Morales v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 10 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:18-cv-2108-MSS-JSS |
| Parties | BRIAN M. MORALES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Morales petitions for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and challenges his state court conviction for unlawful sexual activity with a minor. After reviewing the petition (Doc. 1) and the response and appendix (Docs. 8 and 8-2), it is ORDERED that the petition is DENIED.
Morales pled guilty to unlawful sexual activity with a minor. He did not have the benefit of a plea agreement. (Doc. 8-2 at 8-14) The trial court sentenced Morales to 72 months in prison followed by 24 months of community control and 36 months of sex offender probation. (Doc. 8-2 at 18, 21-26) The trial court granted Morales's motion to mitigate his sentence under Rule 3.800(c), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and modified his sentence to 48 months in prison followed by 24 months of community control and 60 months of sex offender probation. (Doc. 8-2 at 28-30, 33-34) Morales did not appeal.
Morales moved for post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 8-2 at 36-50) The post-conviction court dismissed the claims as facially insufficient with leave to file an amended motion. (Doc. 8-2 at 52-56) Morales failed to file an amended motion, and the post-conviction court denied all claims with prejudice. (Doc. 8-2 at 90-91) Morales appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 8-2 at 130-31 and 135)
Also, Morales moved to correct his sentence under Rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Doc. 8-2 at 139-51), which motion the post-conviction court denied. (Doc. 8-2 at 153-55) Morales appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 8-2 at 180-81, 187)
Finally, Morales filed a second Rule 3.850 motion. (Doc. 8-2 at 191-99) The post-conviction court denied the motion, Morales appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 8-2 at 206-13, 277, 295) Morales's timely federal petition followed.
Because Morales filed his federal petition after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, AEDPA governs his claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to require:
A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the U.S. Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. Clearly established federal law refers to the holding of an opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
"[AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). An unreasonable application is "different from an incorrect one." Id. Even clear error is not enough. Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S. Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017). A federal petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
Morales asserts ineffective assistance of counsel — a difficult claim to sustain. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) explains:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
"There is no reason for a court . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. "[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. "[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
"An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. A reasonable probability is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Strickland cautions that "strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. A defendant cannot meet his burden by showing that the avenue chosen by counsel was unsuccessful. White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992). Because the standards under Strickland and AEDPA are both highly deferential, "when the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so." Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. "Given the double deference due,it is a 'rare case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding.'" Nance v. Warden, Ga. Diag. Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
The state appellate court affirmed in an unexplained decision the post-conviction court's order denying Morales's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Doc. 8-2 at 295) A federal court "'look[s] through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume[s] that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Because the post-conviction court recognized that Strickland governed the claim (Doc. 8-2 at 207-08), Morales cannot meet the "contrary to" test in Section 2254(d). Morales instead must show that the state court either unreasonably applied Strickland or unreasonably determined a fact.
A petitioner must exhaust the remedies available in state court before a federal court can grant relief on habeas. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The petitioner must (1) alert the state court to the federal nature of his claim and (2) give the state court one full opportunity to resolve the federal claim by invoking one complete round of the state's established appellate review process. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971). The state court must have the first opportunity to review and correct any alleged violation of a federal right. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A federal court may stay — or dismiss without prejudice — a habeas action to allow a petitioner to return to state court to exhaust a claim. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). If the state court would deny the claim on stateprocedural grounds, the federal court instead denies the claim as procedurally barred. Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991)).
Also, the failure to comply with a state procedural rule governing the proper presentation of a claim generally bars review of that claim on federal habeas. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. "However, a state court's rejection of a federal constitutional claim on procedural grounds will only preclude federal review if the state procedural ruling rests upon [an] 'independent and adequate' state ground." Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). A state court's procedural ruling rests on an independent and adequate state ground if (1) the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly relies on a state procedural rule to resolve the federal claim without reaching the merits of the claim, (2) the state court's decision rests solidly on state law grounds and is not intertwined with an interpretation of federal law, and (3) the state procedural rule is not applied in an "arbitrary or unprecedented fashion," or in a "manifestly unfair" manner. Judd, 250 F.3d at 1313 (citing Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1990)).
A petitioner may secure excusal of a procedural default on...
To continue reading
Request your trial