Morey v. Colvin

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
• Writing for the Court: Patricia A. Sullivan, United States Magistrate Judge
• Decision Date: 05 October 2015
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 14-433M
• Citation: Morey v. Colvin, C.A. No. 14-433M (D. R.I. Oct 05, 2015)
• Parties: CHRISTINA L. MOREY, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

CHRISTINA L. MOREY, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

C.A. No. 14-433M

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

October 5, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Patricia A. Sullivan, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Christina L. Morey, a young woman suffering from anxiety, depression and polysubstance abuse, asks this Court to reverse the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under §§ 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (the "Act"). She contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") committed reversible error by independently interpreting raw data beyond the ken of a lay person, by failing properly to evaluate the opinions of the testifying medical expert, the state agency reviewing psychologists and her treating sources, and by improperly discounting her credibility. Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin ("Defendant") has filed a Motion for an order affirming the Commissioner's decision. This matter has been referred to me for preliminary review, findings and recommended disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having reviewed the entire record, I find neither legal error nor material factual mistake. Accordingly, I recommend that Plaintiff's Motion for Reversal of the Disability Determination of the Commissioner of Social Security (ECF No. 7) be DENIED and that Defendant's Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner (ECF No. 10) be GRANTED.

I. Background

A. Plaintiff's Characteristics

Plaintiff is a "younger individual." She was thirty-two years old when the ALJ rendered his adverse decision. Tr. 29, 52, 264. She had completed some college and worked as a sales representative, waitress and veterinary technician. Tr. 29, 81, 269. On her alleged onset of disability in October 2008, she stopped working after she was fired by the veterinarian for being "late all the time." She claims she cannot work because leaving the house causes excessive anxiety and because she is obsessive about hand-washing, cleaning and other tasks. Tr. 54-55, 74, 80. Her relationships with members of her family are also a source of anxiety; nevertheless, she lives with family, at times with her parents and at times with a grandmother or with an aunt, depending on the level of conflict. Tr. 52, 334. Despite the claim that she rarely leaves the home, the record reflects that during the period of alleged disability she went out weekly to help her grandmother, gardened, occasionally shopped, cared for the family dog by walking it outside (usually at night to avoid seeing other people) and, except for a two year hiatus, went to church and sang in the church choir. Tr. 28, 59, 70-73, 286-88. She also washes dishes, does laundry, vacuums, cleans and prepares simple frozen and canned meals. Id. In addition to spending time with her family, she socializes with her best friend and with her boyfriend of eleven years. Tr. 70, 290.

As reflected in the record, Plaintiff has been hospitalized twice for psychiatric and substance abuse issues: the first time was prior to onset while she was still working when she was admitted to Butler Hospital in January 2008; and the second was an admission to Kent Hospital in October 2011. Tr. 333-38, 374-411. At Butler, substance abuse was the primary diagnosis, while the Kent hospitalization was related to substance abuse in that it was initiated asan involuntary certification by her family, triggered by her ingestion of her aunt's Vicodin. Tr. 336, 388, 408. Apart from these episodes, virtually all of her mental health treatment has been limited to medical management appointments with nurses, physician's assistants and social workers at Thundermist Health Center ("Thundermist") and several months of substance abuse counseling at the Kent Center in 2009 and early 2010. Tr. 347-71, 420-551. Three months before the hearing on her applications, she switched from Thundermist to Quality Behavioral Health ("QBH"), where she started treating with a psychiatrist and started counseling with a nurse. Tr. 557-79.

Plaintiff has a long list of mental health diagnoses and claimed impairments. They include sleep apnea, chronic fatigue syndrome, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, mood disorder, depressive disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder ("OCD"), polysubstance dependence (alcohol, cannabis, amphetamines and tobacco) and long-term use of medications. Tr. 21, 147, 149, 421.

B. Plaintiff's Prior Applications

These are Plaintiff's second set of applications; because the issues presented in her first set arguably are still in issue, they are described here in detail. With the assistance of an attorney, she initially applied for DIB on February 23, 2009, and for SSI on April 26, 2010, claiming that she had been unable to work since October 24, 2008. Tr. 144. The first ALJ found that she had an array of severe impairments: ADHD, mood disorder, depressive disorder, anxiety, OCD and polysubstance abuse (alcohol, cannabis and amphetamines). Tr. 147. In the prior applications, Plaintiff claimed that she had difficulty leaving her house because she is embarrassed to be seen and she gets sidetracked by obsessions like the need to clean or wash her hands. Tr. 148. According to the prior record, before onset, she worked for three years as aveterinarian's technician and for six years in sales at Macy's; after onset, she continued to work, caring for the child of a friend and cleaning houses. In addition, she kept active by singing in the church choir, doing chores at home and caring for the dog. Tr. 56-57, 148-49.

The first set of applications reflected serious alcohol abuse early in the period of alleged disability, with reduced use but not total sobriety later in the period; the record also reflected regular use of marijuana, occasional use of opiates taken from family and friends and overuse of prescribed Adderall.¹ Tr. 149. A testifying medical expert opined that Plaintiff's medications were not properly prescribed or used, noting that Klonopin should never be mixed with alcohol, that Adderall should not be used to get up in the morning and that Plaintiff's overuse of Adderall may be the cause of her obsessive behaviors. Id. Because significant doses of prescribed medication mixed with various non-prescribed substances (alcohol, marijuana and opiates) could be the cause of many of her symptoms, this medical expert concluded that Plaintiff's substance abuse needed to be treated before any psychiatric diagnosis could be rendered. Tr. 150. Relying on Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") scores ranging from 48 to 60,² mental status examination results largely within normal limits, and discounting her credibility based on lies totreatment providers, overuse of prescribed Adderall and use of opiates taken from family members, the prior ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled from October 24, 2008, to the date of her decision (August 8, 2011). Tr. 150-152. In light of this finding, no analysis of the materiality of substance abuse was performed. Tr. 154.

C. Plaintiff's Mental Health Treatment

The medical record associated with the current applications begins on January 29, 2008, prior to Plaintiff's 2008 onset date, with her admission to Butler Hospital, beginning as an in-patient, and then in the day program. Tr. 334, 338. She was treated for complaints of "mood lability, feelings of hopelessness, alcohol dependence, and amphetamine and opio[i]d abuse." Tr. 334. At discharge, her GAF score was assessed at 51, polysubstance abuse was the primary diagnosis and a mental status examination was "unremarkable," including observations that her attention/concentration was "attentive to interview," her affect/mood was "ok, [a]ffect congruent and reactive with mood" and her insight/judgment was "improved." Tr. 335-36. Alcohol withdrawal symptoms had resolved by the time of discharge. Tr. 334. Although she had been prescribed Adderall prior to admission, it was not prescribed by the physicians at Butler; at discharge, amphetamine dependence was one of her secondary diagnoses. Tr. 336-37.

For most of the period of alleged disability, from December 2008 until February 2013, Plaintiff received mental health treatment from nurses, physician's assistants and social workers at Thundermist; these visits were generally once a month for "medication management," principally with a nurse, Cynthia Jankowski. Tr. 422-512, 518-31, 536-49. The treatment notes show that Plaintiff was anxious and her thought process was obsessive, but she was otherwise cooperative, well-groomed, fully oriented, with "good" attention, "fair" insight and judgment and intact and logical thought process; she was assigned GAF scores generally ranging from 55to 60, with an occasional dip to 50. Tr. 422-28, 466-84, 518-31. At times, providers recorded that she was "feeling well . . . happy to be feeling better," "feeling very strong and happy" and "remains actively involved w/ her [c]hurch-attending mass, choirs and other church related activity," while they also observed that her "hands appeared red and irritated" from use of cleaning wipes. Tr. 440, 442, 448, 468. In January 2011, Plaintiff told Nurse Jankowski that she was feeling well, with good mood, and was reunited with an old childhood friend for whom she was planning to babysit. Tr. 446. Despite Thundermist's recognition that "amphetamine abuse-unspec" was one of her "active problems," Tr. 421, throughout her treatment at Thundermist by an array of providers (none of whom is an "acceptable medical source"), her prescription for Adderall was continued. Thundermist records do not reflect that providers believed that Plaintiff needed more intensive mental health treatment.

In addition to medication management at Thundermist,...