Morales-vallellanes v. Potter

Decision Date11 May 2010
Docket Number08-2452.,No. 08-2346,08-2346
Citation605 F.3d 27
PartiesAngel David MORALES-VALLELLANES, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,v.John E. POTTER, United States Postmaster General, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Miguel E. Miranda-Gutiérrez, was on brief for appellant/cross-appellee.

Michael P. Abate, with whom Marleigh D. Dover, Attorneys, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Rosa E. Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, District of Puerto Rico, were on brief for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, BALDOCK,* Senior Circuit Judge, and HOWARD, Circuit Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee Angel David Morales-Vallellanes (Morales) obtained a jury verdict in his favor on claims under Title VII alleging discrimination and retaliation by his former employer, John E. Potter, the United States Postmaster General (“Potter”). In a prior appeal, we limited Morales to pursuing claims based on three discrete incidents that were previously the subject of formal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaints, and expressly precluded him from seeking relief for a “plethora” of other allegations raised for the first time in the district court. See Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 339 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir.2003) [hereinafter Morales I]. Despite this limitation, the evidence presented at trial included numerous allegations of discrimination and retaliation that were well beyond the scope of our limited remand. Nonetheless, the jury was instructed that Morales could only recover for his claims based on the three specific allegations addressed in the prior appeal. On December 21, 2007, the jury returned a $500,000 lump-sum verdict in his favor, which was later reduced by way of statutory cap to $300,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b)(3)(D). The trial court awarded an additional $64,504 in back pay.

Morales brought this appeal to challenge the sufficiency of the trial court's back pay award, as well as its decision denying him front pay. On cross appeal, Potter contends that the jury verdict cannot stand because Morales failed to prove that he suffered any materially adverse employment action capable of supporting his claims under Title VII. Potter also challenges the jury's damages award as grossly excessive and based on evidence that we previously excluded; contends that Morales was not entitled to back pay; and in various ways opposes Morales's contentions that his damages award was inadequate.

After careful consideration, we conclude as a matter of law that Morales has failed to prove that he suffered any material adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII's discrimination or retaliation provisions. We therefore vacate the jury verdict and remand with instructions to enter judgment in Potter's favor.

I. Background
A. Facts1

We sketch only the basic facts essential to this appeal. Morales began his employment with the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) in 1988 as a Distribution Clerk. In 1990, he was transferred to the USPS station in Caparra Heights, Puerto Rico. In 1995, Morales bid for and obtained the position of Distribution and Window Clerk. In this capacity, Morales typically performed back-office “distribution” duties, which included “business reply,” “express mail,” and “postage due” functions. Because Morales worked the early shift and had an arm injury that limited the tasks he could perform without pain, Morales rarely performed “window” duties, which included customer interactions; nonetheless, he was trained to do so, did so on occasion, and those tasks were part of the job description he had bid for.

Beginning in approximately early 1996, Morales lodged several complaints with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regarding dust accumulation, rodent infestation, and general unsanitary conditions at the Caparra Heights station. Eventually, OSHA conducted a formal inspection and issued the USPS citations for various safety and health violations. Around the same time, Morales also filed unrelated, employment-based complaints with the EEOC. Morales alleged that his supervisors and coworkers began to take various retaliatory actions against him for filing these complaints, and to discriminate against him on account of his gender. Only three such actions are relevant to this appeal.

First, in January 1996 Morales expressed interest in bidding for a Distribution and Window Clerk position that was expected to come with Saturdays and Sundays off, a coveted position given that many USPS employees had an irregular weekend schedule.2 Thereafter, the USPS reclassified the position so that, when it was posted, it came with Thursdays and Sundays off instead. On February 15, 1996, Morales filed a precomplaint with the EEOC alleging that this reclassification was in retaliation for various complaints he had filed, including with the EEOC.3 He alleged that the reclassification was intended to dissuade him from bidding for the position.

Second, on March 23, 1996 Morales's supervisor issued him a letter of warning for unsatisfactory performance due to an “abuse of coffee breaks,” which was withdrawn from his personnel file about a week later. On April 25, 1996, Morales filed a second precomplaint with the EEOC alleging that a new coffee and lunch break policy at the Caparra Heights station unlawfully discriminated against male employees. Specifically, he complained that a female employee, Mayra Irene, was allowed to take longer breaks than permitted under the policy, while male employees were not. He also alleged that on one occasion, his supervisor took Mayra Irene and another female administrative employee out to lunch, but returned late in violation of the policy.

Third, on April 9, 1996 4 Morales's business reply mail, postage due, and express mail duties were temporarily reassigned to a female employee, again Mayra Irene, while he was given “window” duties to perform. Morales complained to the EEOC regarding this rotation of responsibilities, alleging that it was discriminatory and in retaliation for his previous complaints.

All three incidents were the subject of formal EEOC complaints which made their way through the administrative process, and were ultimately dismissed. See Morales I, 339 F.3d at 18.

B. Proceedings Below

In 1997 Morales brought suit in the district court alleging that USPS officials had retaliated against him for his various EEOC complaints and had discriminated against him on the basis of his gender; that the USPS and Postal Workers Union officials breached their obligations under a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”); and that he suffered an intentional infliction of emotional distress at defendant's hands. The district court granted summary judgment in Potter's favor on all claims.

In Morales I, we affirmed the district court in most respects, but disagreed with its conclusion that the acts of discrimination and retaliation Morales had alleged as violations of the CBA were not actionable under Title VII. We determined, however, that many of the allegations of harassment and retaliation Morales relied on to support his federal claims had never been the subject of a formal complaint to the EEOC, and were therefore barred by Title VII's administrative exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, we remanded for the limited purpose of considering Morales's allegations of discrimination and retaliation arising out of the three incidents described above, which were addressed in the EEOC dismissal letters. Because no court had analyzed Morales's claims based on these events under the Title VII rubric, we declined to independently undertake that assessment and instead left that task to the district court in the first instance. We instructed as follows:

Morales is precluded on remand from seeking relief for a plethora of other acts of discrimination and retaliation alleged in his amended complaint, including the discrete acts of bullying, intimidation, and vandalism by his co-workers, his seven-day suspension for violating the USPS uniform policy, his transfer from the Caparra Heights station, his day-long “expulsions” from work in February 1997, his constructive discharge, and his internal grievances against [the Postal Workers Union].

Morales I, 339 F.3d at 19.5

Following our remand, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the theory that Morales's remaining allegations failed as a matter of law to rise to the level of retaliation or discrimination within the meaning of Title VII, but the district court denied the motion in a margin order, which specified that the trial would be “limited to the three issues which survived appeal.” 6 Thereafter, the case was referred to a magistrate judge for trial see 28 U.S.C. § 636, who, in a series of pre-trial orders, made it clear that the evidence presented at trial, and the claims submitted to the jury, would be limited to the three specific incidents identified in our prior opinion.

Morales testified at the trial, which lasted eight days. Much of his testimony and the evidence presented veered well beyond the clear lines drawn in our prior opinion and the trial court's various orders. Thus, Morales told the jury about discrete acts of vandalism by his coworkers, including that they punctured his tires and poured sugar in his gas tank.

He described numerous acts of bullying and intimidation in the workplace. Among other things, he testified that his supervisors engaged in a campaign of harassment and retaliation by “put[ting] the employees against” him; that things became “really tense” in the office when he was investigated “for some supposed death threat [he] had given to another employee;” that the “environment became extremely violent against him;” that he “started receiving threats from other...

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