Moose v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Decision Date | 26 August 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 96-P-596,96-P-596 |
Citation | 683 N.E.2d 706,43 Mass.App.Ct. 420 |
Parties | , 120 Ed. Law Rep. 562 Garret MOOSE v. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY & others. 1 |
Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Daryl J. Lapp, Boston, for defendants.
Daniel J. Johnedis, Woburn, for plaintiff.
Before PORADA, SMITH and IRELAND, JJ.
The plaintiff, Garret Moose, filed a negligence action against the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and two of its track and field coaches, Paul Slovinski and Halston Taylor, seeking damages for injuries sustained while Moose was practicing pole vaulting at the institution. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent with respect to their coaching techniques and the equipment they furnished to him at the time he was injured. In response to special questions a jury found that each defendant, as well as the plaintiff, was negligent and that the defendants' negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The jury assessed damages at $615,000. The percentages of negligence were attributed as follows: plaintiff--fifteen percent, MIT--forty-five percent, Taylor--twenty-five percent, Slovinski--fifteen percent. The court entered judgment in the sum of $522,750 after deducting fifteen percent from the award for the plaintiff's negligence. The judgment provided that MIT's liability was $20,000 plus interest and costs because it was a charitable organization.
After the verdicts, the defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts or, in the alternative, for a new trial, a remittitur, or an amendment of the judgment. The judge denied the defendants' motion, and on appeal, the defendants claim error. The defendants also contend that the judge committed error by excluding certain evidence and by refusing to apportion the damage award and amend the judgment by deleting interest.
1. Denial of defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts. When considering a judge's denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this court's task is to determine "whether 'anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.' " Raunela v. Hertz Corp., 361 Mass. 341, 343, 280 N.E.2d 179 (1972), quoting from Kelly v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 315 Mass. 301, 302, 52 N.E.2d 411 (1943). "We do not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses." Conway v. Smerling, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 3, 635 N.E.2d 268 (1994), citing Rubel v. Hayden, Harding & Buchanan, Inc., 15 Mass.App.Ct. 252, 254, 444 N.E.2d 1306 (1983). "Evidence that contradicts the testimony of the nonmoving party is to be ignored." Conway v. Smerling, 37 Mass.App.Ct. at 3, 635 N.E.2d 268, citing Bennett v. Winthrop Community Hosp., 21 Mass.App.Ct. 979, 982, 489 N.E.2d 1032 (1986). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the jury could have found the following facts.
Pole vaulting is a sport in which the object is to obtain the maximum vertical lift in order to clear a horizontal bar set at some height above the ground. In competition after vaulters have cleared the bar, it is then adjusted upwards until a winner emerges.
To be able to go over the bar, a vaulter takes an approach run towards the bar carrying a long pole. When the vaulter gets near to the bar, he places one end of the pole into the vaulting box--an indentation in the ground almost directly beneath the bar. The box slants downward at the bottom and has metal sides. Once the pole is planted in the box, the vaulter uses the momentum from his approach run to bend the pole. When the pole bends back, the vaulter is lifted upwards and hopefully over the bar. Once over the bar, the vaulter lands on a foam mattress called the landing pit which cushions the vaulter's fall.
The defendant Slovinski, who had been the pole vaulting coach since November, 1990, was coaching Moose at the time of the accident. The defendant Taylor was head track and field coach and responsible for supervising Slovinski's activities as pole vaulting coach. Taylor's functions as head track and field coach included supervising the sports equipment in order to make sure it was safe, recommending the purchase of new equipment, and providing a safe environment for MIT track athletes.
In January of 1991, the plaintiff was a senior at MIT, majoring in aeronautical engineering. He was also a member of MIT's men's track and field team and had been involved in pole vaulting since the spring of his freshman year. On January 21, 1991, the day of the accident, the plaintiff was practicing pole vaulting under Slovinski's direct supervision at MIT's indoor track and field facility. The plaintiff was injured when after executing a pole vault, his heels hooked on the back edge of the landing pit and he fell backward, striking his head on the hard track surface. The back of the pit abutted the indoor track; the back left corner of the pit was two to three inches from the inside lane of the indoor track and the right rear corner was about two feet from the running surface. The track was made of concrete, covered with a thin layer of rubber.
The pit was purchased in 1980 and was thirteen feet in length; the minimum length required by NCAA rules was twelve feet with a recommended length of sixteen feet. Pits with more length were available since at least 1981 but a budgeting crisis at MIT affected the track team and the coaches' ability to purchase new equipment. About a year and one-half after the accident, Taylor had the pit replaced with one that was seventeen feet long.
Both Slovinski and Taylor had witnessed, or at least were aware of, vaulters bouncing off the pit mattress and landing over the sides and front of the pit resulting in the vaulter sustaining second impact injuries. The day of the accident there were no pads at the back or sides of the pit, although in the past, the coaches had placed pads on the sides and sometimes at the back of the pit. Slovinski was aware that some colleges used supplemental padding at the back of the pit. Prior to the accident, Taylor never discussed the padding issue with Slovinski. At the time of the accident, supplemental padding was available and Taylor could have ordered that pads be placed in the area at the back of the pit. 2
On January 21, 1991, pursuant to Slovinski's instructions, the plaintiff was using a training pole to practice pole vaulting drills. There was evidence that the training pole that was being used by the plaintiff was too light for the plaintiff's weight. 3 The selection of a soft training pole for a heavy, fast athlete places the athlete at serious risk of a "blow through." 4
After performing a number of drill techniques, Slovinski instructed the plaintiff to combine two of the vaulting techniques and go through the full vaulting motions. The approach run for these vaults was fifty feet and the plaintiff was to make his approach at about one-half his normal speed. Slovinski told the plaintiff to use the same training pole for the full vaults.
The plaintiff performed the first two of the full vaults. After he performed each vault, Slovinski gave him pointers on his performance. Before each vault, except the last one, Slovinski told the plaintiff to keep his speed down. However, after at least one of these vaults, he landed on the center of the pit, beyond where he should have landed. That landing indicated that he needed either to use a heavier pole, raise his grip, or shorten his approach run. Although proper coaching technique requires that these adjustments be made, Slovinski did not order any of these adjustments nor did he warn the plaintiff that he was overpenetrating.
A coach who is teaching proper pole vaulting techniques should have a vaulter under observation during the vaulter's entire approach run. Once a coach notices that a vaulter is running too fast, the coach should order the vaulter to abort the vault. In the past, other coaches had interrupted the plaintiff's vaults at various stages due to safety concerns, including when he was twenty-five feet into the vault approach run.
Slovinski did not observe the plaintiff's final approach run until the plaintiff had completed twenty-five feet of that run. When Slovinski first observed the plaintiff, he thought the plaintiff was running too fast, and he knew the plaintiff was going to make a bad vault. Slovinski did not instruct the plaintiff to slow down or to abort his vault.
When the plaintiff made the vault, he went up about thirteen feet; when he landed, his heels hooked on the back edge of the pit and he fell backward, striking his head on the hard track surface. Immediately after the accident, Taylor found the plaintiff lying on the track unconscious and convulsing.
The plaintiff was taken to Massachusetts General Hospital where he was diagnosed as having sustained a skull fracture with associated contusions to the brain. While the plaintiff was hospitalized, Slovinski visited him and told him that he was having nightmares and he felt that the accident was his fault. Slovinski also told the plaintiff that when he saw him on his final approach it occurred to him that he had not reminded him to keep his speed down, but he did not say anything to the plaintiff because he did not want to break the plaintiff's concentration.
On appeal, the defendants claim that they are entitled to judgments notwithstanding the verdicts, because there was no evidence to support a finding that they should have reasonably foreseen that the plaintiff would land beyond the back of the pit and hit his head on the track surface.
The defendants appear to have misinterpreted the law pertaining to reasonable foreseeability. It is only the risk which results in the harm that must be reasonably foreseeable, not the precise...
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