Morey v. Independent School District
Citation | 312 F. Supp. 1257 |
Decision Date | 08 September 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 1-69 Civ. 74.,1-69 Civ. 74. |
Parties | Edith MOREY, Plaintiff, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT #492 et al., Defendants. |
Court | United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Court of Minnesota |
William E. Falvey, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.
Raymond B. Ondov, Austin, Minn., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM
In February of 1962 the defendant school district, acting through the school board, attempted to terminate plaintiff's teaching contract. An evidentiary hearing was held before the school board which resulted in plaintiff's discharge. Various litigation ensued, see, Morey v. School Board of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 492, 268 Minn. 110, 128 N.W.2d 302 (1964); Morey v. School Board of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 492, 271 Minn. 445, 136 N.W.2d 105 (1965); Morey v. School Board of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 492,276 Minn. 48, 148 N.W.2d 370 (1967). In each of the above-cited cases the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the action of the school board was defective insofar as the board either failed to make adequate findings of fact, or the evidence adduced at the hearing was insufficient to warrant plaintiff's discharge.
Thereafter, plaintiff brought an action for back pay in the Mower County District Court for the State of Minnesota. The action was entitled: Edith Morey, Plaintiff v. Independent School District No. 492, Mower County, Defendant. The case was tried before a state district court judge, without a jury. Plaintiff was awarded damages of $26,888.19 for back salary, interest, and various medical and hospital insurance benefits. The damages were intended to reimburse plaintiff for losses suffered between September, 1962 and February, 1967. In his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and accompanying memorandum,1 the state district court judge specifically determined that plaintiff was not entitled to be reimbursed for any increments in her salary during the period. Plaintiff did not appeal this decision. In March of 1967, plaintiff resumed her teaching job for defendant school district, and she is so employed at the present time.
The Complaint then demands judgment for $14,301.00 for lost earnings, $50,000 for damages to plaintiff's reputation, and $50,000.00 for exemplary damages. The Complaint also requests that "defendants and each of them be enjoined from further illegal and discriminatory actions."
When jurisdiction is alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and the defendant moves to dismiss, the District Court should ordinarily assume jurisdiction and then determine whether or not the Complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, Olson v. Board of Education of Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 12, Malverne, New York, 250 F.Supp. 1000 (E.D.N.Y.1966); Campbell v. Glenwood Hills Hospital, Inc., 224 F.Supp. 27 (D.Minn.1963). Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges two separate grounds for relief: (1) the claim that she is entitled to lost earnings because defendants arbitrarily and capriciously refused to increase her salary from 1962 to the present, (2) the claim that she is entitled to damages for injury to her reputation because of defendants' alleged defamation.
Defendants assert numerous arguments in support of their motion to dismiss. Some of the arguments apply only to the lost earnings' claim and others apply only to the defamation claim. Furthermore, defendants' arguments do not apply equally to the defendant school district and to the individual defendants. Therefore, for the sake of proper analysis, this memorandum will consider plaintiff's claims in the following order: (1) Lost earnings claim against defendant school district, (2) Lost earnings claim against individual defendants, (3) Defamation claim.
The Court agrees that the decision in Frazier v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, supra, is applicable to the facts in this case and that plaintiff's claim against defendant school board, at least for the period between September, 1962 and February, 1967, is barred by res judicata, see also, Moffett v. Commerce Trust Co., 187 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1951). In fact, it would seem that the plaintiff in Frazier presented a stronger claim for relief than does the present plaintiff. One of the purposes of the original Civil Rights Act was to "provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice", Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174, 81 S.Ct. 473, 477, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). This purpose would seem to be more applicable to the facts in Frazier than to the facts underlying plaintiff's claim. In the litigation which plaintiff and defendant school district have gone through in the state courts, plaintiff has been successful in every phase of every suit, except for that aspect of her claim in the Mower County District Court which dealt with customary salary increases. The decision of the Mower County District Court with respect to that claim is res judicata in this court.
Defendants also argue that the school district is immune from suit because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is limited in its application to suits against individuals. Defendants' position is supported by the case law. In the leading case of Monroe v. Pape, supra, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend to subject municipalities to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that is, that the word "person" in the first sentence of § 1983 is limited to individuals. This interpretation of the statute has been consistently followed by the lower federal courts, e. g., Harvey v. Sadler, 331 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1964); Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F.Supp. 933 (E.D.Pa.1968); Daly v. Pedersen, 278 F.Supp. 88 (D.Minn.1967).
In a memorandum opposing defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues that the school district is subject to suit because: (1) the federal courts have directed equitable relief against municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and ...
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