Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 3:10-CV-01061-BF

• Decision Date: 30 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 3:10-CV-01061-BF,3:10-CV-01061-BF
• Parties: PATSY ANN MORGAN, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

PATSY ANN MORGAN, Plaintiff,

v.COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.

No. 3:10-CV-01061-BF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

Dated: September 30, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a consent case before the United States Magistrate Judge. Patsy Ann Morgan ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to section 405(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She seeks review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her applications for Title II and Title XVI benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(A). For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for further administrative proceedings.2

I. BACKGROUND¹

A. Procedural History

On April 22, 2005, Plaintiff filed applications for Title II and Title XVI benefits, alleging a disability onset date of April 1, 2002. (Pl. Br. 1.) Plaintiff claimed she was disabled due to chronic fatigue, chronic pain, and coordination and balance problems. (Tr. 19, 94-96, 106, 578-81.) The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Pl. Br. 1.) Plaintiff timely requested ahearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), and a hearing was scheduled for November 13, 2006 in Dallas, Texas. (Tr. 582.) On November 13, 2006, Plaintiff requested the assistance of a representative and, thus, the ALJ granted her a thirty day extension. (Tr. 585.) A hearing was then held on February 20, 2007. (Tr. 587.) Plaintiff testified at the hearing, as well as a vocational expert ("VE"). (Tr. 589.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on March 30, 2007, finding Plaintiff had not been under a disability from her date of onset through the date of the decision. (Tr. 511-19.) Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council and review was granted. (Tr. 530-31.) On April 25, 2008, the Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ to (1) give consideration to the nonexamining source opinions; (2) evaluate Plaintiff's subjective complaints and describe how her symptoms were evaluated; (3) give further consideration to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity; and (4) evaluate the claimant's ability to perform her past relevant work. (Tr. 530-31.)

In accordance with the remand, a second hearing was held by the ALJ on September 24, 2008. (Tr. 613.) Again, Plaintiff and a VE testified at the hearing. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on November 19, 2008, again finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 21.) Plaintiff then requested review from the Appeals Council, but this time it was denied on February 24, 2010. (Tr. 10-12.) Plaintiff filed this case on May 26, 2010, seeking judicial review of the administrative proceedings (doc. 1.) This matter is ripe for consideration on the merits.

B. Factual History

1. Plaintiff's Age, Education, and Work Experience

Plaintiff was born May 22, 1954. (Tr. 25, 591.) Plaintiff has a tenth grade education. (Tr. 609.) She has past relevant work as a sales clerk and a ticket seller. (Tr. 639.) Plaintiff met theinsured status requirement of the Act through December 31, 2002. (Tr. 21.)

2. Plaintiff's Relevant Medical Evidence

On July 29, 2002, Plaintiff obtained a medical source statement which supported her disability. (Tr. 23.) Plaintiff complained of depressive episodes, including thoughts of committing suicide, headaches and dizziness. (Tr. 22.) The medical source statement stated that Plaintiff's disability was only expected to last six months. (Tr. 23.) Plaintiff received follow-up care on April 9, 2003 and she reported arthralgias and headaches. (Tr. 23.) Plaintiff also rated her pain as a zero on a scale of zero to ten with ten being the most severe. (Tr. 23.) Between February 2002 and January 2003, Plaintiff was treated for her bipolar disorder at MHMR, where she received a Global Assessment of Functioning or GAF of 61 to 70.² (Tr. 23.) In January 2003, Plaintiff obtained a neuropsychological evaluation due to complaints of ataxi and short-term memory loss. (Tr. 23.)

In June 2005, Plaintiff recommenced medical care due to her complaints of vertigo and dizziness. (Tr. 23.) Plaintiff reported that she was still able to do a full range of daily activities, such as cooking, caring for a pet, going out to dinner, reading, watching television and working on the computer. (Tr. 23-24.) In June 2005, Plaintiff obtained a consultative psychological evaluation where she presented as euthymic for her bipolar disorder and denied depression problems. (Tr. 24.) In October of 2005, Plaintiff's treating physician referred her to a specialist for her chronic dizziness. (Tr. 24.) Plaintiff underwent a battery of tests whereby no significant abnormalities were found. (Tr. 24.) In 2006, Plaintiff was ultimately diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. (Tr. 24.) At herexamination in July 2007, Plaintiff complained of weakness in her left leg and demonstrated a slightly impaired ability to stand and walk. (Tr. 24.) In July 2007, Plaintiff obtained another consultative psychiatric examination where she received a GAF of 50, revealing moderate to serious limitations in function. (Tr. 24.)

C. The ALJ's Findings

First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2002. (Tr. 21.) Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 1, 2002, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 21.) Third, he found Plaintiff to have the severe impairments of bipolar disorder, hypothyroidism, and multiple sclerosis. (Tr. 21.) The ALJ noted in his findings that Plaintiff's medical history in 2002 included bipolar disorder and hypothyroidism, but Plaintiff wasn't diagnosed with multiple sclerosis until 2006. (Tr. 21.) Fourth, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in Appendix I of the Regulations. (Tr. 22.)

Fifth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to lift/carry ten pounds frequently and ten pounds occasionally, stand/walk four to six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit six hours in an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 22.) Plaintiff's ability to push or pull would be limited to the weights given. (Tr. 22.) Plaintiff can occasionally crawl, squat, stoop and bend, but she could not climb ladders, work at heights, or work around hazardous machinery. (Tr. 22.) Plaintiff could concentrate for extended periods of time, respond appropriately to routine changes in work environment, and perform detailed tasks. (Tr. 22.) In making this determination, the ALJ found the testimony of Plaintiff regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms not credible. (Tr. 23.)

Sixth, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as a ticket seller. (Tr. 25.) The ALJ noted in his findings that he compared the Plaintiff's RFC with the testimony of the VE regarding the demands of the work as a ticket seller, and he found that Plaintiff was able to do the work as actually and generally performed. (Tr. 25.) Finally, he found that Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, from April 1, 2002 through the date of the decision. (Tr. 25.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

To be entitled to social security benefits, a plaintiff must prove that he is disabled for purposes of the Act. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1995); Abshire v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 638, 640 (5th Cir. 1988). The definition of disability under the Act is "the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992).

The Commissioner utilizes a sequential five-step inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled. Those steps are:

1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found disabled regardless of medical findings.

2. An individual who does not have a "severe impairment" will not be found to be disabled.

3. An individual who "meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1" of the regulations will be considered disabled without consideration of vocational factors.

4. If an individual is capable of performing the work the individual has done in the past, a finding of "not disabled" must be made.

5. If an individual's impairment precludes him from performing his past work, other factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if work can be performed.

Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1991) (summarizing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f)). Under the first four steps of the inquiry, the burden lies with the claimant to prove her disability. Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564. The inquiry terminates if the Commissioner determines at any point during the first four steps that the claimant is disabled or is not disabled. Id.

The Commissioner's determination is afforded great deference. Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564. Judicial review of the Commissioner's findings is limited to whether the decision to deny benefits is supported by substantial evidence and to whether the proper legal standard was utilized. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994); 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is defined as "that which is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it must be more than a scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance." Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564. The reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence, retry the issues, or substitute its...