Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, No. 86-1954

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before KENNEDY, MILBURN and NORRIS; MILBURN
• Citation: 829 F.2d 10
• Parties: Carolyn MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHURCH'S FRIED CHICKEN, Defendant-Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 86-1954
• Decision Date: 22 September 1987

Page 10

829 F.2d 10 Carolyn MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHURCH'S FRIED CHICKEN, Defendant-Appellee. No. 86-1954. United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit. Argued Aug. 7, 1987.
Decided Sept. 22, 1987.

Gregory M. Janks (argued), Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.

Thomas L. Auth, Jr. (argued), Tyler & Thayer, P.C., Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellee.

Page 11

Before KENNEDY, MILBURN and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.

MILBURN, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Carolyn Morgan appeals from the district court's entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant-appellee Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. in this diversity action alleging that plaintiff was shot by an intruder and rendered permanently disabled as the result of defendant's failure to maintain adequate security for its employees. The principal issue presented is whether plaintiff's action is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Michigan Workers' Disability Compensation Act ("the Act"), Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 418.131, which precludes an employee's action against his employer where the employee's injury resulted from the employer's negligent rather than intentional misconduct. Because we agree with the district court that plaintiff's claim does not constitute an intentional tort, we affirm.

I.

Plaintiff alleged in her complaint ¹ that "while in the course of her employment on the premises of Church's, [she] was caused to be permanently, painfully and severely injured when she was shot by an intruder." Further, plaintiff alleged that her "injuries resulted, in whole or in part, from [d]efendant's deliberate act in not erecting a bullet proof shield for its employees [and] from [d]efendant's deliberate act in not posting a security guard on its premises to protect its employees." Finally, plaintiff alleged that defendant's actions were intentional because defendant "had knowledge of the unsafe conditions of its premises and the potential risk of injury or harm to [p]laintiff ... since the restaurant where [p]laintiff was employed had been robbed approximately six (6) times before in the same fashion."

After filing its answer, defendant filed a motion "for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Defendant urged that plaintiff's action was precluded by the Act because the facts alleged constituted, at most, gross negligence. The district court held that plaintiff's action was barred by the Act, reasoning that "[t]here is no allegation, sufficient allegation as a matter of law, of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and no other intentional tort can be derived from the pleadings."

II.

A. Standard of Review

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred by granting defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings because her complaint contained sufficient allegations of intentional misconduct to avoid the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. While defendant styled its motion as one for a judgment on the pleadings, defendant asked for relief "pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a...