Moran v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1929
• Citation: 145 A. 567,109 Conn. 94
• Parties: MORAN v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H. R. CO.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

145 A. 567

109 Conn. 94

MORAN v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 6, 1929

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; John Rufus Booth Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Sarah Moran against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company for the death of Patrick Mulanphy, employee. From an adverse finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the Third District, affirmed by the Superior Court on trial to the court, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Robert J. Woodruff, John G. Confrey, and John H. Sheehan, all of New Haven, for appellant.

Edward R. Brumley, of New York City, and John H Gardner, of New Haven, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

The plaintiff-claimant seeks to recover from the defendant an award under our Compensation Act upon the ground that she was partially dependent upon Patrick Mulanphy, whose decease occurred while he was in the employ of the defendant and arose out of and in the course of that employment. The trial court concluded and ruled that the work of the deceased on November 30, 1925, the date of his decease, was so closely related to interstate commerce as to become a part of it. The appeal raises a single question, Was the deceased engaged in interstate commerce at the time of his injury? If he was not the plaintiff is entitled to compensation under our Compensation Act; if he was so engaged the plaintiff's exclusive remedy is under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA § § 51-59).

The deceased was employed at the Cedar Hill terminal of the defendant, after the engines had come in from their runs and been placed over the ashpit, in raking out the fires in the engines and in cleaning them out and making them ready for service as needed, and also in cleaning out the ashpit into which the ashes from the engines were deposited. Many of these engines were engaged in interstate commerce--some in intrastate commerce. It is impossible to tell on which engines the deceased worked on the day of his injury. His hours were from 3 p. m. to 11 p. m. On this night he checked out his time card and left the defendant's premises in the only way he was allowed to leave, by a bridge over defendant's tracks, requiring him to climb up 53 steps, 7 1/2 inches in height, then walk about 300 feet across a bridge over defendant's tracks, and then descend 53 similar steps on the other side; he climbed these steps, walked across the bridge, and dropped dead on about the second step from the top of the descending stairs. For a period of more than two months prior to his death the deceased had been suffering from chronic myocarditis. He had been advised by his physician to do only light work and not to climb these stairs. His death was due to a failure of the heart muscle caused by the extra exertion involved in climbing the stairs. The Commissioner concluded that the deceased's leaving the defendant's yard in this way was a necessary incident of his day's work, and that his death did arise out of and in the course of his employment. The deceased's employment continued until he had passed beyond the premises of his employer. It is the undoubted law of both the federal court and of our own court that: " * * * In leaving the carrier's yard at the close of his day's work the deceased was but discharging a duty of his employment." Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170, 173, 37 S.Ct. 556, 557 (61 L.Ed. 1057, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 662); Erie R. Co. v. Szary, 253 U.S. 86, 40 S.Ct. 454, 64 L.Ed. 794; Guiliano v. O'Connell's Sons, 105 Conn. 695, 704, 136 A. 677 (56 A.L.R. 504). His death arose out of the undue exertion caused by climbing these stairs, thus accelerating the condition of his heart so that it could not meet the unusual exertion. The conclusion of the court that the death of the deceased arose out of and in the course of his employment was correct, and, as we understand the record, is unquestioned.

Whether the deceased at the time of his injury was engaged in interstate commerce is to be determined by the test adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States: " Was the employee at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it?" Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558, 36 S.Ct. 188, 189 (60 L.Ed. 436, L.R.A. 1916C, 797); Erie Railroad v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170, 37 S.Ct. 556, 61 L.Ed. 1057, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 662; Illinois Central R. R. v. Behrens, 233 U.S. 473, 478, 34 S.Ct. 646 (58 L.Ed. 1051, Ann.Cas. 1914C, 163); Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177, 180, 36 S.Ct. 517 (60 L.Ed. 941).

From our analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Sullivan v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 105 Conn. 122, 134 A. 795, we determined the rule as to this test to be: " It is the work which the injured employee was doing at the precise time when the injury occurred that is decisive." Subject to the proper application of these tests, " each case must be decided in the light of the particular facts with a view of determining whether, at the time of the injury, the employee is engaged in interstate business, or in an act which is so directly and immediately connected with such business as substantially to form a part or a necessary incident thereof." N.Y. Central & H. R. R. Co. v. Carr, 238 U.S. 260, 263, 35 S.Ct. 780, 781 (59 L.Ed. 1298). The determination of whether an activity at a given time is interstate or intrastate commerce is dependent upon a consideration of degrees. No hard and fast line can be drawn. Industrial Accident Commission of State of California v. Davis, 259 U.S. 182, 187, 42 S.Ct. 489 (66 L.Ed. 888).

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