Morel v. U.S. Xpress, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-1348-WBV-JVM SECTION: D (1) |
| Parties | MICHAEL MOREL, ET AL. v. U.S. XPRESS, INC., ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is Co-Defendant U.S. Xpress, Inc.'s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss All Claims.1 The Motion is opposed,2 and U.S. Xpress, Inc. has filed a Reply.3 After careful consideration of the parties' memoranda and the applicable law, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
This case involves claims of employment discrimination brought by Michael and Teresa Morel (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), arising out of Mr. Morel's employment with U.S. Xpress, Inc. ("Xpress"). Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Morel began working at Xpress on or around July 28, 2018 as a Transportation Supervisor II, earning $50,000 a year.4 Plaintiffs assert that during his initial interview, Mr. Morel notified Clayton Zieglor, Depot Manager at Xpress, of his limitations due to past knee replacements. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Morel suffers from a non-paralytic orthopedic disability which, among other things, prevents Mr. Morel from traversing stairs more than twoor three times a day without substantial pain and causing further damage to his knees.5 Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Ziegler never informed Mr. Morel that the position for which he was applying required climbing flights of stairs multiple times a day.6
Plaintiffs allege that after weeks of traversing the office stairs approximately 25 to 30 times per day, he requested an accommodation from Xpress regarding his disability, including a downstairs office.7 Plaintiffs assert that Xpress had the resources and opportunity to accommodate Mr. Morel's disability, but refused to do so.8 Plaintiffs allege that on September 28, 2018, while walking up the stairs after using the restroom, Mr. Morel's left knee buckled and gave way.9 Mr. Morel contacted the human resources department and was instructed to go to the emergency room.10 Mr. Morel drove himself to the emergency room and began physical therapy soon thereafter.11 Plaintiffs allege that this injury, and the refusal to accommodate Mr. Morel's disability, has led to multiple surgeries on Mr. Morel's knee and leg, and has left him reliant upon a cane to walk for the rest of his life.12
On May 5, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court against Xpress and Walmart Inc. ("Wal-Mart") (collectively, "Defendants"),13 asserting that Xpress violated Mr. Morel's rights under the Americans With Disabilities Act (the "ADA"),42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., Defendants violated the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, La. R.S. 23:301, et seq., and Wal-Mart violated The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).14 Teresa Morel also asserts a loss of consortium claim.15 Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, including an order restraining Defendants from engaging in further discriminatory conduct, compensatory and consequential damages, punitive damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and attorney's fees.16
Xpress filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss All Claims on August 4, 2020, seeking an order pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), compelling Mr. Morel to arbitrate all of his claims against Xpress and dismissing all of the claims asserted by Plaintiffs against Xpress.17 Xpress asserts that, as part of the hiring process, Mr. Morel signed a Nondisclosure and Nonsolicitation Agreement (the "Agreement") containing an arbitration clause, in which he agreed to submit legal claims related to his employment to binding arbitration.18 Xpress attached to its Motion the Declaration of Kelly McGraw, Director of Human Resources for Xpress.19 Ms. McGraw attests that as part of the hiring process, Mr. Morel electronically submitted and digitally signed the Agreement on July 12, 2018, containing thefollowing arbitration clause:
Ms. McGraw states that, as part of the hiring process, Mr. Morel was also provided with the "Xpress Resolution Program and Rules for Arbitration" (the "Arbitration Program").21 Ms. McGraw asserts that Mr. Morel specifically acknowledged in writing that Xpress provided him with a copy of the Arbitration Program and that Mr. Morel reviewed and agreed to its terms.22 Ms. McGraw states that if Mr. Morel had not digitally signed the Agreement, or if he had not acknowledged receipt of and his agreement to the terms of the Arbitration Program, Xpress would not have allowed him to begin his employment.23
Xpress argues that because Mr. Morel previously agreed to arbitrate all of the claims asserted against Xpress in his Complaint, the FAA and controlling Supreme Court authority require that the Court compel him to arbitrate those claims pursuant to the FAA and to dismiss or, alternatively, stay Mr. Morel's claims against Xpress pursuant to the FAA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).24 Xpress further asserts that Mrs. Morel's loss of consortium claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) or, alternatively, stayed pending arbitration of Mr. Morel's claims against Xpress, since the loss of consortium claim derives from Mr. Morel's employment discrimination claims.25
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion, asserting that Mr. Morel's claims are excluded from arbitration because they do not fall within the definition of "Legal Dispute" set forth in the Arbitration Program.26 The Arbitration Program provides the following definition:
"Legal Dispute" means any dispute between a Participant and the Company that involves any legal or equitable claim, regardless of when the events on which it is based occurred, including events before or after a Participant's employment and events before a Participant became subject to this Program (unless such Legal Dispute was already asserted in a court or before an administrative adjudicative body).27
Plaintiffs argue that the definition of "Legal Dispute" contains a "carveout" for legal disputes already asserted in a court or before an administrative adjudicative body, including the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the"EEOC").28 Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Morel timely filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC against Xpress on January 24, 2020, based upon the same allegations contained in the Complaint.29 Plaintiffs argue that because Mr. Morel filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC before filing suit in federal court, all of his claims fall within the "carveout" set forth in the arbitration clause and, therefore, are not subject to arbitration.30
Plaintiffs further assert that Mr. Morel's discrimination claims are not subject to arbitration because he could not have consented to arbitrate future claims that were unknown at the time of executing the Agreement and the Arbitration Program.31 Finally, Plaintiffs argue the arbitration clause is not enforceable under Louisiana law because there is insufficient evidence that Mr. Morel's consent was freely given.32 Plaintiffs contend that mutual consent is lacking because Xpress was in a position of greater bargaining power and had the ability to unilaterally dictate the terms of the arbitration clause without any negotiation.33
In response, Xpress maintains that Mr. Morel's claims are covered by the arbitration clause because the claims asserted in the Complaint were not already in court or before an adjudicative body at the time Mr. Morel signed the Agreement containing the arbitration clause.34 Xpress asserts that Plaintiffs' strained interpretation of the term "Legal Dispute" makes no sense, and that any doubtsconcerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.35 Xpress points out that Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for their assertion that Mr. Morel could not consent to arbitrate future claims, and further assert that the arbitration clause indisputably is an agreement to arbitrate future claims.36 Finally, Xpress asserts there is nothing unconscionable about the arbitration clause, noting that Mr. Morel was given the opportunity to opt-out of certain aspects of the Arbitration Program and he chose not to.37 Xpress argues that Plaintiffs' unsupported assertions regarding unequal bargaining power have repeatedly been rejected as grounds for not enforcing arbitration agreements.38
A. Motion to Compel Arbitration
The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (the "FAA"), governs the enforceability of arbitration agreements in federal court. The FAA provides that an arbitration agreement in writing "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."39 Additionally, a party to an arbitration agreement "may petition...
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