Moran-Ubieta v. Baxter Health Care De P.R. Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 17-cv-02193-MDM |
| Parties | Enrique Moran-Ubieta, Plaintiff, v. Baxter Health Care de Puerto Rico, Inc., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Plaintiff Enrique Moran Ubieta (“Moran” or “plaintiff”) brings this action against his former employer Baxter Healthcare S.A. (“Baxter”) and Luis Vélez (“Vélez”) (hereinafter collectively referred to as “defendants”). Plaintiff claims that defendants discriminated and retaliated against him because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Plaintiff also invokes the Court's supplemental jurisdiction in this action to bring various claims under Puerto Rico law for alleged discrimination, unlawful retaliation, and wrongful discharge in violation of Puerto Rico Law No. 100 of June 30, 1958, as amended, 29 L.P.R.A § 146 et seq. (“Law 100, ”) Puerto Rico Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 §§ 194 et seq. (“Law 115, ”) and Puerto Rico Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 §§ 185a-185m (“Law 80”) and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code.
Presently before the Court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment in which they move to summarily dismiss all claims asserted by Moran in the complaint. (Docket No. 33). Plaintiff opposed the motion (Docket Nos. 40-41, 43) and the defendants then filed a reply thereto. (Docket No. 58). After careful consideration of the pleadings, and in light of the findings of fact and legal discussion set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Before moving onto the arguments which the parties believe dispositive, the Court must first resolve an objection raised by the plaintiff to several affidavits used by the defendants in their statement of uncontested material facts (“SUMF”) in support of their motion for summary judgment. The defendants' motion draws support, in large part, from affidavits executed by various individuals who currently work, or have worked, for Baxter, namely, Edwin Betancourt, co-defendant Luis Vélez, and Todd Collis. The plaintiff challenges all three of those affidavits and moves to strike them, arguing that they are plagued by conclusory and hearsay evidence and because each contains facts that are not supported by the affiant's personal knowledge. The plaintiff also specifically objects to one of Edwin Betancourt's affidavits grounded on the “sham affidavit” doctrine.
As a threshold matter, on summary judgment, Rules 56(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provide that claimants and defendants may move for summary judgment “with or without supporting affidavits.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)-(b). A party asserting that a particular fact is undisputed must support that assertion “by citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations. . ., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); Ortiz-Osorio v. Municipality of Loiza, 128 F.Supp.3d 442, 446 (D.P.R. 2015).
When, like here, the parties use affidavits or declarations as support, they “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). See also Fed. R. Evid. 602 (). Furthermore, under federal law, to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment, a party may offer an unsworn statement that is signed under penalty of perjury in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, in lieu of a sworn statement or affidavit. And, generally, evidence in the form of an affidavit is equal to other forms of evidence, such as deposition testimony. See, 10A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2727 (3d ed. 2011) (“facts asserted by the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion, if supported by affidavits or other evidentiary materials, are regarded as true.”). Even a clearly self-serving affidavit constitutes evidence which the court must consider when resolving summary judgment motions. Malave-Torres v. Cusido, 919 F.Supp.2d 198, 204 (D.P.R. 2013); See, Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 961 n.5 (1st Cir. 1997) ().
The sham affidavit doctrine forbids a party opposing summary judgment from submitting an affidavit contradicting prior testimony solely to create an issue of fact. Malavé-Torres, 919 F.Supp.2d at 203; see also Escribano-Reyes v. Prof'l Hepa Certificate Corp., 817 F.3d 380, 387 (1st Cir. 2016). However, the doctrine does not bar a party from “elaborating upon, explaining or clarifying prior testimony elicited by opposing counsel on deposition.” Id.; see also Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., 283 F.3d 11, 26 (1st Cir. 2002). Further, the Court need not specifically enumerate each contradiction between a party's prior testimony and the later filed affidavit in order to disregard the evidence. Orta-Castro v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme Química PR., Inc., 447 F.3d 105, 110 (1st Cir. 2006). The self-serving nature of the affidavit, alone, does not preclude the Court from considering an affidavit at summary judgment. Perez-Maspons v. Stewart Title Puerto Rico, Inc., 208 F.Supp.3d 401, 408 (D.P.R. 2016). See, Malavé-Torres, 919 F.Supp.2d at 204 (compiling circuit precedents allowing self-serving affidavits as admissible evidence at summary judgment).
Here, the record contains two different statements given by Edwin Betancourt (“Betancourt”) from two different dates. The plaintiff objects to Betancourt's latter statement, arguing that it is a self-serving “sham affidavit” prepared only to support the defendants' motion for summary judgment. He further maintains that the later filed affidavit includes facts that contradict his prior statement. By contrast, the defendants argue that Betancourt's second affidavit merely clarifies, rather than contradicts, his prior testimony. After a careful review of both affidavits, the Court agrees with the defendants.
Betancourt is a decisionmaker for Baxter as far as this Court is concerned. In his first affidavit, he attested to information concerning Baxter's decision-making process as it relates to the actions which the plaintiff challenges as unlawful in this suit. Betancourt's later-filed affidavit pertained mostly to that same information but with additional details-it elaborated on the intricacies and further expounded upon the specifics of the business decisions that Betancourt had testified about in his prior statement. Furthermore, the Court found no inconsistencies between the two statements nor any indication that the information in the second affidavit was included for some improper purpose. The Court thus finds that Betancourt's second affidavit merely explains and amplifies the information contained in his prior statement and, as such, the defendants are not barred from relying on it for summary judgment purposes.
On a final note, the sham affidavit doctrine is typically reserved for instances when a party opposing summary judgment submits an affidavit contradicting prior testimony solely to create an issue of fact to avoid the hot fire of summary judgment. Malavé-Torres, 919 F.Supp.2d at 203. In this case, it is the moving party who submitted the challenged affidavit. Even if the doctrine could be used against a party moving for summary judgment, as it may well be, it is inapposite here.
The plaintiff also challenges the statements from Betancourt, co-defendant Luis Vélez (“Vélez”), and Todd Collis (“Collis”), claiming that each includes inadmissible hearsay because they are not based on personal knowledge. Plaintiff's contention does not hold water. To begin with, Betancourt, Vélez, and Collis all worked for Baxter during the relevant period, they all had decision-making authority, they all worked with Moran to some extent, and they were all involved in the employment decisions that Moran complains of in this action. As such, the information contained in each of their statements is clearly based on their personal knowledge of the events narrated therein since they were all active participants in the challenged decisions, or, at the very least, they were privy to relevant information.
Significantly, moreover, all the affidavits submitted by the defendants in support of their summary judgment motion, including the ones that Moran objects to, comply with the applicable legal requirements and are clearly based on the declarants' personal and specific knowledge of the facts asserted in the statements. Plaintiff has not offered a meritorious or compelling legal reason to strike any of the challenged affidavits. So, to conclude with this preliminary matter, because the affidavits constitute valid evidence, they will be considered by the Court.
Taking all disputed facts in the light most sympathetic to the plaintiff, as the party opposing summary judgment, the Court makes the following factual findings, which are either undisputed or conclusively supported by the evidentiary record.[1]
Baxter operates three pharmaceutical plants in Puerto Rico, which are located in Aibonito, Jayuya and Guayama.
Plaintiff Moran was born on June 17, 1956. He began working for Baxter in 1982...
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