Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc.
Decision Date | 28 August 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 07-3806.,07-3806. |
Citation | 541 F.3d 218 |
Parties | Juan MORALES v. SUN CONSTRUCTORS, INC., Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Emile A. Henderson III (Argued), Law Offices of Yvette D. Ross-Edwards, Frederiksted, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, for Appellee.
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
This case requires us to determine whether an arbitration clause in an employment agreement is enforceable where one party is ignorant of the language in which the agreement is written.
Juan Morales (Morales) was employed by Sun Constructors, Inc. (Sun). The employment relationship between Morales and Sun was governed by a signed employment agreement (the Agreement) that contained an arbitration clause. Morales was terminated by Sun, and he filed a wrongful termination suit against his former employer in the District Court of the Virgin Islands. Sun moved to stay the proceedings pending arbitration, but the District Court denied the motion, finding that Morales signed the Agreement without realizing it contained an arbitration clause. The Agreement was written in English, a language Morales cannot understand, and the District Court concluded that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because Morales did not assent to the clause. On appeal, Sun argues that Morales is bound by the entire Agreement, even if he is ignorant of its terms. We agree and will reverse the decision of the District Court and remand the case with instructions to enter a stay pending arbitration.
Appellee Morales is a Spanish-speaking welder who resides in St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands. Welders like Morales were in high demand by appellant Sun, and Morales acknowledged: Appendix (App.) 114, 121. On April 15, 2004, after Morales had passed a written exam, in English, Sun hired him and required him to attend a 2 1/2-hour orientation conducted entirely in English and to sign an hourly employment agreement. Five paragraphs of the Agreement (paragraphs 12 through 16) pertained to arbitration and covered nearly 8 of the 13 pages of the Agreement. App. 126-38. The Sun employee who conducted the orientation, Mr. Langner, asked Jose Hodge (Hodge), a bilingual applicant who was also present at the orientation, and whom Morales knew, to explain to Morales what Langner was saying and help him fill out the documents. App 83, 69. Hodge testified that he generally understands about eighty-five percent of what is said and written in English. App. 94. He also stated that Morales did not ask him what he was signing and that he did not specifically explain the arbitration clause to Morales, App. 69, 94. Mr. Langner stated that he did explain the arbitration provisions in English and that, during the orientation, Hodge was speaking to Morales in a foreign language. App. 82-83. The Agreement governed the employment relationship between Morales and Sun for the entirety of the relationship.
On April 6, 2005, Sun fired Morales for allegedly dumping a bottle of urine from a great height on another contractor's employees in violation of safety standards. Morales filed a wrongful termination suit against Sun in the District Court on December 20, 2006, seeking relief under eight causes of action all covered by the Agreement's arbitration clause. The District Court determined that mutual assent to the arbitration clause did not exist and denied Sun's motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C. § 16 and exercise plenary review over the District Court's denial of Sun's motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration. To the extent that the District Court based its decision on findings of fact, however, we review for clear error. See Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 247 F.3d 44, 53-54 (3d Cir.2001).
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, provides that arbitration agreements are "enforceable to the same extent as other contracts," and "establishes a strong federal policy in favor of the resolution of disputes through arbitration." Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir.2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, "arbitration provisions may be attacked under `such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.'" Plaskett v. Bechtel Int'l, Inc., 243 F.Supp.2d 334, 339 (D.V.I.2003) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
When determining "whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter ... courts generally ... should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). In the absence of contrary Virgin Islands law, this case is governed by the rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of law approved by the American Law Institute. See 1 V.I.Code Ann. § 4 (2007); Barclays Invs., Inc. v. St. Croix Estates, 399 F.3d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 2005).
It is well-settled under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (the Restatement) that mutual assent between parties is necessary for the formation of a contract. See Restatement § 17; see also Univ. of V.I. v. Petersen-Springer, 232 F.Supp.2d 462, 469 (D.V.I.2002) () (quoting Restatement § 17). While mutual assent "is sometimes referred to as a `meeting of the minds,'" Restatement § 17 cmt. c, this phrase must not be construed too literally. Acceptance is measured not by the parties' subjective intent, but rather by their outward expressions of assent. As the Restatement explains:
The parties to most contracts give actual as well as apparent assent, but it is clear that a mental reservation of a party to a bargain does not impair the obligation he purports to undertake. The phrase used here, therefore, is "manifestation of mutual assent."
The Supreme Court has observed: "It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained." Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50, 23 L.Ed. 203 (1875). The "integrity of contracts demands" that this principle "be rigidly enforced by the courts." 1 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 4:19 (4th ed.2008). As one noted treatise explains:
According to the objective theory of contract formation, what is essential is not assent, but rather what the person to whom a manifestation is made is justified as regarding as assent. Thus, if an offeree, in ignorance of the terms of an offer, so acts or expresses itself as to justify the other party in inferring assent, and this action or expression was of such a character that a reasonable person in the position of the offeree should have known it was calculated to lead the offeror to believe that the offer had been accepted, a contract will be formed in spite of the offeree's ignorance of the terms of the offer. The most common illustration of this principle is the situation when one who is ignorant of the language in which a document is written, or who is illiterate, executes a writing proposed as a contract under a mistake as to its contents. Such a person is bound, in the absence of fraud, if the person does not require the document to be read to him....
Id. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kwetkauskas, 63 F.2d 890, 891 (3d Cir.1933) ( ); Hoshaw v. Cosgriff, 247 F. 22, 26 (8th Cir.1917) ( ). Arbitration agreements in the employment context are not exempt from this principle. See, e.g., Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 315 F.Supp.2d 94, 101 (D.D.C.2004) ( ).
Morales, in essence, requests that this Court create an exception to the objective theory of contract formation where a party is ignorant of the language in which a contract is written. We decline to do so. In the absence of fraud, the fact that an offeree cannot read, write, speak, or understand the English language is immaterial to whether an English-language agreement the offeree executes is enforceable. See Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch Maschinen, 972 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir.1992) ( ); Shirazi v. Greyhound Corp., 145 Mont. 421, 401 P.2d 559, 562 (1965) ( ); Paulink v. Am. Express Co., 265 Mass. 182, 163 N.E. 740, 741 (1928) (...
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