Moran v. Mason, 28054.

CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)
Writing for the CourtRobert S. Barney
Citation236 S.W.3d 137
PartiesLonda J. (Tarver) MORAN, Respondent, v. Lindel W. MASON, Appellant.
Docket NumberNo. 28054.,28054.
Decision Date26 October 2007
236 S.W.3d 137
Londa J. (Tarver) MORAN, Respondent,
v.
Lindel W. MASON, Appellant.
No. 28054.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.
October 26, 2007.

[236 S.W.3d 138]

Appellant is Pro Se.

No brief was filed for Respondent.

ROBERT S. BARNEY, Presiding Judge.


Lindel W. Mason ("Appellant") appeals the judgment and order of the trial court which denied his "Motion to Stay or Modify Child Support" filed against Londa J. Moran ("Respondent").1 Appellant asserts four points of trial court error. We affirm the judgment and order of the trial court.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, as we must, Melton v. Collins, 134 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Mo.App. 2004), the scant record before this Court reveals Appellant was ordered to pay $178.00 per month to Respondent as child support for their minor child ("the Child"). Appellant was incarcerated on March 16, 2005, in the Missouri Department of Corrections.2 It appears that in December of 2005 or January of 2006, an Income Withholding Order was filed on behalf of Respondent with the Farmington Correctional Center where Appellant is incarcerated.3

On February 24, 2006, Appellant filed a "Motion to Stay, or Modify Child Support Order." In his motion, Appellant stated he "has a prison job where he is paid $7.50

236 S.W.3d 139

a month" and the only other money he receives "is gifts from family and friends sent to him because of his paupius state." Appellant stated that he "was complying with the order of child support until he was committed to [the Department of Corrections], and it became impossible to pay $178.00 a month when [he] only make[s] $7.50 a month." He also set out that he owes child support arrearages4 which will accrue to "over $6,000.00 by the time [he] is released from prison." Accordingly, he asked the trial court to stay his child support obligation "retroactive to the date of his commitment to the Department of Corrections." Further, Appellant requested in the alternative that the trial court modify his child support obligation "to a sum appropriate to his monthly earning's [sic] of $7.50 a month."

A hearing was held on Appellant's motion on August 23, 2006. Appellant was allowed to participate in the hearing by telephone. Respondent did not participate. At the hearing, Appellant asserted he "signed away all rights" to the Child and he believed his child support obligations and arrearages had been expunged.5 He also reiterated the assertions in his motion that he was financially unable to pay the child support order issued against him.

The trial court entered its judgment and order on August 23, 2006, in which it denied Appellant's motion to stay or modify his child support obligation; found "there have been no substantial and continuing changes of circumstances involving [Respondent] or the [Child] since the date of judgment;" and determined Appellant's "present incarceration is a result of voluntary illegal and felonious actions taken by [Appellant]" such that he was not entitled to modify or stay his court ordered child support payments. This appeal followed.

We initially observe that Appellant appears in this matter pro se. While he is fully entitled to proceed pro se, he "is bound `by the same rules of procedure as those admitted to practice law and is entitled to no indulgence [he] would not have received if represented by counsel.'" Brumfield v. Div. of Empl. Sec., 54 S.W.3d 741, 742 (Mo.App.2001) (quoting Johnson v. St. Mary's Hlth. Ctr., 738 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Mo.App.1987)). "This principal is not grounded in a lack of sympathy but rather it is necessitated by the requirement of judicial impartiality, judicial economy and fairness to all parties." State ex rel. Morgan ex rel. Div. of Child Support Enforcement v. Okoye, 141 S.W.3d 410, 411 (Mo. App.2004) (internal quotation omitted). As such, Appellant is required to substantially comply with the mandatory briefing requirements of Rule 84.04.6 Emig ex rel. Emig v. Curtis, 117 S.W.3d 174, 177 (Mo. App.2003).

In our analysis we initially observe that Appellant's points relied on are convoluted and difficult to understand. They fail to comply with Rule 84.04 in ways which need not be detailed at length here. While it is within our discretion to dismiss an appeal for failure to comply with Rule 84.04, "`[w]e will not exercise our discretion to dismiss an appeal for technical deficiency under Rule 84.04 unless the deficiency impedes disposition on

236 S.W.3d 140

the merits.'" Id. (quoting Gray v. White, 26 S.W.3d 806, 815 (Mo.App.1999)). Accordingly, where we can discern the essence of Appellant's complaints of trial court error, we shall address them on their merits.

Our standard of review is governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). We will sustain the judgment of the trial court "unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." Id. at 32; see also Nichelson ex rel. Lohrasbi v. Roberts, 164 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Mo.App.2005).

Appellant's first point relied on and fourth point relied on are related and we shall address them together for ease of analysis. As we discern Appellant's allegations in his first and fourth points relied on, they appear to assert the trial court erred in denying Appellant's request for modification of child support based on the trial court's findings that he had not proven changes of circumstances sufficient to reduce or stay his child support obligation. He also maintains the trial court erred in failing to consider, given his incarceration, "his ability to pay or to earn a living, amount of arrearage accrued upon release," as well as the fact that Respondent had presented no evidence, all of which he asserts result in "manifest injustice."

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13 practice notes
  • Evans v. Firstfleet Inc., SD 30624.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • June 23, 2011
    ...than the appellant intended or his opponent understood.’ ” Riley v. Headland, 311 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Mo.App.2010) (quoting Moran v. Mason, 236 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Mo.App.2007)). This Court will not speculate as to the legal reasons for Defendants' claim under this point, as to do so would be imp......
  • Koch v. Koch, SD 35561
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • August 2, 2019
    ...excuse the obligation to support the needs of one’s children." Oberg v. Oberg , 869 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Mo. App. 1993) ; Moran v. Mason , 236 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Mo. App....
  • Thompson v. Flagstar Bank, Fsb, SD 29866.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • November 23, 2009
    ...admitted to practice law and [are] entitled to no indulgence [they] would not have received if represented by counsel.'" Moran v. Mason, 236 S.W.3d 137, 139 (Mo. App.2007) (quoting Brumfield v. Div. of Empl. Sec., 54 S.W.3d 741, 742 (Mo.App. 2001)). "`This principal is not grounded in a lac......
  • Riley v. HEADLAND, SD 29716.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • June 29, 2010
    ...court will interpret the appellant's contention differently than the appellant intended or his opponent understood." Moran v. Mason, 236 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Mo.App.2007) (quoting Franklin v. Ventura, 32 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Mo.App. 2000)). Cognizant of this danger, however, we proceed ex gratia to......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
13 cases
  • Evans v. Firstfleet Inc., SD 30624.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • June 23, 2011
    ...than the appellant intended or his opponent understood.’ ” Riley v. Headland, 311 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Mo.App.2010) (quoting Moran v. Mason, 236 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Mo.App.2007)). This Court will not speculate as to the legal reasons for Defendants' claim under this point, as to do so would be imp......
  • Koch v. Koch, SD 35561
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • August 2, 2019
    ...excuse the obligation to support the needs of one’s children." Oberg v. Oberg , 869 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Mo. App. 1993) ; Moran v. Mason , 236 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Mo. App....
  • Thompson v. Flagstar Bank, Fsb, SD 29866.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • November 23, 2009
    ...admitted to practice law and [are] entitled to no indulgence [they] would not have received if represented by counsel.'" Moran v. Mason, 236 S.W.3d 137, 139 (Mo. App.2007) (quoting Brumfield v. Div. of Empl. Sec., 54 S.W.3d 741, 742 (Mo.App. 2001)). "`This principal is not grounded in a lac......
  • Riley v. HEADLAND, SD 29716.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • June 29, 2010
    ...court will interpret the appellant's contention differently than the appellant intended or his opponent understood." Moran v. Mason, 236 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Mo.App.2007) (quoting Franklin v. Ventura, 32 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Mo.App. 2000)). Cognizant of this danger, however, we proceed ex gratia to......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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