Moore v. Williams

Decision Date30 September 2020
Docket NumberCivil Action No.: 1:19-cv-01648-JMC
PartiesToby Eugene Moore, Petitioner, v. Warden Charles Williams, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
ORDER AND OPINION

Petitioner Toby Eugene Moore, proceeding pro se,1 filed the instant Petition against Respondent Warden Charles Williams seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See ECF No. 1.)

This matter is before the court on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 24.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C.), the matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial handling. On June 22, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation in which she recommended that the court grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss with prejudice Petitioner's Habeas Petition. (See ECF No. 42 at 2, 30.) Petitioner filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation, which are presently before the court. (See ECF No. 44.) For the reasons set forth below, the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, GRANTS Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24), and DISMISSES Petitioner'sHabeas Petition (ECF No. 1) with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is an inmate presently incarcerated at the Allendale Correctional Institution in Fairfax, South Carolina. See SCDC Inmate Search, https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2020). On March 23, 2012, a state court jury found Petitioner guilty of four counts of attempted murder, trafficking in cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, possession with intent to distribute ("PWID") marijuana, PWID methamphetamine or cocaine base, and PWID cocaine base within one-half mile of a school. (ECF No. 23-1 at 485:9-486:12.) Thereafter, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to concurrent sentences of thirty (30) years in prison for each count of attempted murder, twenty-five (25) years for trafficking cocaine, fifteen (15) years for PWID cocaine base, ten (10) years for PWID cocaine base within a half-mile of a school, five (5) years for PWID marijuana, and five (5) years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. (See id. at 490:25-491:13.)

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the South Carolina Court of Appeals on April 2, 2012. (ECF No. 23-3 at 5.) He challenged the trial judge's refusal "to grant a directed verdict of not guilty on the drug charges of Trafficking Cocaine Greater than 28 grams, but less than 100 grams, Possession With Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine Within One-half (1/2) Mile of a School, Possession With Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine and Possession With Intent to Distribute Marijuana due to insufficient evidence of constructive possession." (ECF No. 23-2 at 4.) On January 22, 2014, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. SC Courts, https://www.sccourts.org/opinions//unpublicshedopinions/HTMLFiles/COA/2014-UP-025.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). The South CarolinaSupreme Court denied a petition for rehearing on April 10, 2014. (ECF No. 23-1 at 496-97.)

On July 10, 2014, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). (ECF No. 23-1 at 494-502.) He asserted in his PCR application that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. (Id. at 502.) The PCR court held an evidentiary hearing on June 6, 2016. (ECF No. 23-4 at 7.) "The PCR judge issued an order on May 23, 2017 denying Petitioner[]'s PCR application and dismissing it with prejudice." (Id. at 9.) "The [PCR] judge found [Petitioner] failed to satisfy his burden of proving 'either deficiency or prejudice' regarding trial counsel's failure to object to the jury charge." (Id.)

Petitioner appealed the denial of his PCR application to the South Carolina Supreme Court. (ECF No. 23-4 at 1.) In his petition for writ of certiorari, Petitioner raised the issue of whether the PCR judge erred "in not finding trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the trial judge's instruction to the jury: 'Your sole objective is to simply reach the truth in the matter,' which was burden shifting and instructed the jury to use the incorrect truth standard instead of the correct reasonable doubt standard which was prejudicial to Petitioner Moore[.]" (Id. at 3.) The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred the PCR appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals on July 9, 2018. (ECF No. 23-6 at 1.) The South Carolina Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for certiorari on December 12, 2018. (ECF No. 23-7 at 1.) The South Carolina Court of Appeals remitted the matter to the lower court on January 2, 2019. (ECF No. 23-8 at 1.)

On June 7, 2019, Petitioner timely2 filed the instant Habeas Petition challenging his state court convictions. (See ECF No. 1 at 1.) Specifically, Petitioner states in the Petition that he is entitled to relief based on the following grounds:

1) Unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)], where critical stage of the criminal proceeding counsel failed to object to [the trial judge's] supplemental jury instruction which violated the [Sixth] and [Fourteenth] Amendment[s] of the . . . Constitution;
2) Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceeding violated [Sixth] Amendment of United States Constitution;
3) Search warrant affidavit for a no-knock search warrant contained false statements that were made knowingly and intentionally to establish probable cause in violation of Franks [v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)], violated the United States Constitution under the [Fourth] and [Fourteenth] Amendments; and
4) Ms. Jones (trial counsel) failed to have the State produce the confidential informant (CI) which clearly violates the [Sixth] Amendment of the United States Constitution.

(ECF No. 1-2 at 1-16 (verbatim).) Respondent filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on September 16, 2019. (See ECF No. 24.) Petitioner filed his Response to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on October 25, 2019. (See ECF No. 34.)3

On June 22, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued the Report and Recommendation at issue concluding that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted, and that Petitioner's Habeas Petition should be dismissed with prejudice. (See ECF No. 42 at 30.) On July 6, 2020, Petitioner filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation. (See ECF No. 44.)

The court considers the merits of Petitioner's Objections to the Report and Recommendation below.

II. JURISDICTION

The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides that a federal district court has jurisdiction to entertain a § 2254 Habeas Petition when the petitioner is "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court . . . in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Report and Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The recommendation has no presumptive weight and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. See id. The court reviews de novo only those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objections are filed.4 See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005). The court reviews those portions which are not specifically objected to only for clear error. See id. at 316. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

B. Summary Judgment Generally

Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A genuine question of material fact exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court finds that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, 650 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir. 2011). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the non-moving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). The non-moving party may not oppose a motion for summary judgment with mere allegations or denial of the movant's pleading, but instead must "set forth specific facts" demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir. 1991). All that is required is that "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

C. Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

State prisoners have a statutory right to seek habeas relief in federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). However, a court's review of a § 2254 petition filed after April 24, 1996, is limited by provisions of The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Because Petitioner filed his petition after...

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