Moran v. Cent. R. Co. of N.J.

• Decision Date: 06 March 1916
• Docket Number: No. 22.,22.
• Citation: 88 N.J.Law 730,96 A. 1023
• Parties: MORAN v. CENTRAL R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

96 A. 1023

88 N.J.Law 730

MORAN

v. CENTRAL R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY.

No. 22.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 6, 1916.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by Eugene W. Moran against the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Charles M. Egan, of Jersey City, for appellant. George Holmes and Edwards & Smith, both of Jersey City, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, who was injured by a car of the defendant company, sued for damages in the New Jersey Supreme Court, alleging that the defendant at the time of the accident was a common carrier of passengers and freight to and from the state of New Jersey from and to the states of New York and Pennsylvania, and claimed a right to recover under the act of Congress of April 22, 1908, commonly called the federal "Employers' Liability Act." The case was refered to the Hudson circuit, and the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that at the time the accident happened the car which caused the plaintiff's injury was not engaged in interstate commerce. The learned trial judge, in directing the verdict, observed, among other things:

"When the defendant's case was put in—and no part of this evidence seems to have been shaken by cross-examination, and no attempt was made by way of rebuttal—that this car, when it had discharged its cargo at East Ferry street, had then been taken back to Brill's Junction, to be left there awaiting an order for cars, and that order was given to Mr. Hastings, who was the general yardmaster, then the nature of the order was manifested; the order was that he was to give a certain amount of tonnage in cars, and it was his function to select what cars should comply with that order, and that order was not given until half past 5 or 6 o'clock on the day of the accident, and the accident happened at 3 on that day—my function, then, it seems to me, became perfectly clear, and that was, when all the evidence was in, and it was manifest that there was nothing upon which the jury could infer, in the light of the explanatory proof produced by the defendant, which amplified and clarified the rather vague evidence produced on the part of the plaintiff—it then seemed to me it became my duty to say that there was not anything in the case which would authorize me to say that the jury might conclude that the car at that time was engaged in interstate commerce. * * * I think the interstate character...