Moraca v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 21 February 1974
• Citation: 132 N.J.Super. 117,332 A.2d 607
• Parties: Thomas MORACA, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Evelyn Moraca, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR CO., a corporation of the State of Delaware, and Merlin Motor Co., a corporation of the State of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 117

132 N.J.Super. 117

332 A.2d 607

Thomas MORACA, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Evelyn Moraca, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR CO., a corporation of the State of Delaware, and Merlin Motor Co., a corporation of the State of

New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents.

Superior Court of New Jersey,

Appellate Division.

Argued Oct. 29, 1973.

Decided Feb. 21, 1974.

Thomas F. Connery, Jr., Camden, for plaintiff-appellant (Brown, Connery, Kulp, Wille, Purnell & Greene, Camden, attorneys).

Arthur Montano, Camden, for defendant-respondent Ford Motor Co. (Kisselman, Deighan, Montano & Summers, Camden, attorneys).

A statement in lieu of brief for defendant-respondent Merlin Motor Co. was filed by David G. Eynon, Haddenfield (Farrell, Eynon & Munyon, Haddenfield, attorneys).

Before Judges LEONARD, ALLCORN and CRAHAY.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LEONARD, P.J.A.D.

This is an automobile products liability case. Following a jury trial, plaintiff Thomas Moraca appeals from a judgment of no cause of action in favor of defendants and against him.

On November 27, 1967 plaintiff, on behalf of a corporation controlled by him, purchased a new 1968 Lincoln Continental 4-door sedan from defendant Merlin Motor Co. (Merlin). On February 5, 1968 the vehicle was returned to Merlin for a 6000 mile checkup, although the mileage thereon was only 4370 miles. Plaintiff experienced no mechanical trouble from the time he took delivery of the automobile until May 28, 1968, the day of the accident here involved. At that time the car had been driven approximately 11,000 miles.

Approximately 11 A.M. on the day in question, plaintiff left his place of business in Cherry Hill, New Jersey, with the intention of driving to Ocean City, Maryland, a distance of about 150 miles. He first stopped at a gas station immediately adjacent to his office. The station attendant, finding that the power steering fluid was very low and that no fluid showed on the dip-stick, added approximately one-third of a quart of transmission oil to the power-steering reservoir. Plaintiff then proceeded south on the New Jersey Turnpike, crossed into Delaware and continued in the same direction on Route 13.

At the scene of the accident, Route 13 curves gradually to the right. When plaintiff entered this curve, he estimated he was traveling 45 miles per hour in the right lane of the dual highway. The speed limit at the location was 60 M.P.H. It was raining rather heavily at the time.

Just after entering the curve, plaintiff heard a noise, which he described as a 'gink' in the front end of the vehicle. Immediately following, the car began to Slide to the right. The front wheels felt as if they were locked and the steering wheel would not respond to plaintiff's efforts. It would not turn even though plaintiff exerted force with both hands. The car traversed the 12 foot right shoulder and into a contiguous field, where it continued in a side-slide down the highway for about 42 feet. It struck a tree located 3 feet from the outside edge of the shoulder. The front portion of the vehicle came to rest against the tree and the remaining part about 30 feet away.

Plaintiff testified that he took his foot off the accelerator when the slide started and did not thereafter increase his speed. He also stated that he did not think he had his foot on the brake as he was attempting to turn the locked steering wheel.

As a result of the accident plaintiff suffered serious personal injuries.

Sometime after the accident, the two sections of the Continental were returned to this state and following notice to both defendants, the power steering system was disassembled in the presence of representatives and experts of all parties.

At trial plaintiff produced two experts. They substantially agreed in their testimony that there existed two manufacturing defects in the power steering sector shaft of plaintiff's automobile. The first was a rough area along on side of the bearing surface on the lower portion of the shaft, where it would come into contact with the seal. The second was that the sector shaft itself was bent. Both opined that the first would abrade the seal, causing it to eventually fail, resulting in loss of power steering fluid. The second would cause the shaft to rotate in an eccentric fashion, in turn causing the lip of the seal to be stretched so that it would allow power steering fluid to spurt out. Additionally, the first expert testified that as a result of the loss of oil level, the power steering unit would instantaneously lock, making it impossible for a person of ordinary strength to control it. It was his further opinion that the two described defects, with the accompanying loss of oil, were the cause of the instant malfunction, and of the resultant accident.

Defendant in turn offered three experts who contradicted plaintiff's witnesses. They denied the loss or leakage of power steering fluid or damage to the seals. In their opinion the bend in the sector shaft was due to the accident impact.

At the close of the trial, plaintiff submitted to the court the following written requests to charge:

Nor is the plaintiff required to establish the specific defect that existed in the product. Rather, in order to recover for breach of warranty, the plaintiff must present evidence from which it is reasonable to infer or conclude that more probably than not, the harmful event ensued from some defect in the product, whether the defect is identifiable or not, and that the defect arose out of the design or manufacture of the product or while it was in the control of the defendant, and that the defective product proximately caused injury or damage to the plaintiff.

A breach of warranty may be established where the total effect of the circumstances shown from purchase to accident is adequate to raise an inference that the product was defective and that such condition was causally related to the mishap that occurred.

Both were denied on the ground that they were 'included' in the main charge.

The case was submitted to the jury on the basis of four special interrogatories, the last pertaining to damages. The pertinent three follow:

1. Do you find any defect in the automobile operated by plaintiff making it unfit for its intended use, which was a proximate cause of the circumstances resulting in plaintiff's injuries?

If your answer is 'NO' to question #1, you need not answer question #2. If your answer is 'YES' then answer question #2.

2. Did such defect exist at the time the automobile left the control of the manufacturer, Ford Motor Co.?

3. Do you find the plaintiff, Thomas Moraca, guilty of negligence which constituted a substantial factor in contributing to the happening of the circumstances, resulting in plaintiff's injuries?

If you answer 'YES' to questions #1 and #2, and 'NO' to question #3, then answer #4. If your answer is 'NO' to question #1 or YES' to question #3, you need not answer question #4.

After a period of deliberation, the jury returned and queried, 'If the first question is answered 'no' but we also answer question #3 'no' can Ford circumstantially be held responsible and Mr. Moraca awarded damages?'.

Plaintiff's counsel renewed his request for a specific charge on 'circumstantial evidence.' This was denied and counsel excepted. Thereafter, the jury returned, answering special interrogatories #1 and #3 in the negative. The court thereupon entered a verdict of no cause of action in favor of both defendants and against the plaintiff.

In this appeal plaintiff contends that since in a product liability action, circumstantial evidence of a malfunction or defect is sufficient to support a finding for an injured plaintiff, the trial court erred in twice refusing to charge his two requests.

Defendants, on the other hand, although they do not deny that liability in this type of a case can be supported by circumstantial evidence of a defect, contend that plaintiff has the burden of proving that the product was defective as alleged, and that the defect was a proximate cause of the malfunction and resultant accident. They further assert that the resolution of these issues was for the jury and in the instant case the jury resolved them against plaintiffs. Finally, they claim the charge as a whole was sufficiently broad to include 'a fundamental equivalent' to a charge on circumstantial evidence.

In this State, in the application of the doctrine of strict liability in tort, evidence of some specific defect or design, manufacture or workmanship as the cause of a malfunction resulting in the injury is not an essential of plaintiff's burden of proof. The 'total effect of the circumstances shown from purchase to accident is adequate to raise an inference that the car was defective and that such condition was causally related to the mishap.' Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 409, 161 A.2d 69, 97 (1960). Although the existence of a defect cannot be found on the basis of mere conjecture or guess, yet it is not necessary to exclude every other possible cause which the ingenuity of counsel might suggest. The finding of strict liability may be circumstantially supportable. Id. at 411, 161 A.2d 69. Thus 'whenever the facts permit an inference that the harmful event ensued from some defect (whether identifiable or not) in the product, the issue of liability is for the jury'. Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 59 N.J. 365, 366, 283 A.2d 321 (1971), affirming 113 N.J.Super. 279, 273 A.2d 606 (App.Div.1971). See also Rose v. Port of New York Authority, 61 N.J. 129, 136--137, 293 A.2d 371 (1972); Corbin v. Camden Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 N.J. 425, 435--436, 290 A.2d 441 (1972). Cf. M. Dietz & Sons, Inc. v. Miller, 43 N.J.Super. 334, 128 A.2d 149 (App.Div.1957).

Here, the facts testified to by plaintiff permitted such an inference--that the malfunction in the steering apparatus of his automobile was causally related to some defect of design, manufacture or...