Morales v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.
| Decision Date | 14 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-CV-1171 (SVN) |
| Parties | ANGEL MORALES, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT and HARTFORD HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
ORDER AND RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Angel Morales brings this pro se action arising from a dispute with Defendants, the Housing Authority of the City of Hartford (“HACH”) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). Morales and his family were living in a house owned by the City of Hartford and built by HACH through federal funding obtained from HUD. After an administrative proceeding with HUD Morales filed the present complaint against HACH and HUD. Specifically, he alleges that HACH discriminated against him by refusing to let him buy the house from the City, in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988. While Plaintiff's claims against HUD are less clear, it appears he may be challenging the outcome of the administrative proceeding HUD conducted.
Both Defendants have moved to dismiss. HUD seeks to dismiss all claims against it as barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Alternatively, HUD contends that the complaint fails to state a claim against it because Morales alleges virtually nothing about HUD's involvement in the events at issue. HACH argues that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief against it because the claims, as pleaded, are time-barred and inadequately alleged. For the following reasons, the claims against both Defendants are dismissed.
The facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint contains relatively sparse factual allegations. Specifically, it states only:
This background is supplemented with the following facts detailed in the administrative decision pertaining to this matter, which HACH submitted to the Court for consideration along with its motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 14-1. However, the Court declines to take judicial notice of these facts. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a court may judicially notice a fact only when it is “not subject to reasonable dispute” because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. “Because the effect of judicial notice is to deprive a party of the opportunity to use rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument to attack contrary evidence, caution must be used in determining that a fact is beyond controversy under Rule 201(b).” Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998). While it would be proper for the Court to take judicial notice “to establish the fact of” earlier administrative proceedings “and related filings,” it cannot take judicial notice of the “truth of the matters asserted” in the other proceeding, as HACH requests here. Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991); Cabrera v. Schafer, 178 F.Supp.3d 69, 7273 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (). The facts detailed in the administrative decision are therefore simply set forth here as background.
Since 1999, Morales' family has been living in a single-family house in a low-income public housing community in Hartford. Compl., ECF No. 1, at 2. The house was built by HACH through federal funding from HUD, and certain HUD regulations dictated who was qualified to live in the house. ECF No. 14-1 at 16, 19. Morales alleges that, when his family first occupied the house, they were told by the former Executive Director of HACH that they would be able to purchase the house after renting it for five years. Compl. at 2. Morales alleges that his parents were not permitted to buy the house five years later as promised, but that HACH informed them that “they would be ‘grandfathered' into a policy where if they passed, [Morales] would be able to remain in the home.” ECF No. 14-1 at 12.
In May of 2019, HACH approved Morales to live in the house as a live-in aide for his mother, the qualified tenant. Id. at 19. In agreeing to serve as a live-in aide for his mother, Morales certified that he “[w]ould not be living in the unit except to provide supportive services” and was “not included on the lease,” nor was he “considered a member of the household[.]” Id. at 15. Following his mother's death in November of 2020, Morales continued to live in the house and mailed rent checks to HACH. Id. In February of 2021, HACH sent Morales a letter returning the rent checks and directing him to vacate the house immediately because he was not a qualified tenant. Id. at 16. Upon receipt of this letter, Morales spoke to an attorney at HACH and requested to buy the house, but HACH denied the request. Id. at 13.
Soon thereafter, Morales filed a complaint with HUD's Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, contending that he should be permitted to buy the house as his family was previously promised. Id. at 19. Morales further alleged that HACH's refusal to sell him the house was discriminatory and retaliatory in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“Title VI”), and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (the “FHA”) (together, the “Civil Rights Acts”). ECF No. 14-1 at 5. HUD investigated Morales' allegations pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 1 et seq., implementing Title VI, and 24 C.F.R. § 103 et seq., implementing the FHA. HUD ultimately concluded that HACH did not discriminate or retaliate against Morales or otherwise fail to comply with federal civil rights law. ECF No. 14-1 at 20-22. HUD also found that Morales' retaliation claim failed because it was time-barred and alleged neither protected activity nor a causal link between the alleged protected activity and the adverse action. Id. at 21.
Following resolution of the administrative proceeding, Morales filed the present complaint against HACH and HUD, claiming that they violated the Civil Rights Acts. Compl. at 1-3. Specifically, he alleges that Defendants discriminatorily applied “terms,” “conditions,” and “privileges”; discriminatorily refused to rent, sell, negotiate, and “deal” with respect to the subject property; denied him housing; and discriminated against him due to his criminal history. Id. He also alleges that HACH retaliated against him because he had previously complained about an employee. Id. He seeks a Court order directing Defendants to sell the house to him. Id. at 4.
Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 13, 19. HUD moves to dismiss all claims against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on the ground that Morales' claims against it are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.[1] ECF No. 19. HACH argues that Morales' allegations are time-barred and fail to state a claim against it upon which relief can be granted based on the sparse factual allegations of the complaint. ECF No. 13. For his part, Morales filed two opposition briefs, although they do not address Defendants' specific arguments. ECF Nos. 26, 28. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants both motions to dismiss.
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). “Issues of sovereign immunity are properly addressed in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Gristede's Foods, Inc. v. Unkechuage Nation, 660 F.Supp.2d 442, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Garcia v. Akwesasne Hous. Auth., 268 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2001)). A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists. Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113.
“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). While “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature,” Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113, the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity are “nonetheless wholly distinct,” Presidential Gardens Assocs. v. United States, 175 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also C.H. Sanders Co. v. BHAP Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 903 F.2d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1990) (...
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