Morales v. City of Delano

Decision Date14 February 2012
Docket NumberNo. 1:10–CV–1203 AWI JLT.,1:10–CV–1203 AWI JLT.
Citation852 F.Supp.2d 1253
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
PartiesManuela Cancino Contreras MORALES and R.A.M., a minor, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF DELANO; Mark P. Derosia; Jose Mejia; Shaun Manuele; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

852 F.Supp.2d 1253

Manuela Cancino Contreras MORALES and R.A.M., a minor, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF DELANO; Mark P. Derosia; Jose Mejia; Shaun Manuele; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 1:10–CV–1203 AWI JLT.

United States District Court,
E.D. California.

Feb. 14, 2012.


[852 F.Supp.2d 1258]


Mark Richard Pachowicz, Law Offices of Mark Pachowicz, Lanny Mark Tron, Tron & Tron, Camarillo, CA, for Plaintiff.

Jon Farrell Hamilton, Kimberly Anne Wah, Ferguson Praet and Sherman, Santa Ana, CA, for Defendants.


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE PARTIES' CROSS–MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

ANTHONY W. ISHII, Chief Judge.

This is an action for damages arising out of the death of Ruben Mesa Morales (“Decedent”) as a result of a gunshot wound inflicted by Jose Mejia (“Mejia”), a reserve officer of the City of Delano Police Department, acting in the course and scope of his employment. The action is brought by Manuela Cancino Contreras Morales individually and as successor in interest of Decedent and by R.A.M., a minor child of Decedent by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Manuela Morales (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). In the currently-operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiffs allege a total of seven claims for relief against defendants City of Delano, Mark P. Derosia (“Derosa”), Delano Chief of Police, Mejia and Shaun Manuele (“Manuele”), a City of Delano police officer.

[852 F.Supp.2d 1259]

Defendants Derosa, Meja and Manuele (the “individual Defendants”) are each sued in both their individual and official capacities. Currently before the court is Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on a portion of their first claim for relief. Document # 46. Also currently before the court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment as all claims against all Defendants. Document # 42. Federal question jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper in this court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Although most of the facts alleged in the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are sharply disputed, a short list of stipulated facts has been submitted from which a general picture of the events giving rise to this action can be drawn. Decedent married Plaintiff Morales in Zacatecas, Mexico in 2000. They had one child together, R.A.M., who was born in the United States in Georgia. Decedent is a veteran of the United States military and lived in a converted garage apartment (hereinafter, the “apartment”) that was attached to a house owned by Maria and Gabriel Nunez in Delano, California. Except for the birth of R.A.M. in Georgia, Plaintiffs have continuously resided in Zacatecas, Mexico. Decedent was paying a monthly rent of $500.00 per month to Maria and Gabriel Nunez at the time of his death.

Shortly after midnight on July 7, 2009, Mrs. Nunez returned home with her three children and noted that the front door was open and lights were flickering inside her home. After calling her husband at work, she called 9–1–1. Police officers arrived shortly thereafter. Mrs. Nunez was approached by Officer Felix, a non-party to this action, as Mrs. Nunez stood on the sidewalk in front of the residence. Mrs. Nunez, who spoke only Spanish, told Officer Felix that she rented a portion of her home to a person. Officer Felix was not certified as Spanish speaking by the Delano Police Department. Although there is some dispute over the details, it is generally not disputed that officers Mejia and Manuele were deployed to the back yard of the residence after which other officers entered the house by the front entrance. While the parties do not disputed that one of the responding non-party officers, Officer Felix, was told there was a renter who lived on the property in the apartment, it is sharply disputed whether Mejia or Manuele knew, or should have known, of the presence of Decedent in the apartment.

Although it is not entirely clear to the court whether the apartment can be accessed from the front of the house, there is no dispute that the apartment cannot be accessed from the inside of the main part of the house. It is not disputed that Mejia and Manuele entered through an unlocked doorway in the backyard leading into Decedent's apartment. It is not disputed that Mejia fired a single shot from his service pistol that struck Decedent and that the gunshot would ultimately resulted in Decedent's death. It is not disputed that Decedent was unarmed at the time of his shooting.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The original complaint in this action was filed on June 30, 2010. The currently operative SAC was filed on August 6, 2010. Plaintiffs' SAC alleges a total of seven claims for relief; four claims are alleged pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the remaining three are alleged pursuant to California common law for wrongful death, battery and negligence, respectively. Although Plaintiffs' first claim for relief is set forth as a single claim against officers Mejia and Manuele, it actually alleges violation of Decedent's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments on

[852 F.Supp.2d 1260]

four separate legal theories; unlawful warrantless search, unlawful use of force, unlawful denial of Decedent to access to medical care necessitated by Defendants' actions, and falsification of evidence in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive Decedent to access to courts. Plaintiffs' second claim for relief alleges the violation of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment right to the companionship and support of Decedent. Plaintiffs' first and second claims for relief are alleged against Mejia and Manuele.

Plaintiffs' third claim for relief is alleged against City of Delano pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Plaintiffs' fourth claim for relief is alleged against Police Chief DeRosa in his individual capacity and the City of Delano for supervisory liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief for wrongful death under California common law is alleged against all defendants; the sixth claim for relief alleges common law battery against Mejia only, and the seventh claim for relief alleges negligence against Mejia and Manuele.

The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication were filed on September 23, 2011. Each party filed an opposition to the motion of the other party on October 24, 2011. The parties filed their respective replies on October 31, 2011. The hearing on the cross motions was vacated and the matter was taken under submission as of November 7, 2011.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir.1985); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir.1984).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Although the party moving for summary judgment always has the initial responsibility of informing the court, the nature of the responsibility varies “depending on whether the legal issues are ones on which the movant or the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.” Cecala v. Newman, 532 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1132–1133 (D.Ariz.2007). When the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party must carry its initial burden at summary judgment by presenting evidence affirmatively showing, for all essential elements of its case, that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc); Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir.1986); see also E.E.O.C. v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir.2002) (stating that if “party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proof on an issue, he cannot prevail unless the evidence that he provides on that issue is conclusive.”)


If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to

[852 F.Supp.2d 1261]

the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir.1979). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348;First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575;Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir.1973). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e.,...

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