Morgan v. Chapman
| Decision Date | 21 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 6:17-CV-00004 |
| Parties | COURTNEY MORGAN, Plaintiff, v. MARY CHAPMAN and JOHN KOPACZ, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
On July 18, 2013, “a team of law enforcement officers and Medical Board investigators locked down [Plaintiff Courtney Morgan's] clinic, rifled through private patient records and seized confidential files.” Morgan v Chapman, 969 F.3d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 2020). As a result Morgan was indicted on “trumped-up charges of running a pill mill” that were later dismissed by a state district court. Id. Morgan now “brings a civil suit agents two government agents for violating his constitutional rights.” Id.
Pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Mary Chapman and John Kopacz. After the Fifth Circuit remanded the case, this Court granted Plaintiff Courtney Morgan leave to amend his complaint. Morgan, a physician, now asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of the use of an instanter subpoena to search his medical facilities in 2013. The documents obtained from the 2013 search resulted in an indictment and Morgan's arrest. Chapman and Kopacz move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Both raise statute of limitations, but only Chapman asserts qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Chapman is entitled to qualified immunity as to the Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim, but all other claims survive.
The following allegations are from the Third Amended Complaint.[1] (Dkt. No. 110). This case arises out of the arrest of Morgan, a licensed physician, and the search of his family medical practices in 2013 under an administrative instanter subpoena.[2] The search was authorized by the Texas Medical Board and led by one of its agents- Chapman. While serving the subpoena, Chapman was aided by Kopacz, a law enforcement officer with the Texas Department of Public Safety. Chapman and Kopacz executed the instanter subpoena for the purpose of conducting a criminal investigation of Morgan.
After seizing several documents from Morgan's family medical practices, including some that were not listed in the subpoena, Chapman compiled an investigative report. Chapman deliberately falsified information in his report with the purpose to mislead, while Kopacz concealed exculpatory evidence. After receiving the seized documents and investigative report, the District Attorney indicted Morgan for violating Section 162.152 of the Texas Occupations Code. Based on the way the report was compiled, including the deliberate exclusion of relevant information, Chapman purposefully led the District Attorney to believe that Morgan was operating an uncertified pain management clinic. Chapman's report was the sole evidence used to support Morgan's indictment.
Following his arrest, Morgan moved to suppress the evidence in his state-court proceedings. The state court made findings that were critical of Chapman's testimony and the search of Morgan's facilities and granted the motion to suppress. The charge against Morgan was later dismissed in January 2016.
One month after the charge against him was dismissed, Morgan filed this lawsuit in federal court. (Dkt. No. 1). Morgan amended his complaint twice. (Dkt. No. 39); (Dkt. No. 63). In the Second Amended Complaint, Morgan generally asserted claims under Section 1983 for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. (Dkt. No. 63 at ¶¶ 71-121). Chapman and Kopacz moved to dismiss, but Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt concluded that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 75). Chapman and Kopacz filed an interlocutory appeal. (Dkt. No. 78).
The Fifth Circuit reversed. Morgan v. Chapman, 969 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2020). It held that Chapman and Kopacz were entitled to qualified immunity because “malicious prosecution and abuse of process are not viable theories of constitutional injury.” Id. at 241 (emphasis added). Instead, malicious prosecution and abuse of process are torts. Id. at 245. But the Fifth Circuit also concluded that it would not be futile for Morgan to assert a due process claim or a claim for unreasonable search or seizure. Id. at 250. It remanded to allow this Court to consider providing Morgan another opportunity to amend his complaint. Id.
Morgan promptly moved for leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 98). Chapman and Kopacz opposed the amendment. (Dkt. No. 101); (Dkt. No. 102). The Court granted Morgan's request. (Dkt. No. 108). The Third Amended Complaint is now the live pleading. (Dkt. No. 110).
The Third Amended Complaint asserts claims against Chapman and Kopacz in their individual capacities. (Dkt. No. 110 at 2). Those claims include: (1) unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment against both Chapman and Kopacz; (2) unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment against both Chapman and Kopacz; and (3) violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment against Chapman. (Id. at 14-28). Morgan seeks monetary damages, costs, interest, and attorney's fees. (Id. at 1, 28).
Chapman and Kopacz once again move for dismissal. (Dkt. No. 111); (Dkt. No. 112). Morgan is opposed. (Dkt. No. 118); (Dkt. No. 119).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,'” it demands more than labels and conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are generally disfavored. Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003); Boudreaux v. Axiall Corp., 564 F.Supp.3d 488 (W.D. La. 2021). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and view those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. White v. U.S. Corrections, L.L.C., 996 F.3d 302, 306-07 (5th Cir. 2021). The court must evaluate whether “a complaint contains sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (cleaned up). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Thus, a court should dismiss when the live pleading fails to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010).
Kopacz raises a single ground for dismissal: the Fourth Amendment claims are time barred. (Dkt. No. 111 at 2-5). Chapman similarly argues that all claims are time barred. (Dkt. No. 112 at 20-22) But she further argues that, even so, she is entitled to qualified immunity and the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply. (Dkt. No. 112 at 20). The Court begins with the statute of limitations because Chapman and Kopacz both raise it. See, e.g., Arnone v. Syed, No. 3:17-CV-03027-E, 2020 WL 2085594, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2020).
Kopacz and Chapman both argue that the statute of limitations for Morgan's Fourth Amendment claims began to accrue on July 18, 2013, when the alleged unreasonable search and seizure occurred. (Dkt. No. 111 at 3-5); (Dkt. No. 112 at 20-22). In response, Morgan raises two arguments. First, as to his unreasonable seizure claims, Morgan argues that the claims did not begin to accrue until the charges were dismissed. (Dkt. No. 118 at 4-6). Second, as to his unreasonable search claims, Morgan argues that he asserts a viable theory of tolling. (Id. at 4-7).
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1). Thus, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for a time barred claim “is proper only where it is evident from the complaint that the action is barred and the complaint fails to raise some basis for tolling.” Acad. of Allergy & Asthma in Primary Care v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 998 F.3d 190, 200 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Put differently, the live pleading must show “beyond doubt” that the plaintiff cannot overcome the statute of limitations defense. See Bell v. Eagle Mountain Saginaw Indep. Sch. Dist., 27 F.4th 313, 320 (5th Cir. 2022). The Fifth Circuit “will remand if the plaintiff has pleaded facts that justify equitable tolling.” King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 758 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Morgan's claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “provides a cause of action against persons who, under color of state law, deprive him ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.'” Morgan, 969 F.3d at 245 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The rights secured by the Constitution that were violated, according to Morgan, are grounded in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
“Section 1983 claims are subject to a state's personal injury statute of limitations.” Reed v. Goertz, 995 F.3d 425, 431 (5th Cir. 2021). In Texas, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem....
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