Morales v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co.
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana |
| Writing for the Court | BOUTALL |
| Citation | Morales v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 246 So.2d 52 (La. App. 1971) |
| Decision Date | 08 March 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 4261,4261 |
| Parties | Sara Gendusa MORALES v. TOYE BROS. YELLOW CAB COMPANY and Coy D. Blackwell. |
Francipane, Regan, Post & Pee', Philippi P. St. Pee', Metairie, for plaintiff-appellant.
Charles F. Ferrara, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, Charles F. Seemann, Jr., New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.
Before REDMANN, STOULIG, and BOUTALL, JJ.
Sara Gendusa Morales instituted this suit on behalf of herself and her two minor children, seeking damages for the wrongful death of her husband, Joseph Morales, who was killed as the result of being struck by a taxi cab operated by Coy D. Blackwell and owned by Toye Brothers Yellow Cab Company, both named defendants in the instant case.
A jury found for defendants and plaintiffs perfected this appeal.
The undisputed facts are that the accident occurred on November 6, 1967, at approximately 10:40 p.m., in the 3400 block of the Airline Highway in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. The decedent, Joseph Morales was struck by a taxi cab operated by Coy Blackwell. Morales was killed instantly.
Dr. Monroe Samuels, who assisted in the autopsy, testified at the trial that the alcoholic level in Morales' bloodstream was 0.23%, sufficient to impair his judgment.
Prior to the accident, Blackwell was operating the taxi in the left or neutral ground lane of the southbound roadway. Decedent was crossing the highway from west to east, in an area where there was no intersection nor a pedestrian crossing.
In the vicinity of the accident, the Airline Highway has two roadways, one southbound (toward New Orleans) and one northbound. Each roadway is 31.5 feet wide, and has three marked traffic lanes; the roadways are separated by a neutral ground 5.7 feet wide, making a total width of 68.7 feet.
The report of the investigating police officer, who arrived on the scene shortly after the accident, indicates that the situs of the accident was poorly lit. The only street light was on the northbound side of the highway. From further examination of the trial record, the officer's testimony is that 'this street light was so weak that even standing directly under it I had to use my flashlight to prepare my report'. The only other lighting was from some lights illuminating signs on the bar from which decedent apparently came, and a night light at a commercial establishment some 240 feet from the location of the accident. Added to these lighting conditions, at the time of the fatality, are the headlights of the taxi cab and another vehicle in the center lane, traveling in the same southbound direction. The report further indicates that there were clear weather conditions on the night of the accident and the decedent was wearing dark clothing.
There are, of course, a number of disputed facts which arose from conflicting testimony of the various witnesses. There are conflicts as to the range and field of vision of the defendant driver, as to the visibility of the pedestrian because of the lighting conditions and type of clothing worn by him, and as to the activity of the pedestrian and degree of care exercised by the defendant to avoid him. These conflicts required the jury to consider the credibility of the witnesses in resolving them. Obviously they were resolved by the jury in favor of the defendant, and the verdict should not be set aside unless there is manifest error.
The counsel for plaintiff urges that there are several errors of such gravity as to require setting aside the verdict. His first specification of error is that the trial judge erred in charging the jury on the doctrine of sudden emergency, arguing that on the facts of the case the doctrine should not apply. This premise is not acceptable. The court's duty in framing the charge is to explain the law applicable to the case as a whole and applicable to all the contingent factual conclusions before the jury. It is the jury's duty in fact finding to assess the applicability of a charge to the merits of the case.
Here there was some evidence that decedent had already reached the highway median and stepped back into defendant's path. If the jury believed this evidence, it might properly have applied the sudden emergency doctrine. Additionally, there was some evidence indicating that decedent may have stepped from a hidden position in front of a preceding vehicle into defendant's lane of travel. Such evidence would bolster the necessity of the charge. Under such circumstances, we feel that the trial judge properly exercised his function by instructing the jury of the legal consequences of a finding that the defendant was confronted with a sudden emergency.
The plaintiff also contends that the trial judge erred in his refusal to give certain special charges on the doctrine of last clear chance. Plaintiff submitted to the court four special charges involving the doctrine of last clear chance and discovered peril. These are not numbered but appear in the record as Tr. 115, 116, 117, and 118. In particular, at the trial, plaintiff objected to refusal to give the entire charge contained in document Tr. 116, complete with quotations from two cases.
An examination of the trial judge's charge, as it appears in the record, convinces us that he gave a proper and complete statement of the law consistent with the evidence presented in the case. In fact his charge largely paraphrases the two requested charges in Tr. 115 and 116, omitting only the quotations from two prior cases. His charge, in part, reads:
This is a sufficient statement of the point of law involved. Franicevich v. Lirette, 241 La. 466, 129 So.2d 740 (1961); Tauzier v . Bondio, 237 La. 516, 111 So.2d 756 (1959); Soileau v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 160 So.2d 793 (La.App.3rd Cir., 1964); Campisi v . Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 152 So.2d 88 (La.App.3rd Cir., 1963).
The special charges which were refused were, in effect, included in the judge's general charge, and there is no error apparent. Hanford v. Jan C. Uiterwyk Company, 214 So.2d 236 (La.App.4th Cir., 1968); Guerra v. W. J. Young Construction Company, 165 So.2d 882 (La .App.4th Cir., 1964).
The plaintiff further urges that the verdict of the jury did not conform to the evidence. The plaintiff argues that the evidence shows that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the decedent.
The operative factor in the instant case is whether decedent's peril was sufficiently apparent to the motorist at a time when the motorist had a clear chance to avoid the accident. The plaintiff argues that the first duty on an operator of a motor vehicle is to keep a sharp lookout ahead to discover the presence of those who might be in danger, citing the following line of cases: Belshe v. Gant, 235 La. 17, 102 So.2d 477 (1958); Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860, 181 So. 195 (1938); Rottman v. Beverly, 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1935).
While we do not disagree with the above cited cases, they are distinguishable from the instant case. For the defendant to be liable his negligence must be established.
The evidence is undisputed that the defendant Blackwell was operating his vehicle prudently, well within the speed limit, prior to the accident. There is not the slightest hint that, prior to the accident, his conduct violated any statute, ordinance or rule of motor vehicle operation.
The only possible ground of negligence is that the defendant failed to observe plaintiff in the roadway prior to the time he began to enter Blackwell's lane. Blackwell testified that there was another vehicle ahead of the taxicab in the center lane, which vehicle obstructed his view of the decedent until moments before Morales entered the taxi's lane, at which time he diligently attempted to avoid...
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...to render it probable that justice has not been done and that a re-examination would vary the result.'" In Morales v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 246 So.2d 52, 57 (La.App. 4 Cir.1971), the trial court denied a motion new trial, finding that "a full and complete record has been made up. A new......
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...Cir.1974), nor must a judge give requested special charges where they were included in the general charges. Morales v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 246 So.2d 52 (La.App. 4th Cir.1971), writ refused, 258 La. 772, 247 So.2d 867 The trial court did not err in refusing to grant plaintiff's specia......
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93-2418 La.App. 4 Cir. 5/17/94, Carmen v. Gonzalez
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