Moreland v. Gold Kist, Inc., CV 95-PT-2587-S.
Decision Date | 20 December 1995 |
Docket Number | No. CV 95-PT-2587-S.,CV 95-PT-2587-S. |
Citation | 908 F. Supp. 898 |
Parties | Ellen MORELAND, Plaintiff, v. GOLD KIST, INC., et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
James M. Patton, Rodden Hayes & Carter, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for plaintiff.
Mac B. Greaves, Sadler Sullivan Sharp Fishburne & Van Tassel, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for defendants.
This cause comes on to be heard on Plaintiff's Motion To Remand filed on November 13, 1995. Plaintiff's motion is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) which states: "A civil action in State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States."1
Plaintiff's claim is that she was the victim of a retaliatory discharge as forbidden by § 25-5-11.1, Code of Alabama. That section provides:
No employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because the employee has instituted or maintained any action against the employer to recover workers' compensation benefits under this chapter or solely because the employee has filed a written notice of violation of a safety rule pursuant to subdivision (c)(4) of Section 25-5-11.
Plaintiff argues that her retaliation claim is brought pursuant to that section and cites Subra v. CMS Therapies, Inc., 900 F.Supp. 407 (M.D.Ala.1995), where the court stated:
As stated in Pettaway v. Wayne Poultry Company, 791 F.Supp. 290 (M.D.Ala. 1992), § 25-5-11.1 is a subsection of Title 25 of the Alabama Code, covering "Industrial Relations." Chapter 5 of this Title, where the statute at issue is located, is entitled "Workers' Compensation." Not only is it located in the chapter of the Code dealing with workers' compensation, but it is also clearly a part of Alabama's statutory scheme for dealing with on the job injuries. Further, unlike Illinois, Alabama case law establishes that a claim for retaliatory discharge did not exist prior to the effective date of § 25-5-11.1.
In Jackson County Hospital v. Alabama Hospital Association Trust, 619 So.2d 1369, 1370-71 (Ala.1993), the court stated:
The court added:
This court does not agree with the holding in Subra.2 The quoted language in Jackson County not only states why the retaliation claim is a tort claim which does not arise under the Alabama workers' compensation laws, it also suggests reasons why, even under federal law, the claim does not arise "under the workmen's compensation laws of such State...." 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c).3 These suggestions include the following:
(1) Alabama law does not tie "the claim to damages relating to workers' compensation benefits."
(2) "A plaintiff who brings such a claim can be awarded damages under the general law of torts."
(3) The Alabama court notes that "claims that do `arise under' worker's compensation laws are generally for occupational diseases and accidental injuries resulting from one's employment."4
All these reasons are applicable to any consideration of whether a § 25-5-11.1 claim arises under workmen's compensation laws for the purpose of considering the issue of removal under federal law. The Spearman case cited in Subra relies on Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 705, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 1349, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) where the court stated "Hence the Act of Congress must be construed as setting up its own criteria, irrespective of local law, for determining in what instances suits are to be removed from the state to the federal courts." Here, Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) has referred to claims arising "under the workmen's compensation laws of such State." Who better to determine whether a claim so arises than the Supreme Court of the "State?" The federal statute does not say "related" to such laws, but "arising under" such laws.
Spearman, supra, held as this court is holding.5 This court is of the opinion that the fact that the Illinois claim was not based on a statute, but under common law, is a distinction without a difference. ("But whether a state has codified a statute as part of its workers' compensation chapter does not determine whether a claim filed under that statute is `one arising under the workers' compensation laws' for the purpose of section 1445(c).") Jones v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1991). To the extent that Jones is otherwise inconsistent with this court's holding, the court declines to follow it. Since Jones decided...
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