Moore v. Woonsocket St. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 February 1906
• Citation: 27 R.I. 450,63 A. 313
• Parties: MOORE v. WOONSOCKET ST. R. CO.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

63 A. 313

27 R.I. 450

MOORE

v. WOONSOCKET ST. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 2, 1906.

Trespass on the case for negligence, by Henry Moore against the Woonsocket Street Railway Company. A judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, and defendant moved for a new trial. Granted.

Argued before DOUGLAS, C. J., and DUBOIS, BLODGETT, JOHNSON, and PARKHURST, JJ.

John W. Hogan and John J. Mee, for plaintiff. John J. Heffernan and James H. Rickard, Jr., for defendant.

PARKHURST, J. This is an action of trespass on the case for alleged negligence of the defendant, whereby the plaintiff was deprived of the services and society of his wife, Catherine Moore. It appears in evidence that on the evening of July 9, 1904, the plaintiff's wife was a passenger on one of the defendant's cars and was injured by a fall while alighting. The case made by the plaintiff's witnesses was that, desiring to alight and not being able to attract the attention of the conductor, who was in the front of the car collecting fares, Mrs. Moore pulled the bell cord herself; that the car came to a full stop and she proceeded to alight; that while she was upon the running board, preparing to step to the ground, the usual starting signal of two bells was given, the motorman in response thereto started the car, and she was thrown to the ground. No one testified who it was who gave the starting signal, and there is no evidence that' the motorman or conductor knew, or had reason to know, either that Mrs. Moore desired to alight or that she was in fact attempting to alight at the time of the accident. On the other hand, the defendant's witnesses testified that the car was moving at a uniform speed of three or four miles per hour from the last stopping place until after Mrs. Moore fell, and that, after vainly signaling to the conductor, she voluntarily left the car while it was in motion. The motorman testified that he did not hear any signal to stop or start the car just before the accident, and the conductor testified that he did not hear any signal given to stop the car, nor was any signal to start the car given to his knowledge. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $4,500. The defendant petitions for a new trial, upon the grounds: (1) That the verdict is contrary to the evidence; (2) that the verdict is contrary to the law; (3) that the damages are excessive; (4) that the judge erred in excluding testimony offered by the defendant; (5) that the judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the defendant; ((5) that the defendant has discovered new evidence.

1. The defendant, by its engineer, without objection, placed in evidence a plan showing the street where the accident occurred, with its intersecting streets, track, location of "white poles," and other details, and showing various measurements of distances between "white poles," etc. The defendant then proceeded, in the course of its testimony, to inquire of the motorman who ran the car in question at the time of the accident, "Did the company have any established stopping places on Social street?" which was ruled out, on objection by plaintiff's attorney, on the ground that the defendant should not be allowed to prove its own rules as a defense in the action. As shown by the arguments on the question of admissibility in the record, the purpose of this question was to lead up to an explanation of the meaning of the "white poles" already shown to exist, their relation to the rules as to operating cars, and to show what were the rules of the defendant as to stopping and starting cars, and that this explanation was offered for the purpose of giving to the jury full knowledge of the conditions under which this car was being run at the time of the accident, as a circumstance proper to be considered by the jury in weighing conflicting testimony as to the causes of the accident. We think the trial court erred in excluding this testimony. It would have been proper to allow the defendant to explain fully what was the meaning of the "white poles," shown upon the plan. As this matter was left, by the exclusion of this testimony, without explanation, we cannot know what would have been shown; but it left a matter of apparent importance in a state of uncertainty which may have confused the...