the lease was in dimensions 50 feet by 137 feet. The terms of the lease referring to the care and...

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7 cases
  • Linda EASTWOOD v. HORSE HARBOR Found. INC., 81977-7.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • November 4, 2010
    ...estate may revert to those having the reversionary interest, without material deterioration.” Moore v. Twin City Ice & Cold Storage Co., 92 Wash. 608, 611, 159 P. 779 (1916). Only damage rising to the level of “substantial injury” is considered waste. Id. A lessor thus has a right to the re......
  • Elliott v. Flynn Bros., 14519.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • July 22, 1937
    ...Harrison, 50 S.C. 39, 43, 27 S.E. 539; Owens v. North State Life Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 373, 92 S.E. 168; Moore v. Twin City Ice, etc., Co., 92 Wash. 608, 159 P. 779, Ann.Cas.1918D, 540; 26 R.C.L. 628. And this principle has been specifically applied as creating a waiver of the absence of an in......
  • Gaunt v. Alabama Bound Oil & Gas Co., Inc., 5893
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • May 30, 1922
    ...370, 374, 100 N.W. 55; Schaeffer v. Coldren, 237 Pa. 77, 84, 85 A. 98, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 175; Moore v. Twin City Ice & Cold Storage Co., 92 Wash. 608, 613, 159 P. 779, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 540; Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1819. Payment by check or similar bank paper has become so generally reco......
  • Elliott v. Bros, 14519.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • July 22, 1937
    ...v. Harrison, 50 S.C. 39, 43, 27 S.E. 539; Owens v. North State Life Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 373, 92 S.E. 168; Moore v. Twin City Ice, etc, Co., 92 Wash. 608, 159 P. 779, Ann.Cas.l918D, 540; 26 R.C.L. 628. And this principle has been specifically applied as creating a waiver of the absence of an ......
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