Morgan v. Cooper
Decision Date | 28 January 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 3-880A230,3-880A230 |
Citation | 415 N.E.2d 729 |
Parties | Phyllis Cooper MORGAN, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Charles COOPER, Appellee (Petitioner Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Thomas M. Carusillo, Elkhart, for apppellant.
W. L. McLaughlin, Simpson & McLaughlin, Goshen, for appellee.
This civil action concerns the dissolution of the marriage of Phyllis Cooper Morgan (Morgan) and Charles Cooper (Cooper). A decree of dissolution of marriage was entered which provided for the distribution of the assets of the parties, the payment of attorney fees, and the restoration of the wife's former name. The trial court amended the distribution of assets two times after the original decree.
The essence 1 of the issues Ms. Morgan raises on appeal are as follows:
(1) Did the trial court err when it amended its order twice after its original decree?
(2) Did the trial court err in not providing the parties an opportunity to be heard before it amended its order on its own motion?
(3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it did not give Ms. Morgan special consideration in dividing the marital property?
We affirm.
The original decree of the dissolution of marriage and order of the division of property was entered on December 27, 1979. On January 4, 1980, counsel for Mr. Cooper sent the judge 2 and Ms. Morgan's attorney a letter which noted that the original order had failed to distribute all of the assets of the parties. On February 25, 1980, Cooper's attorney filed his motion to correct errors. On March 6, 1980, the judge 3 amended his original order.
On March 10, 1980, Cooper's attorney sent another letter to both the judge and Morgan's attorney. The attorney suggested that the judge had made an arithmetic error if he had intended to equally divide the parties' assets. The judge amended his order again on March 12, 1980.
Ms. Morgan filed her Motion to Correct Errors on April 11, 1980. Cooper filed a Statement in Opposition to her Motion to Correct Errors. On May 16, 1980, the court held a hearing on the Motion to Correct Errors, the Statement in Opposition to it, and any arguments and other matters that could have been presented at a hearing on Cooper's original motion to correct errors.
On appeal, 4 Ms. Morgan argues that Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 59 requires the trial court to make a statement of the facts and grounds upon which the errors it corrects are based. She contends that the party aggrieved by the court's granting of the Motion to Correct Errors would not otherwise be able to formulate his appeal and that this Court would not be able to pass upon the propriety of the trial court's action. We disagree.
TR. 59(I)(7) states:
(Emphasis added.).
This trial rule requires great specificity when a new trial is granted. In the instant case, TR. 59(I)(7) merely requires the court to give the general reasons for its correction of its Order. 5
In looking at the trial court's first amendment 6 to its Order of December 27, 1979, the general reasons for the trial court's corrective relief is not plainly set out for all of the action that was taken. As we can determine the reasons for the actions the trial court took by comparing its December 27, 1979 Order with its March 6, 1980 Order, we deem this error harmless.
The March 6th Order states the trial court understated the total assets of the parties by $2,300.00, yet the Order increases the husband's judgment by $9,725.00. While this Court realizes the form in which the trial court stated its Order makes its Order difficult to decipher, it can be done. It appears that the trial court also neglected to divide $14,000 7 between the parties.
Here is a summary of what the trial court ordered:
Both parties received more assets in the amended order. Although the trial court should have clearly set forth the general reasons for amending its order, its error is harmless as the reasons for the amendment are clear. Neither party was prejudiced by the court's error as they could determine that the court amended its order so as to distribute all of the marital assets.
The trial court's second amendment 8 of its order also does not clearly set forth the general reasons the trial court granted corrective relief as is required by TR. 59(I)(7). This error is also harmless as it can be determined why the trial court amended its order.
Summarizing the second amendment (March 12, 1980) reveals the following:
Both the March 6th amendment and the March 12th amendment stated, "The Court, therefore, finds that the correct sum of judgment to be entered for the Husband, in order to balance equally their respective shares, is the sum of" XX dollars. (Emphasis added.). In comparing the two amendments, it is obvious that the trial court had made an arithmetic error and was correcting its error so the parties' respective shares would be equal.
In Reynolds v. Meehan (1978), Ind., 375 N.E.2d 1119, this Court stated, "The provision requiring general reasons to be given affords the litigants a statement of why the court has acted and makes a record sufficient for the court to review on appeal." Certainly it would have been better for the trial court to plainly state the general reasons for amending its Order; however, when it is obvious from a comparison of the amended orders that the trial court is correcting its arithmetic errors, we find this error harmless. AP. 15(E).
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