Morelock v. Intercontinental Hotels Grp. Res., LLC.
| Decision Date | 13 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | SD 37022 |
| Citation | 644 S.W.3d 843 |
| Parties | Melissa MORELOCK, Appellant, v. INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP RESOURCES, LLC., Six Continents Hotels, Inc., Myer Family Hotel Company and Holiday Hospitality Franchising, LLC., Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appellant's attorney: David A. Lunceford, Lee's Summit.
Respondents’ attorneys: Jessica L. Liss, St. Louis and Amanda E. Sisney.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit initiated by Melissa Morelock alleging various violations by her employers of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), see sections 213.010-.137.1 The parties named as defendants by Morelock in her second amended petition—Intercontinental Hotels Group Resources, LLC ("IHGR"), Myer Family Hotel Company ("MFHC"), Six Continents Hotels, Inc. ("SCH"), and Holiday Hospitality Franchising, LLC ("HHF") (collectively referred to as "Defendants")—ultimately sought and were granted summary judgment in their favor. See Rule 74.04.2 Morelock timely appeals the trial court's judgment, raising five points. Determining that Morelock's first, second, and fourth points have merit, we reverse and remand.
In her second amended petition, Morelock generally alleges that she "was employed by Defendants from approximately May 17, 2017 through on or about July 13, 2018." Then, in four counts against Defendants, Morelock alleges that during said employment she was subjected to age discrimination, disability discrimination, a hostile working environment, and retaliation, all in violation of the MHRA ("counts 1 through 4").
After Morelock filed her second amended petition, Defendants filed a Rule 55.27 motion to dismiss ("motion to dismiss"). The motion to dismiss asserted various legal reasons that the second amended petition should be dismissed, including, inter alia , because "Plaintiff's claims against SCH, MFHC, and HHF[ ] are time-barred because they were not filed within 90 days of the administrative agency's issuance of the notice of right to sue"; "IHGR was not Plaintiff's employer nor does IHGR have any relationship to Plaintiff or her former employer"; and "Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies against IHGR ...." The motion to dismiss included argument referencing legal authority and the contents of five evidentiary exhibits, which were attached to the motion.
Morelock moved to strike Defendants’ motion to dismiss, asserting that the attached evidentiary exhibits converted it to a motion for summary judgment and that Defendants failed to follow the required summary judgment procedures under Rule 74.04. Following a hearing, the trial court issued relevant rulings as follows: "the Court, relying on Supreme Court Rules 55.27(b) and 74.04, will consider Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss a Motion for Summary Judgment and order Defendant[s] to answer [Morelock]’s 2d Amended Petition within 20 days ...."
Defendants timely filed answers to the second amended petition. As relevant here, those answers included denials of Morelock's allegations that she had been an employee of Defendants and affirmatively alleged that "Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations" and "Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies" (collectively referred to as the "affirmative defenses").
Defendants thereafter filed a "motion for summary judgment" on Morelock's second amended petition and a supporting statement of uncontroverted material facts ("SUMF") containing 15 numbered paragraphs of purported uncontroverted material facts. In their motion, Defendants asserted that they were entitled to summary judgment because:
(1) Plaintiff's claims against SCH, MFHC, and HHFL are time-barred because they were not filed within 90 days of the administrative agency's issuance of the notice of right to sue; (2) IHGR was not Plaintiff's employer nor does IHGR have any relationship to Plaintiff or her former employer; (3) HHFL is not subject to the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA") because HHFL has no employees and is thus not an employer as defined by the MHRA; (4) Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies against IHGR, SCH, and HHFL; and (5) finally, even if the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims against SCH, MFHC, and HHFL were timely, that IHGR is a proper party, and that HHFL is subject to the MHRA, Plaintiff's claims still must fail because she has not adequately plead a cognizable cause of action under the MHRA.
The 15 numbered paragraphs in Defendants’ SUMF asserted:
(Specific references to supporting documents omitted.)
Thereafter, Morelock filed motions to strike the portions of Defendants’ answers and motion for summary judgment regarding the affirmative defenses. Morelock argued that the defenses in question were not properly pleaded as they contained no allegations of fact and failed to cite the statutory sections on which they relied. Defendants did not seek leave to amend their answers but, rather, filed a reply in support of their motion for summary judgment in which they argued that they raised and set forth the facts in support of their affirmative defenses in their motion to dismiss and attached memorandum.
Following a hearing, the trial court ultimately granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The legal bases for summary judgment, as described by the trial court in its judgment, were threefold: (1) "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate as to the claims against IHGR because it was not [Morelock]’s employer ..."; (2) "because [Morelock] failed to exhaust administrative remedies against IHGR"; and (3) "[t]he claims against SCH, MFHC, and HHF are time barred under the applicable statute of limitations ...."
This appeal timely follows. Points 1, 2, and 4, each of which separately challenges respectively the trial court's three bases for summary judgment, are dispositive. For ease of analysis, we discuss points 2 and 4 together.
The trial court makes its decision to grant summary judgment based on the pleadings, record submitted, and the law; therefore, this Court need not defer to the trial court's determination and reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. In reviewing the decision to grant summary judgment, this Court applies the same criteria as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was proper. Summary judgment is only proper if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to the material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Goerlitz v. City of Maryville , 333 S.W.3d 450, 452 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal citations omitted).
In her first point, Morelock challenges the trial court's first legal basis for summary judgment—"[s]ummary judgment is appropriate as to the claims against IHGR because it was not [Morelock]’s employer ...." Morelock argues that this legal basis fails because Defendants’ SUMF failed to make the prima facie showing necessary to support it. We agree.
The legal authority upon which Morelock's counts 1 through 4 are premised is found within the following statutory framework:
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