Moorehead v. District of Columbia

Decision Date16 March 2000
Docket NumberNo. 97-CV-881.,97-CV-881.
PartiesDonzell W. MOOREHEAD, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Andrew P. McGuire, for appellant.

Sheila Kaplan, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Jo Anne Robinson, Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Rena K. Schild, Assistant Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before TERRY, STEADMAN, and SCHWELB, Associate Judges.

TERRY, Associate Judge:

Appellant Moorehead seeks reversal of the trial court's pre-trial dismissal of his claims against the District of Columbia on several grounds. First, he contends that the issue of whether a special police officer licensed by the District is an agent of the District for purposes of respondeat superior is a question for the jury, and that the court therefore should not have dismissed his respondeat superior claim before trial. Second, he asserts that there was a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether the police officer who arrested him had probable cause, thereby precluding summary judgment on this claim. Third, he maintains that the court abused its discretion when it refused to grant his motion for an extension of time to designate an expert under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 26(b)(4). We affirm.

I

On December 7, 1994, Special Police Officer ("SPO") Rodney Brown was working in a Rite-Aid Pharmacy in the District of Columbia when a customer informed him that another person, appellant Moorehead, was stealing bottles of Tylenol from the shelves. According to Mr. Brown, when Moorehead left the store, the anti-theft alarm sounded, indicating that he had taken merchandise from the store without paying for it. Brown pursued Moorehead out of the store but was unable to catch him. As Moorehead fled, however, he dropped his gym bag; Brown retrieved it and took it back inside the store.

Brown inspected the contents of the bag in an office at the rear of the store, but he did not find any bottles of Tylenol or other items that appeared to be store properly. However, by the time Mr. Brown returned to the floor, Moorehead had come back to the store and was asking for his gym bag. Brown approached Moorehead and demanded that he return the stolen items; Moorehead in turn demanded the return of his bag. In the shoving match that ensued, SPO Brown, using his baton, knocked Moorehead to the ground and handcuffed him.1 As a result of the altercation between the two, Moorehead allegedly suffered injuries to his leg and head. Brown was uninjured, but the condition of his uniform indicated that he had been in a struggle.

Moments later, Officer James Koons and other members of the Metropolitan Police arrived at the store in response to a call about an assault with a dangerous weapon. SPO Brown explained to Officer Koons that a customer had seen Moorehead stealing merchandise and that the store's alarm had sounded when Moorehead went out the exit door. Brown also told Officer Koons that Moorehead had resisted when he tried to detain him. Koons thereupon placed Moorehead under arrest for assault, but apparently not for shoplifting (the record is not entirely clear on this point, but the complaint contains no allegation of a shoplifting arrest).2

Several months later, Moorehead filed this personal injury action against the District of Columbia, Officer Koons, and "several unknown Metropolitan Police officers." His claims against the District were twofold. First, he asserted that the District was liable for SPO Brown's "attack" on him, based on theories of respondeat superior and negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Second, he claimed that the District was liable for false imprisonment and for negligent hiring, training, and supervision of Officer Koons and the other officers involved in his arrest, and that the District and the officers were liable for conspiracy to violate his civil rights.3

The District filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that a special police officer such as Brown "is neither an employee nor an agent of the District such that a plaintiff injured by a special police officer can allege negligent hiring, training and supervision of that officer, or common law torts based upon a respondeat superior theory." Despite Moorehead's insistence that Brown's relationship to the District was a question of fact that could not be decided summarily, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the portion of the complaint against the District that was based on the actions of SPO Brown. The court concluded that D.C.Code § 4-114 (1994), which authorizes the Mayor to appoint special police officers, "is a licensing statute which does not create an agency relationship between the person licensed and the District of Columbia, nor does common law."

Some time later the District filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims for false arrest and deprivation of civil rights, arguing essentially that Officer Koons had probable cause to arrest Moorehead. Moorehead again responded that the issue of probable cause was an issue of fact for the jury because Officer Koons had failed to investigate adequately the circumstances of the incident before arresting him. The court found Moorehead's argument unpersuasive, since he had made no showing that further investigation would have negated probable cause. It ruled that "the undisputed facts establish that Officer Koons had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for assault, or at the very least a reasonable, good faith belief that he was acting lawfully in doing so." It therefore granted the motion for summary judgment. On appeal Moorehead challenges both rulings, as well as the trial court's denial of his motion to extend the time for designating an expert witness under Rule 26(b)(4).

II

With respect to SPO Brown's conduct, Moorehead's claims against the District are based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.4 "In order to succeed under the respondeat superior theory of liability, appellant must show that a master-servant relationship existed between [Brown] and [the District], and that the incident at issue occurred while [Brown] was acting within the scope of his employment." Giles v. Shell Oil Corp., 487 A.2d 610, 611 (D.C.1985). The trial court held, and we agree, that there is no basis on the essentially undisputed facts of this case for imposing respondeat superior liability on the District.

We hold, first of all, that Moorehead's reliance on Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857 (D.C.1973) (en banc), is misplaced because this case involves a special police officer rather than a regular police officer. In Wade this court held "that the District of Columbia may be sued under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior for the intentional torts of its employees acting within the scope of their employment." Id. at 863.5 The "employees" involved in Wade were District of Columbia police officers, who allegedly assaulted and falsely arrested the plaintiff. Rejecting the District's defense of immunity, we reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case for trial. Moorehead places heavy reliance on Wade and urges us to follow it here. We cannot do so because the issue which lies at the heart of this case — whether the alleged tortfeasor was an agent of the District — was uncontested in Wade. There was no dispute that the police officers in Wade were employees of the District, acting within the scope of their employment. See id. at 859. Special police officers, however, unlike regular police officers, are not as a matter of law agents of the District of Columbia. While there may be cases in which the particular facts show that a special police officer is an agent of the District,6 this is not such a case.

"Whether a master-servant (or principal-agent) relationship exists in a given situation `depends on the particular facts of each case.'" District of Columbia v. Hampton, 666 A.2d 30, 38 (D.C.1995) (quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Kelly, 448 A.2d 856, 860 (D.C.1982)).7 This court considers several factors when determining whether there is such a relationship:

(1) the selection and engagement of the servant, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to discharge, (4) the power to control the servant's conduct, (5) and whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer.

Hampton, 666 A.2d at 38 (quoting Le-Grand v. Insurance Co. of North America, 241 A.2d 734, 735 (D.C.1968)); see also Beegle, supra note 7, 679 A.2d at 485; Giles, 487 A.2d at 611-612; Safeway Stores, 448 A.2d at 860. Of the five, "`the determinative factor' is usually the fourth: `the right to control an employee in the performance of a task and in its result, and not the actual exercise of control or supervision.'" Hampton, 666 A.2d at 38-39 (quoting Safeway Stores, 448 A.2d at 860).

In striving to demonstrate a principal-agent relationship between the District and SPO Brown. Moorehead relies on various similarities between the duties and powers of special police officers and those of regular police officers.8 He reasons that since the District is liable for the intentional torts and negligence of police officers acting within the scope of their employment, see Holder v. District of Columbia, 700 A.2d 738, 741-742 (D.C.1997)

; Wade, 310 A.2d at 863, it must also be liable for the tortious conduct of special police officers, such as Brown, who share many of the same responsibilities and duties. But despite the similarities, there are also numerous differences distinguishing special police officers from regular police officers,9 some of which are crucial to the master-servant analysis. See Hampton, 666 A.2d at 38-39.

First, although the District (through the Mayor) appoints special police officers, the corporation or individual for whom the appointee works must apply for the...

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