Moorer v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 16 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:11cv397/LAC/EMT |
| Parties | DEREK L. MOORER, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72.1(A), 72.2(D) and 72.3 of this court relating to review of administrative determinations under the Social Security Act ("Act") and related statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. It is now before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Act for review of a final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34, and for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83.
Upon review of the record before this court, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the findings of fact and determinations of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence; thus, the decision of the Commissioner should be affirmed.
On January 11, 2007, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, and in both applications he alleged disability beginning January 4, 2005, although he later amended his alleged onset dateto December 10, 2006 (Tr. 17).1 Plaintiff's applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, and thereafter he requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). A hearing was held on February 2, 2010, and on February 25, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision in which she found Plaintiff "not disabled," as defined under the Act, at any time through the date of her decision (Tr. 17-25). The Appeals Council subsequently denied Plaintiff's request for review (see Tr. 1). Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner, subject to review in this court. Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007). This appeal followed.
In her decision dated February 25, 2010, the ALJ made the following findings relative to the issues raised in this appeal (see Tr. 17-25):
Review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence from the record and was a result of the application of properlegal standards. Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991) (); see also Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). "A determination that is supported by substantial evidence may be meaningless . . . if it is coupled with or derived from faulty legal principles." Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991). As long as proper legal standards were applied, the Commissioner's decision will not be disturbed if in light of the record as a whole the decision appears to be supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322; Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439; Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but not a preponderance; it is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)); Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439. The court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986).
The Act defines a disability as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To qualify as a disability the physical or mental impairment must be so severe that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, "but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g),3 the Commissioner analyzes a disability claim in five steps:
1. If the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled.
2. If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, his impairments must be severe before he can be found disabled.
3. If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity and he has severe impairments that have lasted or are expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, and if his impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed disabled without further inquiry.
4. If the claimant's impairments do not prevent him from doing his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
5. Even if the claimant's impairments prevent him from performing his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that accommodates his RFC and vocational factors, he is not disabled.
The claimant bears the burden of establishing a severe impairment that keeps him from performing his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512. If the claimant establishes such an impairment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show the existence of other jobs in the national economy which, given the claimant's impairments, the claimant can perform. MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 1986). If the Commissioner carries this burden, the claimant must then prove he cannot perform the work suggested by the Commissioner. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987).
A. Personal History
Plaintiff was born on July 13, 1977, and thus was twenty-nine years of age on the date he alleges he became disabled (Tr. 36). He has a high school education and past relevant work as a stocker, reamer, utility helper, buffer, and roofing helper, which work he performed at "light" to "very heavy" levels of exertion (Tr. 23).
On January 4, 2005, Plaintiff was injured at work and complained of back pain (Tr. 21). Approximately four months later he underwent a functional capacities evaluation, which resulted in a determination that Plaintiff could return to work and work at a medium level of exertion (Tr. 21, 304). Plaintiff thus returned to work in mid-May 2005, and he continued working until November 20, 2006 (Tr. 209-10, 224-25). On December 10, 2006, he was involved in a motor vehicle accident ("MVA"), and his DIB and SSI claims are based on injuries sustained in the MVA (see Tr. 21).
B. Relevant History Regarding Medical Treatment and Prescription Medications Plaintiff saw Raymond R. Fletcher, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, on twelve occasions between February 2005 and July 2006 for treatment related to his January 2005 work injury and associated workers' compensation claim (see Tr. 378-82). Dr. Fletcher's treatment records reflect that Plaintiff was prescribed various medications, including Davocet, Skelaxin, Lortab, and Flexeril (see, e.g., Tr. 379); they further reflect that Plaintiff reported no side effects from any of his prescribed medications (see Tr. 378-82). Plaintiff also presented to an emergency room ("ER") four times while under Dr. Fletcher's care. On March 6, 2005, Plaintiff presented with complaints of back pain and reported he had run out of his prescribed pain medications (Tr. 453). ER staff discharged Plaintiff with a prescription for tramadol and recommended that he obtain followup treatment (presumably with Dr. Fletcher) (Tr. 456). Plaintiff made similar complaints at an ER visit on June 20, 2005, and stated he had run out of Lortab and Darvocet (Tr. 447, 449). He was released with prescriptions for Ultracet, Flexeril, and Naprosyn and advised to followup with Dr. Fletcher (Tr. 450). Plaintiff returned with complaints of back pain on October 13, 2005, and was released by ER staff with prescriptions for Naprosyn and Ultracet (Tr. 445). Finally, on April 6, 2006, Plaintiff again presented to the ER with complaints of back pain (Tr. 430). Upon discharge, Plaintiff was advised to take over-the-counter Motrin, Advil, or Tylenol, as the attending physician did not feel comfortable prescribing...
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