Moreau v. Harris County
| Citation | 158 F.3d 241 |
| Decision Date | 19 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-20796,97-20796 |
| Parties | 136 Lab.Cas. P 33,734, 4 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1697 Lynwood MOREAU; Kenneth O. Adams; David W. Addison, Jose A. Alvarado; Robert Amboree; Bobby G. Andrews; Randy Anderwald; Gary R. Ashford, Craig L. Bailey; Richard Bailey; Richardo E. Balderaz; Herbert V. Barnard; Gerald Barnett; Paulette M. Barnett; Brad T. Bennett; Bridgett Blackmon; Flynt E. Blackwell; Gary F. Blahuta; Scott P. Blankenburg; Deborah Bliese; Bruce H. Breckenridge; J.W. Brooks; Brian Buchanan; Patricia M. Bui; Don. E. Bynum; Clarence A. Callis; William M. Campbell; Heather Carr; Thomas J. Carr; Paul E. Carpenter; Robert Casey; Mark E. Cepiel; Eladio C. Chavez; Edward A. Christensen; Roy Clark; Denny D. Coker; Alford A. Cook; Gregory P. Cox; Donald D. Crayton; Richard D. Crook, David A. Davis; Gary W. Davis; Christopher E. Dempsey; Russell Dukes; Larry A. Eikhoff; Frank Fairley; David W. Finely; James P. Fitzgerald; Erine R. Fowler; Michael A. Garcia; Thomas M. Gentry; John Godejohann; Robert M. Goerlitz; David Gonzales; Raul V. Gonzales; Miguel A. Gonzalez; Billy Gray; William L. Gray; Lawrence P. Gries; Thomas P. Gurney; Preston R. Halfin; Sammy Head; Neil Hines; Larry D. Howell; Marshall P. Isom; James A. Johnson; Derry L. Jones; David E. Kaup; William C. Kenisell; Howard J. Kimble; Steve Kirk; Edgar D. Knighten; Freddy G. Lafuente; Michael G. Lagrone; Al Lanford; Vernon S. Lemons; Shemei B. Levi; Jeanne Long; Timothy Loyd; Joe S. Magallon; David B. Martin; Pedro Martinez; Russell L. Mayfield; Terry McGregor; Robert C. Meaux; Stephen Melinder; Marty M. Mingo; D.D. Montgomery; Jose L. Morin; Richard O. Newby; Arthur W. Nolley; William R. Norwood; Richard C. Nunnery; Karen D. O'Bannion; Raymond E. O'Bannion; Guadalupe Palafox; Wayne Parinello; Deborah Petruska; James A. Phillips; Simon C. Ramirez; Michael B. Rankin; James C. Reynolds; Willard G. Rogers; Gerald M. Robinson; Joe Ruffino; Lance J. Scott; Rob R. Self; Donald Shaver; James K. Shipley; James Smedick; Gina K. Spriggs; (Grahmann); Jeffre |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Richard H. Cobb, Houston Police Patrolman's Union, Murray Edward Malakoff, Legal Dept., Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Bruce S. Powers, Houston, TX, for Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
Harris County appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of a certified class of employees, finding that the County's policy requiring the use of accrued compensatory time by its employees contravened 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). We are persuaded that the 1985 Amendments to the FLSA do not grant public employees a right to choose when they will use accrued comp time. We reverse.
The members of the class are employees of the Sheriff's Department of Harris County. The class asserted claims for wrongful refusal of compensatory time off, retaliation and involuntary use of compensatory time.
The parties have stipulated to the essential facts. By County policy the accrued comp time for non-exempt employees must be kept below a predetermined level, set by each bureau commander. This level is based on the personnel requirements of each bureau.
An employee reaching the maximum allowable hours of comp time authorized by the FLSA is requested to take steps to reduce the number of accrued hours. A supervisor is authorized to order the employee to reduce accumulated comp time at a time suitable to the bureau. An employee dissatisfied with his supervisor's order may informally complain to higher levels of supervisory authority within the department.
Based upon the stipulation of facts, the district court ordered the parties to move for summary judgment and to address whether the County policy requiring the involuntary use of comp time by its employees contravened 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5) of the FLSA.
On November 26, 1996, the district court issued an "Opinion on Summary Judgment" and an Interlocutory Declaratory Judgment that "Harris County may not force employees to use their accumulated comp time without violating the FLSA" and asked for briefing from both parties on attorneys' fees. Then, on July 28, 1997, the district court issued an order entitled "Final Judgment" which stated the following:
Final Judgment
1. Harris County may not force employees to use their accumulated compensatory time without violating the Fair Labor Standards Act.
2. The parties plaintiff are awarded attorneys' fees of $21,360 from Harris County.
Plaintiffs did not ask the district court to rule on their claims for wrongful refusal of the use of comp time and for retaliation and it did not do so. This appeal followed.
First, there is our jurisdiction. The record on appeal indicates that the claims for wrongful refusal of the use of comp time and for retaliation have not been ruled on by the district court. Responding to our question, Harris County agreed with the class that we have jurisdiction since the district court intended its order to be a final judgment. 1
We have jurisdiction only over final decisions of the district court, with limited exceptions that are not relevant here. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (West 1993). A final judgment is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). We have advocated a practical approach in deciding issues of finality. A judgment reflecting an intent to dispose of all issues before the district court is final. Vaughn v. Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing Southeast, Inc., 891 F.2d 1195, 1197 (5th Cir.1990); Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 705 (5th Cir.1994). If a party abandons one of its claims, a judgment that disposes of all remaining theories is final and appealable so long as it is apparent that the district judge intended the judgment to dispose of all claims. Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 314 (5th Cir.1991). When the district court hands down a judgment couched in language calculated to conclude all claims before it, that judgment is final. Armstrong v. Trico Marine, Inc., 923 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir.1991).
Here, the district court in entering final judgment appeared to decide all claims, although it did not explicitly address plaintiffs' wrongful refusal and retaliation claims. Nevertheless, plaintiffs did not pursue any error by the district court and acknowledged at oral argument that we have this jurisdiction over this appeal. We conclude that the district court decided all claims before it that were not abandoned. The order is a final judgment for purposes of this appeal.
This dispute centers around Harris County's policy of not permitting accrued comp time for non-exempt employees to rise above a predetermined level by directing employees to reduce the number of hours of accrued comp time. The district court held that accumulated comp time and salary must be treated the same way and that employees have a right to use comp time when they choose. Granting summary judgment for the class, the district concluded that Harris County's policy of controlling the amount of accrued comp time violated the FLSA. More precisely put, we must decide whether Harris County violates 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5) of the FLSA when it involuntarily shortens an employee's workweek with pay.
The relevant FLSA statute states:
(5) An employee of a public agency which is a State, political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency--
(A) who has accrued compensatory time off authorized to be provided under paragraph (1), and
(B) who has requested the use of such compensatory time, shall be permitted by the employee's employer to use such time within a reasonable period after making the request if the use of the compensatory time does not unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency.
29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5) (West Supp.1998).
Harris County contends that the 1985 Amendments to the Fair Labor Act of 1938, reflected above, were enacted to alleviate the economic burden upon state and local governments imposed by the Act's cash overtime requirements, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) (), as were the implementing Department of Labor regulations. The County urges that Congress must have intended for public employers to control the accrual of comp time because Congress contemplated a circumstance in which a public employer may elect to reduce or eliminate accrued comp time by making a cash payment. They point to 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(3)(B) which states that "if compensation is paid to an employee for accrued compensatory time off, such compensation shall be paid at the regular rate earned by the employee at the time the employee receives such payment." Since this statute permits a public employer to reduce accrued comp time with cash payments, Harris County asserts that reductions in comp time must be at the employer's option.
The class contends that Congress vested the employee, rather than the employer, with the right to determine the use of accrued comp time off. They urge that 29...
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...that employees use accrued compensatory time when their balances approach a set amount does not violate the FLSA. Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1998), aff’d sub nom., Christensen v. Harris County , 529 U.S. 576 (2000). Section 207(o) says nothing one way or the other about......
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...that employees use accrued compensatory time when their balances approach a set amount does not violate the FLSA. Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241 (5th 1998), aff’d sub nom., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). Section 207(o) says nothing one way or the other about compe......
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...that employees use accrued compensatory time when their balances approach a set amount does not violate the FLSA. Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1998), aff’d sub nom., Christensen v. Harris County , 529 U.S. 576 (2000). Section 207(o) says nothing one way or the other about......
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...that employees use accrued compensatory time when their balances approach a set amount does not violate the FLSA. Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1998), aff’d sub nom., Christensen v. Harris County , 529 U.S. 576 (2000). Section 207(o) says nothing one way or the other about......