Moran v. Eastern Equipment Sales, Inc.

• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BISHOP, J.
• Citation: Moran v. Eastern Equipment Sales, Inc., 76 Conn. App. 137, 818 A.2d 848 (Conn. App. 2003)
• Decision Date: 08 April 2003
• Docket Number: (AC 22273).
• Parties: ROBERT MORAN v. EASTERN EQUIPMENT SALES, INC., ET AL.

76 Conn. App. 137

818 A.2d 848

ROBERT MORAN v. EASTERN EQUIPMENT SALES, INC., ET AL.

(AC 22273).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 16, 2003.

Officially released April 8, 2003.

Foti, Dranginis and Bishop, Js. Scott L. Haworth, pro hac vice, with whom were James Somers and, on the brief, Christopher Lynch and Bonnie Schinagle, for the appellant (defendant Case Corporation).

William T. Blake, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

BISHOP, J.

The defendant Case Corporation (Case) appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury verdict, in favor of the plaintiff, Robert Moran.¹ Case claims that the court improperly (1) refused to set aside the verdict on the basis of General Statutes § 52-577a, (2) refused to direct a verdict in favor of Case and grant its motion to set aside the verdict on the question of design defect, (3) refused to grant Case's motion to set aside the verdict on the question of failure to warn, (4) admitted the testimony of the plaintiff's expert, (5) admitted as exhibits an operator's manual and parts catalog, and (6) instructed the jury on the issues of warnings and proximate cause. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury could have reasonably found the following facts. On December 20, 1993, the plaintiff purchased a W24 wheel loader, manufactured by Case, from Eastern Equipment Sales, Inc. (Eastern). The purchase price was $12,000. Eastern and Case had a distribution agreement under which Eastern sold Case products and provided product support for Case products.

On January 8, 1994, while the plaintiff was working in a plaza removing snow with the W24, he moved a fuel truck next to the W24, removed the engine cover and placed it on the ground, and, with the W24's engine still running, ran a hose from the fuel truck to the fuel fill inside the W24's engine compartment to refuel the W24. When he was finished, he replaced the cap on the fuel fill and returned the hose to the fuel truck. He next reached down with his left hand to retrieve the engine cover while resting his right hand near the fuel fill. The plaintiff then slipped and his right hand went forward. Hearing a "thump, thump" noise, the plaintiff pulled his hand back, saw that his glove had been shredded and that he had sustained an injury. A coworker then took him to a hospital, where Paul Fischer, an emergency room physician, performed a procedure on the plaintiff's hand requiring the amputation of the right index finger while saving the right middle finger. Fischer later testified that the cause of the plaintiff's injury was contact with the W24's engine fan blade.

The plaintiff subsequently brought an action against Eastern and Case under the Product Liability Act, General Statutes § 52-572m et seq. Case denied liability and asserted twelve special defenses, including numerous specifications of contributory negligence and misuse. The action was tried to the jury beginning on July 6, 2001. On July 17, 2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $12,000 in economic damages and $200,000 in noneconomic damages. The jury assessed liability finding the plaintiff to be 25 percent responsible, Eastern to be 50 percent liable and Case to be 25 percent liable. The court rendered judgment thereon. On July 26, 2001, Case filed a motion to set aside the verdict, which the court denied on August 15, 2001. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

Case's first claim is that the court improperly refused to set aside the verdict against Case on the basis of § 52-577a.² Specifically, Case claims that because it parted possession with the W24 more than ten years prior to the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff was required to and failed to prove that the W24 was within its safe and useful life, as provided in § 52-577a (c), at the time of his injury. Case further contends that § 52-577a (c) provides five considerations for the court to determine whether a product is within its safe and useful life, and that the plaintiff failed to present proof as to any of those factors. We disagree.

"[T]he proper appellate standard of review when considering the action of a trial court granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict ... [is] the abuse of discretion standard.... In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court's ruling.... Reversal is required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done.... We do not ... determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.... A verdict must stand if it is one that a jury reasonably could have returned and the trial court has accepted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bolmer v. McKulsky, 74 Conn. App. 499, 510, 812 A.2d 869, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 954, 818 A.2d 780 (2003).

The issue of whether the plaintiff's injury occurred during the W24's safe and useful life was posed to the jury in a special interrogatory asking: "Do you find that the accident of January 8, 1994, occurred during the useful safe life of the W24?" The jury answered in the affirmative. Therefore, we must determine whether the record supported the jury's finding.

As a preliminary matter, we note that with respect to the factors set forth in § 52-577a (c), Case is incorrect in its suggestion that they are statutory requirements. Rather, the statute enumerates those factors as those a fact finder "may consider among other factors ...." General Statutes § 52-577a (c). The enumerated factors merely are guidelines to aid the fact finder in determining whether a product is within its safe and useful life.

The plaintiff's expert, O. John Zamparo, testified that wear and tear played no role in the plaintiff's injury. He asserted, rather, that the injury occurred because of a defect in the W24's design. The design defect, he stated, was the location of the fuel fill in close proximity to an unguarded fan blade. Zamparo further testified that the design of the W24, with regard to the fan blade, was unchanged from its design on the date of manufacture.

Additionally, the plaintiff testified that prior to his injury, he had used the W24 for loading sand and salt. After his injury, he continued to use the W24 for such things as snow removal and loading trucks until the W24 sustained engine trouble, at which time the plaintiff parked it in an outdoor storage lot, not wanting to alter it due to this litigation. Case's expert, David H. Seaburg, an engineer employed by Case, testified³ that the W24 model was available with an hour meter and that a W24 with 6000 hours of indicated use would still be within its normal life expectancy. He further testified that he inspected the plaintiff's W24 in 1998 and found that its meter had a reading indicating less than 6000 hours of use. He claimed, however, that he did not believe the hour meter was working because of the low number of hours indicated on the meter. Finally, he acknowledged that he did not test the meter to verify his assumption that it was not functioning properly.

On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiff's W24 was within its safe and useful life at the time of the plaintiff's injury. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in refusing to set aside the verdict against Case based on § 52-577a.

II

Case next claims that the court improperly refused either to direct a verdict in its favor or to set aside the verdict against it on the question of design defect. Specifically, Case argues that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof under § 52-572m et seq. on his claim that the W24 was defective in its design. We disagree.

"Our standard of review of a directed verdict is well settled. A trial court should direct a verdict for a defendant if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a jury could not reasonably and legally reach any other conclusion than that the defendant is entitled to prevail." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beecher v. Greaves, 73 Conn. App. 561, 563, 808 A.2d 1143 (2002). "The trial court's refusal to set aside the verdict is entitled to great weight and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.... In reviewing the action of the trial court in denying [a motion] ... to set aside [a] verdict, our primary concern is to determine whether the court abused its discretion and we decide only whether, on the evidence presented, the jury could fairly reach the verdict [it] did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazzacane v. Elliott, 73 Conn. App. 696, 699, 812 A.2d 37 (2002).

Our Supreme Court thoroughly reviewed the topic of design defect strict liability claims in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199, 694 A.2d 1319 (1997). In Potter, the court stated that "[p]roducts liability law has thus evolved to hold manufacturers strictly liable for unreasonably dangerous products that cause injury to ultimate users. Nevertheless, strict tort liability does not transform manufacturers into insurers, nor does it impose absolute liability.... [F]rom the plaintiff's point of view the most beneficial aspect of the rule is that it relieves him of proving specific acts of negligence and protects him from the defenses of notice of breach, disclaimer, and lack of privity in the implied warranty concepts of sales and contracts.... Strict tort liability merely relieves the plaintiff from proving that the manufacturer was negligent and allows the plaintiff to establish instead the defective condition of the product as the principal basis of liability." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 210-11.

The court recognized that under the then existing test for design defect liability, the "consumer...