Morales v. Venegas Constr. Corp.
| Decision Date | 15 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 13–1904MEL. |
| Citation | 99 F.Supp.3d 238 |
| Parties | Pablo L. Matías MORALES, Plaintiff, v. VENEGAS CONSTRUCTION CORP., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Alfredo Acevedo–Cruz, Alfredo Acevedo–Cruz Law Office, Juana Diaz, PR, for Plaintiff.
Javier Font–Alvelo, Garcia & Font CSP, Aibonito, PR, Polonio Garcia–Pons, Garcia & Font CSP, Ponce, PR, for Defendant.
On December 11, 2013 Pablo L. Matías Morales (“plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Venegas Construction Corporation (“defendant”), alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (the “ADEA”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 (“Law 100”), and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 (“Article 1802”) and unlawful discharge in violation of P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185a (“Law 80”). ECF No. 1. Pending before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's response in opposition. ECF Nos. 21; 22. For the reasons that follow defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
II.Summary of Uncontested Facts1
Plaintiff began working for defendant in August of 1965, when he was hired as a Heavy Equipment Operator.2 ECF No. 21–1, ¶ 4; 22–1, at 1, ¶ 4. Over the course of his employment with defendant plaintiff operated numerous types of heavy equipment machines and vehicles. ECF No. 22–1, at 7, ¶ 1. Generally, when one piece of heavy equipment broke down the vehicle's operator could be transferred to operate another machine, if work were available. Id.
In June or July 2012, plaintiff was assigned to work on a construction project that involved demolishing a hotel at Cayo Largo, in Fajardo, Puerto Rico. ECF Nos. 1, ¶ 9; 5, ¶ 9; 22–1, at 7, ¶ 2. In this role plaintiff worked under the supervision of Eng. Luis Feliciano Medina (“Feliciano”). ECF Nos. 21–1, ¶ 7; 22–1, at 2, ¶ 7. Defendant was the subcontractor for the Cayo Largo project and was required by the contractor, a demolition company known as R4 Company, to supply the heavy machinery and employees to accomplish the project. ECF Nos. 21–1. ¶ 5–6; 22–1, at 1–2 ¶ 5–6. All of the equipment at the Cayo Largo worksite “suffered problems” and required maintenance. ECF Nos. 22–1, at 9, ¶ 5. Plaintiff was routinely assigned to the Caterpillar model 235 excavator machine (the “CAT 235”) to perform demolition; the CAT 235 was known as “the Matías machine.” ECF Nos. 21–1. ¶ 5–6; 22–1, at 1–2, ¶ 5–6. Id.
In early September 2012, while plaintiff was performing demolition work with the CAT 235 excavator for the Cayo Largo project, the excavator broke down when a rod got caught underneath the excavator and damaged the excavator's “starter” and “temperature cable.” Id. ¶ 3; ECF No. 25–1, at 10: 10–15. After a new starter was purchased and installed, plaintiff was ordered to continue performing demolition with the CAT 235. ECF No. 22–1, ¶ 5. On September 17, 2012, the radiator in the CAT 235 clogged and the excavator overheated, requiring repairs. Id.
On September 19, 2012, the date of plaintiff's 73rd birthday, plaintiff was assigned to operate another excavator with a hammer installed on its arm in order to demolish a beam that was approximately 40 to 50 feet high. ECF Nos. 1, ¶ 14; 5, ¶ 14; 21–1, ¶ 11; 22–1, at 4 ¶ 11, at 10 ¶ 6. Plaintiff wanted to demolish one of the sides before pushing the beam to fall over, and he told Feliciano that hitting the beam in its center could cause the beam to fall on plaintiff and/or to break the hammer. ECF No. 22–1, at 10 ¶ 6. Feliciano ordered plaintiff to hit the center and plaintiff obeyed him. Id. While plaintiff was demolishing the beam, the hammer strut of the excavator broke. ECF Nos. 21–1, ¶ 9; 22–1, at 3 ¶ 9. Feliciano became aggravated and instructed plaintiff to leave the Cayo Largo worksite “in the convoy.” ECF Nos. 21–1, ¶ 9; 22–1, at 3, ¶ 9, at 10 ¶ 7. Plaintiff left the worksite. ECF No. 22–1, at 10, ¶ 7.
At the time of plaintiff's departure from the Cayo Largo worksite there were three other excavators and a CAT roller at the site. ECF Nos. 1, ¶ 18; 5, ¶ 18. After the September 19, 2012 incident, plaintiff visited defendant's President, Emilio Venegas, who informed plaintiff that it would take about two weeks to have the machine repaired and advised plaintiff to collect unemployment benefits for those two weeks. ECF No. 22–1, ¶ 14. On September 22, 2012, Feliciano called plaintiff to offer him work at the Cayo Largo worksite, which plaintiff accepted, returning to the Cayo Largo worksite on September 24, 2012.3
ECF No. 21–1, ¶ 12; 22–1, ¶ 12. On September 25, 2012, “a pin of the bucket of the excavator” that plaintiff was operating broke and plaintiff had to leave the Cayo Largo worksite once again. ECF No. 21–1, ¶ 13; 22–1, at 4 ¶ 13, 13 ¶ 12. On March 22, 2013, Emilio Venegas sent plaintiff a letter requesting that he report to work at the Rafael Hernández Colón Library project on March 25, 2013. ECF Nos. 22–1, ¶ 9. Plaintiff did not report to work at the Rafael Hernández Colón Library project. ECF Nos. 21–1, ¶ 18; 22–1, at 6, ¶ 18. Plaintiff did not work between the September 25, 2012 incident and defendant's March 2013 request for him to report to the Rafael Hernández Colón Library project. ECF No. 21–1, ¶ 20; 22–1, ¶ 20.4 Defendant performed work at the Cayo Largo worksite until June 2013. ECF No. 22–1, at 10 ¶ 12.
III.Legal Standard
The purpose of summary judgment “is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992). Summary judgment is granted when the record shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “ ” Farmers Ins. Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 782 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Rodríguez–Rivera v. Federico Trilla Reg'l Hosp., 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir.2008) ).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant presents a properly focused motion “averring ‘an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case[,]’ [t]he burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least one fact issue which is both ‘genuine’ and ‘material.’ ” Griggs–Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug., Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990) ). For issues where the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely “rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts” in the record “that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute.”McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995). The plaintiff need not, however, Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004) (emphasis in original).
In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court “must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Griggs–Ryan, 904 F.2d at 115 (citations omitted). There is “no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, [and] no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood....” Greenburg v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir.1987). The court may, however, safely ignore “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Medina–Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted).
IV.Analysis
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”) makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). In an ADEA discrimination case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving “that age was ‘the reason’ that the employer decided to act.” Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 168, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) ). The ADEA does not authorize a plaintiff to bring mixed-motive age discrimination cases in which age is only a “motivating factor” in the employer's decision; it requires a plaintiff “to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial), that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.”5 Id. at 177–78, 129 S.Ct. 2343 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141–44, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ). “Direct evidence is evidence which, in and of itself, shows discriminatory animus.” Jackson v. Harvard University, 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir.1990) ; Mandavilli v. Maldonado, 38 F.Supp.2d 180, 192 (D.P.R.1999). When a plaintiff provides direct evidence that the employer discriminated on the basis of age, “the issue may be put to a finder of fact without further ado.”6 Alvarez–Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of...
To continue reading
Request your trial