Moreno v. City of Clarksville

• Decision Date: 18 September 2015
• Citation: 479 S.W.3d 795
• Parties: Richard Moreno v. City of Clarksville
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

479 S.W.3d 795

Richard Moreno

v.City of Clarksville

Supreme Court of Tennessee, AT NASHVILLE.

February 5, 2015 Session

Filed September 18, 2015

Amy J. Farrar, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, Lance A. Baker and Jeffrey T. Goodson, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, City of Clarksville, Tennessee.

Bruce Kennedy and John T. Maher, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Richard Moreno.

Holly Kirby, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Sharon G. Lee, C.J., Cornelia A. Clark, and Jeffrey S. Bivins, JJ., joined.

OPINION

Holly Kirby, J.

In this appeal, the claimant seeks to toll the statute of limitations on his claim against a municipality based on two statutes: (1) Tennessee Code Annotated § 20–1–119, the 90–day "window" in Tennessee's comparative fault statute to name a non–party defendant as a comparative tortfeasor, and (2) Tennessee Code Annotated § 9–8–402(b), the tolling provision in the Tennessee Claims Commission Act that states that the filing of written notice of a claim against the State tolls all statutes of limitations as to other persons potentially liable to the claimant. The trial court dismissed the claimant's complaint against the municipality. It held that, because the antecedent complaint against the State of Tennessee was filed in the Tennessee Claims Commission after expiration of the one–year limitations period, the 90–day window under Section 20–1–119 to file the lawsuit against the municipality, as a comparative tortfeasor, was never triggered. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the claimant's written notice of his claim against the State, filed with the Division of Claims Administration before the one–year limitations period elapsed, was an "original complaint" within the meaning of Section 201–119, so the lawsuit against the municipality was timely. The municipality appeals. We hold that the complaint, not the written notice of a claim, is the "original complaint" under Section 20–1–119, so the 90–day window to name a non–party defendant as a comparative tortfeasor was never triggered in this case. We also hold that Section 9–8402(b), the tolling provision in the Claims Commission Act, is not applicable to toll the statute of limitations for a claim against a municipality filed under Tennessee's Governmental Tort Liability Act. Therefore, this action is time–barred.

Factual and Procedural Background

On December 24, 2009, at approximately 5:00 p.m., as Appellee Richard Moreno was driving his car across the Neal Tarpley Bridge in Clarksville, Tennessee, a large tree fell across the bridge onto Mr. Moreno's vehicle. The tree was planted on property owned by the State of Tennessee. Mr. Moreno sustained serious bodily injury in the accident, as well as significant property damage.

On December 17, 2010, within one year of the accident, Mr. Moreno filed a timely written notice of his claim against the State of Tennessee with the Tennessee Department of Treasury's Division of Claims Administration ("Division of Claims"), in accordance with the Tennessee Claims Commission Act.¹ Section 9–8–402(a) of the Claims Commission Act provides that the claimant must "give written notice of the claimant's claim to the division of claims administration as a condition precedent to recovery." Tenn.Code Ann. § 9–8–402(a)(1). Mr. Moreno's written notice consisted of a signed and dated Tennessee Department of Treasury form filled out with his information and two attached exhibits: Mr. Moreno's description of the accident and a description of the damages he incurred, including his medical expenses available at the time of the notice and the estimated damages to his vehicle. In the written notice, Mr. Moreno asserted that he had sustained over $25,000 in damages, with the proviso that he expected additional medical bills because he was still receiving treatment for his injuries.

For reasons that do not appear in the record, the Division of Claims failed to either honor or deny Mr. Moreno's claim within the 90–day period set forth in Section 9–8402(c).² Tenn.Code Ann. § 9–8–402(c). Consequently, in accordance with the statute, on March 17, 2011, the Division of Claims transferred Mr. Moreno's claim to the administrative clerk of the Claims Commission. Id.

On March 30, 2011, Mr. Moreno received an initial order from the Claims Commissioner, outlining the Claims Commission's governing procedures. Among other things, the order stated: "A formal complaint should be filed with the Clerk's Office and served upon the Commissioner and opposing counsel within thirty days of transfer of any claim to the Commission."

As per the order, on April 14, 2011, Mr. Moreno filed a formal complaint against the State of the Tennessee with the Claims Commission. The complaint alleged that the State maintained and created the roadway and bridge, as well as the surrounding trees and other foliage, in a manner that was negligent and grossly negligent.

On May 18, 2011, the State filed an answer to Mr. Moreno's complaint. The answer included several affirmative defenses but did not mention other potential tortfeasors. Discovery ensued.

Sixteen months later, on September 18, 2012, the State filed a motion to amend its answer. The amended answer alleged that the Appellant in this case, the City of Clarksville, Tennessee ("City of Clarksville" or "City") was comparatively at fault in Mr. Moreno's accident. The State asserted that a recent inspection indicated that water runoff may have created erosion that rendered the subject tree unstable and caused it to fall on Mr. Moreno's vehicle. The amended answer asserted that the water run–off may have come from a City of Clarksville storm drain, rather than from a state road. On October 5, 2012, the Claims Commission filed an order permitting this amendment to the State's original answer.

In response, on November 5, 2012, Mr. Moreno filed a motion with the Claims Commission to amend his original complaint to add the City of Clarksville as a defendant, based on its alleged negligence. The motion attached a copy of the proposed amended complaint.

On November 26, 2012, before the Claims Commission acted on Mr. Moreno's motion to amend his complaint, Mr. Moreno filed a separate complaint against the City in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Tennessee. The Circuit Court complaint alleged that the City was negligent and not immune from suit under Tennessee's Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA).³ Mr. Moreno's Circuit Court complaint stated:

5. This Complaint is being filed pursuant to T.C.A. § 20–1–119 and Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.⁴

6. That a timely Complaint was filed with the Claims Commission of the State of Tennessee Claim No. T21000677. That an Answer was filed by the State of Tennessee.

7. That on September 18, 2012[,] the State of Tennessee filed a Motion to Amend their Answer to include the City of Clarksville. On October 5, 2012 [,] an Order was entered allowing the State to amend their Answer. That on November 2, 2012, the Claimant filed a Motion to Amend the original Complaint.

(Footnote added).

After Mr. Moreno filed the Circuit Court complaint against the City of Clarksville, he filed a motion with the Claims Commission to withdraw his pending motion to amend the Claims Commission complaint to add the City of Clarksville as a defendant. The motion to withdraw was granted, so Mr. Moreno's complaint with the Claims Commission was not amended to add the City as a defendant.

On February 11, 2013, the City of Clarksville filed a motion in the Circuit Court to dismiss Mr. Moreno's claim. The motion asserted that Mr. Moreno's claim was time–barred under Tennessee Code Annotated § 20–1–119, Tennessee's comparative fault statute, which governs the addition of a defendant where a named defendant asserts in its answer that a person not a party to the suit caused or contributed to the injury.

On February 20, 2013, Mr. Moreno and the State entered into a consent order under which the Claims Commission transferred the Claims Commission proceedings against the State to the Montgomery County Circuit Court.⁵ After the transfer, no other proceedings remained pending before the Claims Commission. In the Circuit Court, Mr. Moreno's claims against the State and his claims against the City of Clarksville were consolidated into a single action.

On April 26, 2013, the Circuit Court held a hearing on the City's motion to dismiss. Counsel for Mr. Moreno argued that the Circuit Court should deny the City's motion to dismiss. He stressed that he had fully complied with the procedural requirements in the Claims Commission Act. He contended that Mr. Moreno's claim against the City was timely based on two different statutes: (1) Tennessee Code Annotated § 9–8–402(b), the provision in the Claims Commission Act that states that the filing of the written notice in the Claims Commission "tolls all statutes of limitations as to other persons potentially liable" due to the occurrence that is the subject of the claim, and (2) Tennessee Code Annotated § 20–1–119, the provision in the comparative fault statutes that permits a plaintiff to add a defendant who was named in an answer as potentially at fault for the injury.

Counsel for the City of Clarksville argued that the Circuit Court should grant the motion to dismiss. He emphasized the plain language of Section 20–1–119 and contended that the claimant must file an "original complaint" within the original statute of limitations in order to take advantage of the 90–day statutory window to add a non–party who is named in an answer as potentially at fault. He analogized the pre–suit written notice in the Claims Commission Act to the pre–suit notice required in a health care liability action. He also argued that Section 9–8–402(b) was inapplicable.

On May 20, 2013, the Circuit Court entered an order granting the City's motion to dismiss. In considering Tennessee Code Annotated § 20–1–119, the Circuit Court observed that Mr. Moreno filed his Claims Commission...