Morales v. Coca-Cola Co., 4D01-1795.

• Decision Date: 13 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 4D01-1795.,4D01-1795.
• Parties: Sabas Flores MORALES and Justina Leone Morales, Appellants, v. The COCA-COLA COMPANY, a foreign corporation; Manuel C. McKenzie, individually; Collis Faniel, individually; Faniel Harvesting, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

813 So.2d 162

Sabas Flores MORALES and Justina Leone Morales, Appellants, v. The COCA-COLA COMPANY, a foreign corporation; Manuel C. McKenzie, individually; Collis Faniel, individually; Faniel Harvesting, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.

No. 4D01-1795.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 13, 2002.

Rehearing Denied April 25, 2002.

Roy D. Wasson of Wasson & Associates, Miami, and Robert E. Gordon of Gordon & Doner, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellants.

Michael V. Elsberry of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A., Orlando, for appellees.

WARNER, J.

This appeal arises from a summary final judgment in favor of The Coca-Cola Company in a negligence action. The court granted summary judgment on the basis that Coca-Cola was not the owner of the vehicle in which appellant was injured, even though Coca-Cola was the record title owner. Because we conclude that the affidavits in support of the motion did not satisfy Coca-Cola's burden of showing the absence of beneficial ownership of the vehicle, we reverse.

According to the allegations of the complaint, Sabas Flores Morales, appellant, was injured when a goat truck he was driving went out of control, ran off the road, and flipped, causing him serious injuries. A goat truck is a vehicle used in the citrus harvesting business. He initially brought suit against Manuel McKenzie and his businesses, claiming that McKenzie owned the truck and that his injuries were the result of McKenzie's negligent maintenance of the vehicle. However, after limited discovery, Morales' counsel learned that Coca-Cola was the record title holder of the vehicle. He thus amended his complaint to add a count alleging that Coca-Cola was the owner of the vehicle, according to the records of the State of Florida. As record title owner, Coca-Cola had a duty to insure that the vehicle was properly maintained and was liable to the plaintiff under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.¹

Coca-Cola denied that it owned the vehicle and, pursuant to a motion for summary judgment, filed an affidavit from its former vice president. The vice president stated that he was responsible for the negotiation and sale of The Coca-Cola Florida Grove Properties, including those in St. Lucie County. He attached to the affidavit a copy of the agreement for sale and stated that the purchase took place on December 30, 1993, and all assets used by Coca-Cola in its grove properties were transferred to Running W Citrus Limited Partnership, including all goat trucks. After that date, the company maintained no interest in any of the assets which had been transferred as part of the sale, and Running W took control of all of the assets transferred to it. He concluded by stating that "I am certain that The Coca-Cola Company transferred any interest it had in that vehicle to Running W Citrus Limited Partnership as of December 30, 1993, and exercised no ownership or control over it after that date."

In response, Morales filed records from the State of Florida showing that the vehicle was registered to Coca-Cola, but the registration had expired in 1985. The records also identified Coca-Cola as the owner of the vehicle as recently as March 16, 2001. Nevertheless, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Coca-Cola, concluding that the company had rebutted the presumption of ownership created by record title with the affidavit of the vice president which demonstrated that The Coca-Cola Company had transferred its ownership of the vehicle as of December 30, 1993, long before the accident in this case occurred. Morales appeals the judgment.

This case involves Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The dangerous instrumentality doctrine, as applied to motor vehicles, is unique to Florida. We recently explained the development of the doctrine:

Under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the owner of a motor vehicle is liable to third persons for injuries caused by the negligent operation or use of the motor vehicle by the person to whom the owner entrusted the vehicle. See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 637 (1920). The doctrine is based upon the view that motor vehicles are dangerous instrumentalities when operated upon the public highways; consequently, the owners of motor vehicles are obligated to ensure that their vehicles are properly operated when on the public highway under their authority. See Barth v. Miami, 146 Fla. 542, 1 So.2d 574 (1941). Since adopting the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in 1920, Florida courts have repeatedly applied the doctrine, with very few exceptions. Recently, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the important public policies underlying its adoption. See Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla.2000)

(quoting Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990)). As Justice Grimes wrote in Kraemer:

The dangerous instrumentality doctrine seeks to provide greater financial responsibility to pay for the carnage on our roads. It is premised upon the theory that the one who originates the danger by entrusting the automobile to another is in the best position to make certain that there will be adequate resources with which to pay the damages caused by its negligent operation. If Florida's traffic problems were sufficient to prompt its adoption in 1920, there is all the more reasons for its application to today's high-speed travel upon crowded highways.

572 So.2d at 1365.

Dockery v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 796 So.2d 593, 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(footnote omitted). The question of who is liable as an owner under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine continues to be refined by the courts. In Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 63 (Fla.2000), the court stated:

Legal title remains the most common basis for imposing vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. However, a narrow exception for the legal title owner to escape vicarious liability has been recognized where the holder of "mere naked title" is able to demonstrate the absence of beneficial ownership of the vehicle.

The court further noted that absent a sales agreement, the circumstances where an entity holding legal title could disclaim beneficial ownership and not be found vicariously liable were "extremely limited." Id. at 64. Where a defendant contests ownership, in order for the defendant to meet its burden on summary judgment, it must "conclusively show that there [are] no genuine issues of material fact with regard to their ownership" of the vehicle or their consent to its use. Medina v. Yoder Auto Sales, Inc., 743 So.2d 621, 622 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

Coca-Cola grounded its denial of beneficial ownership on the fact that it had sold the goat truck to Running W in the global sale of its citrus business pursuant to the Agreement of Sale dated December 30, 1993. However, the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement are in conflict with the statements in the affidavit. The Asset Purchase...