Moore v. U.S.

• Citation: 950 F.2d 656
• Decision Date: 02 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. 91-7083,91-7083
• Parties: Dennis Wayne MOORE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)

Page 656

950 F.2d 656

Dennis Wayne MOORE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 91-7083.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

Dec. 2, 1991.

Submitted on the Briefs: ^*

Dennis Wayne Moore, pro se.

John Raley, U.S. Atty., and Sheldon J. Sperling, Asst. U.S. Atty., Muskogee, Okl., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner-appellant appeals from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, in which he claims that his perjury conviction is constitutionally invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel caused by an actual and simultaneous conflict of interest. We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

In connection with a large amphetamine manufacturing operation, petitioner was charged with a drug conspiracy and a conspiracy to carry or use firearms in connection with a drug offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 846; 18 U.S.C. § 371. Pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner pled guilty to interstate transportation in aid of a racketeering enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952. At the plea hearing, petitioner implicated Larry Lee Callihan, a codefendant, as the source of his compensation. ¹ Petitioner does not challenge this conviction.

The government subsequently charged petitioner with perjury on the theory that petitioner had failed to acknowledge the involvement of codefendant Darrel Glen Russell in the conspiracy. ² Petitioner pled guilty to the perjury charge on the promise that the government would not seek to invalidate the first plea agreement on the interstate transportation in aid of racketeering charge. Petitioner was sentenced to sixty months on the interstate transportation in aid of racketeering conviction, and an additional sixty months on the perjury conviction, to run consecutively.

On both convictions, petitioner was represented by attorney D.G. ³ D.G. was retained by Greg Cox for petitioner and Cox paid D.G. a $5,000 fee. According to petitioner, D.G. could not represent him with undivided loyalty because Cox was implicated in the drug conspiracy (and was later indicted), and that fact was known by D.G. Petitioner now alleges that D.G. told him to keep Cox's name out of the proceedings and to implicate codefendant Callihan, who would testify for the government pursuant to a plea agreement. Petitioner informed the government of this prior to the plea agreement on the perjury charge, but did not so inform the district court at the second (perjury) plea hearing. However, petitioner has attached affidavits from his father and wife in which the affiants claim to have heard D.G. telling petitioner to implicate Callihan before the first plea hearing. ⁴ I R. doc. 1, exs. A & B. Petitioner further claims that he is factually innocent of the perjury charge, and that D.G. did not pursue proper defenses on the perjury charge because of two conflicts of interest. These conflicts of interest include D.G.'s alleged personal involvement in suborning perjury at the first plea hearing and D.G.'s alleged representation of Cox's interests from the outset. D.G. has disputed similar allegations. ⁵

The magistrate recommended that the petition be denied without a hearing based upon a review of the pleadings in this case and in the underlying drug conspiracy and perjury cases. I R. doc. 7 at 2. See also R. 8(a) & (b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. The magistrate relied on the plea hearings in which petitioner twice expressed satisfaction with his counsel and indicated an understanding of the consequences of perjury. Relying upon Hedman v. United States, 527 F.2d 20, 22 (10th Cir.1975), the magistrate regarded petitioner's statements at the plea proceedings "as conclusive in the absence of a believable, valid reason justifying a departure from the apparent truth of the statements." I R. doc. 7 at 2. The magistrate concluded that "[p]etitioner's allegation that he was not represented by competent counsel is not supported by the plea transcript." Id. at 3. The magistrate did not consider the performance, prejudice or waiver implications of petitioner's allegation of attorney conflict. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980).

The magistrate's recommendation indicated that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D.Okla.R. 32(d), ⁶ "the parties are given ten (10) days from the above filing date [March 28, 1991] to file with the Clerk of Court any objections, with supporting brief." I R. doc. 7 at 4. See also R. 8(b)(2) & (3), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. The memorandum containing the magistrate's findings and recommendation failed to apprise petitioner of the consequences of failing to file objections, namely waiver of appellate review. On April 19, 1991, the district court noted that no objections had been filed and adopted the magistrate's recommendation.

Although we plainly have jurisdiction over this appeal, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253, 2255, we have adopted a firm waiver rule when a party fails to object to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate. Niehaus v. Kansas Bar Ass'n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (10th Cir.1986); Boyd Motors, Inc. v. Employers Ins., 880 F.2d 270, 271 (10th Cir.1989). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146, 106 S.Ct. 466, 470, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Our waiver rule provides that the failure to make timely objection to the magistrate's findings or recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. ⁷ The waiver rule as a procedural bar need not be applied when the interests of justice so dictate. Thomas, 474 U.S. at 155, 106 S.Ct. at 474. In this case, however, we need not decide whether the interests of justice exception applies.

We join those circuits that have declined to apply the waiver rule to a pro se litigant's failure to object when the magistrate's order does not apprise the pro se litigant of the consequences of a failure to object to findings and recommendations. Small v. Secretary, HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir.1986); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir.1985). See also 7 James W. Moore, Jo D. Lucas & Kent Sinclair, Jr., Moore's Federal Practice p 72.04[9.--6] (1991) & Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir.1991) (district courts should provide notice to pro se litigants of certain complex procedural issues). In proceedings in which a party appears without benefit of counsel, we shall exercise our supervisory power and require magistrates within the circuit to inform a pro se litigant not only of the time period for filing objections, but also of the consequences of a failure to object, i.e. waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the district court based upon the findings and recommendations of the magistrate. See Arn, 474 U.S. at 144, 155, 106 S.Ct. at 469, 474. Cf. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir.1981). This notice should be included in the text of the document containing the magistrate's findings and recommendations. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d at 6.

Turning to the merits of the appeal, § 2255 provides for an evidentiary hearing "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." In reviewing petitioner's claims, we must first decide whether "petitioner's allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief." United States v. Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1423 (10th Cir.1985). If so, the district court's summary denial of an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.

Notwithstanding the strong presumption of truth accorded petitioner's in-court statements at the perjury plea hearing, see Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977), the analysis relied upon by the district court is incomplete. The court below framed the ineffective assistance issue solely as one of attorney competence, and did not address the attorney conflict issues not only inherent in these facts, but also squarely presented by petitioner. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268-69, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1102, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) ("Courts and commentators have recognized the inherent dangers that arise when a criminal defendant is represented by a lawyer hired and paid by a third party, particularly when the third party is the operator of the alleged criminal enterprise."); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) ("Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing.").

A defendant making an ineffectiveness claim on a counseled guilty plea must identify particular acts and omissions of counsel tending to prove that counsel's advice was not within the wide range of professional competence. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369-70, 88 L.Ed.2d 203; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The defendant must also show prejudice, "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. The performance inquiry is made with deference to counsel's assistance, but in recognition that the validity of a guilty plea depends upon a defendant's knowing and voluntary choice among alternatives. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 369; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.

Notwithstanding the highly deferential review of counsel's performance required in an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant's right to counsel may be compromised by conflict. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 ("Counsel's function is to assist defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to...