Morey v. Carroll Cnty., Civil Case No.: ELH-17-2250
| Decision Date | 03 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Case No.: ELH-17-2250 |
| Parties | MADELINE M. MOREY, Plaintiff, v. CARROLL COUNTY, GOVERNMENT, et.al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff Madeline Morey filed suit against defendants "Carroll County Government" and the "Carroll County Board of Commissioners" (collectively, "Carroll County" or the "County"). ECF 1.1 In a First Amended Complaint (ECF 17), Morey alleges retaliation, in violation of several statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981"); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. ("Title VI"); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. ("Section 504"); and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act ("MFEPA"), Md. Code , § 20-601 et seq. of the State Government Article ("S.G."). Plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive damages.
Defendants filed a pre-discovery, combined motion to dismiss in part and motion for summary judgment. ECF 21. The motion is supported by a memorandum of law (ECF 21-1) (collectively, the "Motion") and several exhibits. Plaintiff opposes the Motion (ECF 24, "Opposition"), supported by several exhibits. Defendants have replied. ECF 25 ("Reply").
No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons stated below, I shall grant the Motion in part and deny it in part.
The County hired plaintiff on May 28, 2013, to serve as its "Director of the Department of Citizen Services." ECF 17, ¶ 16. Plaintiff's responsibilities included supervising 60 to 70 employees and overseeing "Transit"; the Aging and Disabilities Bureau; the Bureau of Housing; Children Services for Carroll County; and Coordinator with regard to the Americans with Disabilities Act. ECF 17, ¶¶ 17-18. A department within the Bureau of Housing, known as the Public Housing Authority, "receives federal funding from [the] U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ('HUD') to administer the Section 8 Housing Choice voucher program." ECF 21-4 (), ¶¶ 3, 4. The federal funding is known as "Housing Assistance Payment ('HAP')." Id. at ¶ 4..
In September 2014, plaintiff received a complaint from an employee, Janet Boyd, who informed plaintiff that other employees "were engag[ing] in intentional racial discrimination and disability discrimination," which was allegedly in violation of Title VI, Title VII, and § 504. ECF 17, ¶¶ 19-20. Specifically, Ms. Boyd informed plaintiff that "'people who are of another race, in poverty or need accommodation for a disability [are] viewed as an annoyance' and weredenied County benefits under programs receiving federal financial assistance." Id. ¶ 21 (brackets in ¶ 21). Thereafter, plaintiff reported the complaints to the County's Human Resources Department ("HR"). Id. ¶ 23.
A month later, on October 2, 2014, "a former Bureau of Housing employee," Lena Bauerlein, informed plaintiff that "her coworkers, [particularly Rita Zimmerman], had created a hostile work environment in the Bureau . . . and that Ms. Bauerlein believed she had been discriminated against based on her religious beliefs (Buddhism)." Id. ¶ 24.3 Again, plaintiff reported these complaints to HR. Id. ¶ 25. Thereafter, on October 27, 2014, "a County housing recipient" reported to plaintiff that County employees were discriminating against her "because of her race and because her Daughter is a disabled person under the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act ["ADA"]." Id. ¶ 26. Upon further investigation, plaintiff discovered that the housing recipient, who is Jewish, was asked to provide additional income documentation that "other non-Jewish [non-disabled,] housing recipients and County employees were not required to provide[.]" Id. ¶¶ 28-29. Plaintiff also discovered that Rita Zimmerman, the Deputy Director of Citizen Services, was ignoring the recipient's calls. ECF 17, ¶ 28.
Subsequently, at an unspecified time, but apparently prior to July 1, 2015, plaintiff made additional reports to HR, including: (1) Ms. Boyd had observed Bureau of Housing employees "failing to provide accommodations to people with disabilities and denying services to housing recipients based on [their] race"; (2) Ms. Boyd "was retaliated against for opposing discriminatory practices"; (3) Ms. Bauerlein was terminated because "she had complained about how staff recipients were being treated." Id. ¶¶ 31-34.
On July 1, 2015, in light of plaintiff's "excellent performance," defendants gave plaintiff a four-year contract extension, through June 30, 2019, along with a pay raise. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. Later that month, female members of plaintiff's staff complained to plaintiff that, under defendants' Grant Contingent Employment Policy (the "Policy"), females were treated "differently" from male employees, and "female County employees . . . earn[ed] less money than similarly situated male County employees." Id. ¶ 38. On July 29, 2015, upon discovering that the Policy did, in fact, cause female employees to earn less than male employees, see id. ¶ 39, plaintiff complained about the Policy to the County Administrator, Roberta Windham. Id. ¶ 40. The following day, July 30, 2015, plaintiff filed a written complaint with HR regarding the disparate treatment of the female employees. Id. ¶ 41.
Another County employee, Dorothy Miles, reported to plaintiff on August 19, 2015, that "employees under Plaintiff's supervision were creating a hostile work environment." Id. ¶ 42. Ms. Miles, who is Caucasian, is married to an African American male and has biracial children. Id. ¶ 43. Ms. Miles told plaintiff that, as a result of her marriage, employees Zimmerman and Loretta Pressimone, Ms. Miles's supervisors, were discriminating against her, "had made inappropriate racial comments," and were treating "County constituents differently based on race." Id. ¶¶ 43-44. On August 25, 2015, plaintiff notified HR of Ms. Miles's complaints, id. ¶ 45, and on September 16, 2015, plaintiff directly informed Kim Frock, the HR Director. Id. ¶ 46.
Plaintiff was terminated on September 17, 2015. Id. ¶ 47. Ms. Miles was subsequently terminated. Id. At the time of plaintiff's termination, Windham told plaintiff that "the County was 'planning a re-organization.'" Id. ¶ 49. And, the County told the Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, Division of Unemployment Insurance ("DLLR"), that plaintiff's position was "eliminated pursuant to reorganization." Id. ¶ 50. Moreover, the Countystated that plaintiff was terminated for "'no-cause.'" Id. ¶ 51. As a result, the County was not required to provide plaintiff with the opportunity to improve her work performance. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. Yet, plaintiff "was the only employee affected by the 'reorganization.'" Id. ¶ 61. Moreover, Frock, the HR Director, asserts in her Affidavit (ECF 21-6) that plaintiff "was terminated for reasons related to her job performance, namely her lack of accessibility and ineffective leadership." Id. ¶ 8.
On October 1, 2015, plaintiff filed a charge (the "Charge") with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights. Id. ¶ 81.4 She also asserts substantial compliance with the Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act ("LGTCA"), Md. Code (2013, 2017 Supp.), §§ 5-301 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("C.J."). ECF 17, ¶¶ 63-80.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants terminated her in retaliation for her "protected complaints about unlawful race discrimination" (ECF 17, ¶ 86), and because she opposed the County's discriminatory employment practices. ECF 17, ¶¶ 87, 107-110, 115-118. The claims are made under five statutes: Title VII, MFEPA, § 1981, Title VI, and § 504. Defendants seek dismissal in part and/or summary judgment as to each of plaintiff's retaliation claims. ECF 21.
In particular, defendants contend that, as to the MFEPA claim, plaintiff has failed to comply with the notice requirement under the LGTCA, C.J. § 5-304. Further, defendants argue that plaintiff "has failed to state a cognizable claim under Title VI" and under § 1981. ECF 21-1 at 2. In addition, defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to exhaust a portion of her Title VII claim. And, defendants posit that plaintiff "has not alleged and/or cannot prove all of theelements of retaliation under any statute." ECF 21-1 at 2.5 And, defendants contend that plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is subject to dismissal.
"Motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies are governed by [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Clarke v. DynCorp Int'l LLC, 962 F. Supp. 2d 781, 786 (D. Md. 2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Demetres v. East West Const., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015); see also The Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. The Cty. Comm'rs Of Carroll Cty., MD, 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion should be granted "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Clarke, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 786 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may proceed "in one of two ways": either a facial challenge, asserting that the allegations pleaded in the complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, or a factual challenge, asserting "'that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true.'" Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (...
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