Moran v. State
| Decision Date | 31 January 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. PD-1310-05.,PD-1310-05. |
| Citation | 213 S.W.3d 917 |
| Parties | Armando MORAN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Erick A. Bovik, Austin, for appellant.
Carl Bryan Case, Jr., Asst. D.A., Matthew Paul, State's Attorney, Austin, for state.
Appellant was convicted of murder. He committed this murder in Austin and fled to Laredo. Appellant provided two written statements (the "statements") to the Laredo police. The Court of Appeals decided that these statements should not have been used by the State at appellant's trial because they were the product of custodial interrogation by the police after appellant had invoked his right to counsel. See Moran v. State, 171 S.W.3d 382, 384 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005). We will reverse.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress, generally alleging that the statements were obtained in violation of the "Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Appellant's motion to suppress did not specifically allege that the statements were the product of custodial interrogation after he had invoked his right to counsel. The suppression-hearing record reflects that appellant voluntarily accompanied two other persons (Hilda and Vanessa) to the Laredo Police Department after learning that the police wanted to question them about the Austin murder. Appellant provided the statements to Laredo Police Detective Guzman in an interview room at the Laredo Police Department.
On direct examination by his attorney at the suppression hearing, appellant testified that these statements were the result of his voluntary intoxication and Guzman's promise that "everything would go all right" if appellant confessed (Guzman denied making any such promises and also testified that appellant appeared to be in control of his mental faculties). Appellant made no claim during this direct examination by his attorney that these statements were the product of custodial interrogation after he had invoked his right to counsel. Appellant testified on direct examination by his attorney:
Q. Well, by "to a point," how do you mean?
A. Well, I was really, I was really just writing it thinking, you know, they explained to me that, you know, if I wrote this everything would go all right and, you know, I was just doing it just to hurry up the process. I wasn't really thinking about the situation itself.
Q. Was that decision, was it because of the alcohol and drugs that you had been taking?
A. I was still under the influence, sir.
Appellant also testified on direct examination by his attorney that he knew that he was a suspect in the Austin murder and that he "felt" that he was being "detained" for this murder when he made the statements even though no one had told him that he was under arrest.
Guzman testified at the suppression hearing that appellant was not arrested until after he made the statements.
Q. As far as you were concerned, based upon the information that was available to you, did you consider the defendant to be under arrest at that time?
A. No, sir.
Q. As far as you were concerned, had he wished to leave at that point in time, was he free to leave?
A. He was free to leave, but he didn't ask.
Q. Did you do or say anything to him before you began questioning him to indicate to him that he might not be free?
A. No, sir.
* * *
Q. Okay. So in between the time that you initially met [appellant] there in the interview room and 2 a.m. when the second written statement was completed, I presume you had learned from [Austin] Detective Fuentes that an arrest warrant had actually been issued there in Austin for the arrest of [appellant]?
A. That is correct.
Q. And that arrest warrant was for the offense of murder?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, at any time prior to 2 a.m. when [the second written statement was completed], did you inform [appellant] that this arrest warrant had been issued?
A. No, I had not.
Q. Do you know whether or not Detective Guerra or anyone else with your department informed the defendant that an arrest warrant had been issued before 2 a.m.?
A. No, sir.
Q. At what point in time did you inform him, if at all, that the warrant had been issued?
A. It was when [Austin Detective] Fuentes told me that the arrest warrant had been secured.
Q. Was that after 2 a.m.?
A. That was after 2 a.m Guzman also testified that, when he initially met appellant in the police interview room and informed appellant that he was a suspect in the Austin murder, appellant told Guzman that he wanted to speak to an attorney. Guzman responded that appellant had that right and also told appellant that he had already spoken to several other people. Guzman then began to leave the room. As Guzman reached the door, appellant told Guzman that he would tell him what happened after which appellant made the statements.
Q. All right.
A. And I did tell him that, if he wanted to talk to us at that point.
Q. All right. And what did you recall [appellant's] response being after you informed him that he was a suspect in this murder?
A. He told us that he wanted to speak to an attorney.
Q. And at that point in time, the individuals that were physically present were yourself, [appellant], and Martin Guerra?
A. That's correct.
Q. What if anything — well, strike that. Prior to [appellant] making that statement, had you handcuffed him?
A. No.
Q. And what if anything did you do or say when [appellant] informed you that he wanted to speak with an attorney?
A. I just advised him, I told him that he had that right. I also told him that we had already spoken to Hilda, we spoke to Jose Luis and Jerry. At that time we got up and we were walking out of the room.
Q. And do you recall any further conversation before you and Detective Guerra stood up to leave the room?
A. That was it, from our part.
Q. Do you recall whether or not Detective Guerra said anything before the two of you stood up to leave the room?
A. No, we both stood up and we were walking out.
Q. All right. As you were walking out of the room, what if anything do you recall occurred?
A. As we reached for the — I reached for the door, and Guerra was right behind me. I just opened it up. And he said, "simon," which means, yes, I will tell you, I will tell you what happened.
Appellant testified on cross-examination by the State that he did not remember what Guzman told him when he told Guzman that he wanted to speak to an attorney. Appellant also testified during this cross-examination that he was under the influence of alcohol and not thinking clearly when he told Guzman that he wanted to speak to an attorney and that he continued to talk to Guzman because Guzman told him that it would "make it easier" on himself (not because Guzman told appellant that he had spoken to the other people).
Q. You will need to say yes or no for the record.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Now, after Detective Guzman-strike that. Did he read you your Miranda warnings, the right to remain silent and those other rights before he asked you anything about these events?
A. I really don't remember, sir.
Q. Okay. Do you know why you don't remember?
A. Because I was still under the influence at the time.
Q. And at that point in time, you were under the influence of what?
A. Alcohol.
* * *
Q. Okay. After Detective Guzman read you your Miranda rights, do you recall saying to him that you wanted to speak with an attorney?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. And what did Detective Guzman, what do you recall him saying to you at that point?
A. I do not remember, sir.
Q. Do you remember what, what happened after you indicated you wanted to speak with an attorney?
A. Well, I remember — I don't remember what was said. I just remember him starting to walk out the door.
Q. All right. What if anything do you remember happening when he started to walk out the door?
A. I believe I told him yes, I'll say something.
Q. And why did you say that?
A. Because I felt that, you know, I would be able to leave.
Q. What made you think that you would be able to leave if you said something versus not saying it?
A. Because I wasn't thinking clearly, sir.
Q. All right. So it wasn't anything that Detective Guzman said? It was just because you weren't thinking clearly?
A. Well, he said, you know, make it easier on yourself.
Q. When did he say that?
A. Right before he got up.
Q. Okay. And then you said, Okay, I will talk to you?
A. (Nods affirmatively).
During its closing arguments to the trial court at the suppression hearing, the State claimed, among other things, that appellant was not under arrest and in "custody" when he made the statements. During his closing arguments to the trial court at the suppression hearing, app...
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