Moore v. Wallace

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
• Writing for the Court: Jean C. Hamilton
• Decision Date: 26 March 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:10CV1107 JCH
• Citation: Moore v. Wallace, Case No. 4:10CV1107 JCH (E.D. Mo. Mar 26, 2013)
• Parties: ANTHONY CURTIS MOORE, Petitioner, v. IAN WALLACE, Respondent.

ANTHONY CURTIS MOORE, Petitioner,

v.IAN WALLACE, Respondent.

Case No. 4:10CV1107 JCH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

Dated: March 26, 2013

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Missouri State prisoner Anthony Curtis Moore's first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("§ 2254 Petition"). The matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition.

On April 26, 2007, Petitioner was convicted after a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, of two counts of murder in the first degree in connection with the suffocation deaths of his children. Petitioner was sentenced on May 25, 2007, to two concurrent terms of imprisonment of natural life without probation and parole. Petitioner's convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Moore, 264 S.W.3d 657 (Mo. App. 2008). Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15, which was denied as untimely filed. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Petitioner's post-conviction motion as time-barred. Moore v. State, 328 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2010).

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Southeast Correctional Center in Charleston, Missouri. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 18, 2010. (ECF No. 1). The Court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner on November 7, 2011 (ECF No. 25), and attorney Kevin L. Schriener filed the instant § 2254 Petition on Petitioner's behalf on May 23, 2012.(ECF No. 37). In his § 2254 Petition, Petitioner raises the following six claims for relief:

(1) That the trial court erred in overruling Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal, as there was insufficient evidence to refute Petitioner's affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect;

(2) That the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Petitioner's post-offense conduct on the issue of his mental health;

(3) That Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that trial counsel failed to call a neurologist to testify regarding the presence and import of a bilateral frontal subdural hematoma discovered in a CT scan taken just after the incident;

(4) That Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that trial counsel failed to present evidence regarding additional mental health treatment Petitioner may have received after the offenses and while in custody;

(5) That Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that trial counsel failed sufficiently to advise Petitioner regarding his right to a jury trial; and

(6) That Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, in that appellate counsel failed to challenge on appeal the trial court's improper admission of hearsay evidence during trial.

(§ 2254 Petition, PP. 5-32). The Court will address the claims in turn.

DISCUSSION¹

I. Ground 1

As stated above, in Ground 1 of his petition Petitioner asserts the trial court erred in overruling Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal, as there was insufficient evidence to refute Petitioner's affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. (§ 2254 Petition,PP. 5-13). Specifically, Petitioner faults the trial judge for finding that Petitioner acted with knowing deliberation, despite the testimony of two expert witnesses that Petitioner was not responsible for the deaths of his children. Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal of his convictions, and after reciting the background facts of the case in detail the Missouri Court of Appeals denied the claim as follows:

In his first point on appeal, Defendant² claims the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal because the defense established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant lacked responsibility for his actions because he suffered from a mental disease at the time of the charged criminal conduct.

Expert Witness Testimony

Dr. Bruce Harry, a forensic psychiatrist hired by the defense, examined Defendant approximately one year after the deaths of Toni and Kanyé. In Dr. Harry's opinion, Defendant suffered from Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified when he killed his children. Dr. Harry concluded that, as a result of this condition, Defendant was not able to appreciate the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the crimes.

Dr. Harry based his conclusion that Defendant suffered from a temporary psychotic disorder on Defendant's: 1) disorganized speech; 2) disorganized behavior, which included foaming at the mouth and wandering around; 3) commission of the crimes during daylight and in plain sight; 4) failure to try to clean himself; 5) characterization as "OBS violent" by law enforcement and the police officers' request for a CIT officer, an officer specialized in working with mentally ill individuals in severe distress; 6) refusal to yield to uniformed law enforcement officers in the face of lethal cover and threat of Taser application; and 7) almost immediate receipt of antipsychotic medication from EMS. Dr. Harry weighed these factors against those indicating that Defendant was able to understand the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of his actions, which included the following facts: 1) Defendant mostly submerged the children in the mud; 2) Defendant left the scene; 3) prior to his arrest, Defendant reportedly told one of his sisters, "She's dead"; and 4) upon being informed that his children were dead, Defendant responded, "I know." Dr. Harry concluded that these factors suggesting sanity and deliberation did not outweigh those indicating that Defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect excluding responsibility.

On cross-examination, Dr. Harry acknowledged that his "balancing test" did not take into account certain factors that suggested Defendant understood his actions. Dr. Harry admitted that the numerous steps Defendant took in committing the crimes—such as driving down the boat ramp, getting out of the car, carrying the children to the front of the vehicle, putting them down in the mud, and holding their faces in the mud—could indicate that Defendant knew what he was doing and had a plan and a purpose. Dr. Harry also conceded the possibility that Defendant manifested the psychotic behavior after committing the crimes. In other words, Defendant's psychotic behavior might have been triggered by the trauma of killing his children.

Dr. John Rabun, a forensic psychiatrist appointed by the court upon the State's motion for mental examination, also testified. Dr. Rabun performed his evaluation approximately two years after the crimes were committed. Like Dr. Harry, Dr. Rabun found that Defendant did not exhibit any signs of a mental disease or defect before he committed the crimes or at the time of his examination, and he concluded that Defendant suffered from Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified for the brief period of time during which he killed his children. On cross-examination, Dr. Rabun also acknowledged the possibility that Defendant knew at the time of the murders that his actions were wrong and then suffered a psychotic disorder caused by the trauma of killing his children.

Section 552.030.1 provides that a "person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect such person was incapable of knowing and appreciating the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of such person's conduct." Mo.Rev.Stat. § 552.030.1 (2008). Section 552.030.6 provides that:

All persons are presumed to be free of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility for their conduct.... The issue of whether any person had a mental disease or defect excluding responsibility for such person's conduct is one for the trier of fact to decide upon the introduction of substantial evidence of lack of such responsibility.... Upon the introduction of substantial evidence of lack of such responsibility, the presumption shall not disappear and shall alone be sufficient to take to the trier of fact.

Mo.Rev.Stat. § 552.030.6 (2008). The statute makes clear that when an individual commits a crime, the legal presumption of sanity is very strong. See e.g., State v. Bradshaw, 593 S.W.2d 562, 568 (Mo.App. W.D. 1979).

A successful insanity defense requires a defendant to first present substantial evidence that he lacked responsibility for the offense because he suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense. State v.Bass, 81 S.W.3d 595, 615 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002). Assuming the defendant satisfies this burden, he must then overcome the statutory presumption of sanity by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a mental illness that precluded him from appreciating the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of his criminal conduct. Id. The presumption that a defendant is free from mental disease or defect remains throughout the proceeding and alone is enough to sustain a finding of sanity even when a defendant presents substantial evidence to the contrary. Bradshaw, 593 S.W.2d at 568.

Even where a defendant presents substantial and uncontroverted evidence of a mental disease, a trial court is not required to grant a judgment of acquittal. The trial court is free to accept or reject Defendant's evidence of mental disease or defect. State v. Bell, 798 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Mo.App. S.D. 1990). As previously stated, in the absence of expert testimony that a defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or defect excluding responsibility at the time of the crime, the statutory presumption of sanity standing alone is substantial evidence to sustain a court's finding on this issue. State v. Lee, 654 S.W.2d 876, 881 (Mo. banc 1983).

A review of the record persuades us that there was substantial evidence in this case for the court to find Defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or defect excluding

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