Morgan v. Department of Social Sec.

Decision Date07 July 1942
Docket Number28627.,28626,28637
Citation14 Wn.2d 156,127 P.2d 686
PartiesMORGAN v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY. CAMFIELD v. SAME. JACOBSON v. SAME.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

In No 28637, Appeal from Superior Court, Jefferson County; Ralph Smythe, Judge.

In Nos 28626, 28627, Appeals from Superior Court, Thurston County John M. Wilson, Judge.

Proceedings by James R. Morgan, by Laura M. Camfield, and by William L Jacobson, against the Department of Social Security of the State of Washington, under the Senior Citizens Grants Act. From a judgment in favor of James R. Morgan, the defendant appeals, and from a judgment affirming decision of the Director of Social Security, Laura M. Camfield and William L. Jacobson appeal.

Judgment in the Morgan case reversed with instructions and judgments in the cases of Camfield and Jacobson affirmed.

SIMPSON and MILLARD, JJ., dissenting.

Ralph L. J. Armstrong, of Olympia, for Laura M. Camfield and William L. Jacobson.

Smith Troy, Phil H. Gallagher, R. C. Finley, and Pat Guimont, all of Olympia, for Department of Social Security.

John Caughlan, of Seattle, for James R. Morgan.

Hyland, Elvidge & Alvord, of Seattle, amici curiae.

BEALS Justice.

James R. Morgan, Laura M. Camfield and William L. Jacobson, being needy persons, were, prior to December, 1940, receiving from the state monthly allowance by way of what was popularly referred to as old age pensions. After the effective date of initiative measure No. 141, passed by vote of the people November 5, 1940, proclaimed by the governor December 5, 1940, and printed as chapter 1, Laws of 1941, the three persons above named, each already receiving relief as a needy person, were considered as applicants for senior citizen grants, according to the provisions of the act above referred to, and were each awarded such a grant, Mr. Morgan on recommendation of the Jefferson county welfare department, Mrs. Camfield and Mr. Jacobson on recommendation of the Thurston county welfare department, the grants to date from March 1, 1941.

The three recipients, being dissatisfied with the amount of the grants made, appealed to the director of social security, who sustained the department in the grants made to Mr. Morgan and Mrs. Camfield, the director increasing the grant to Mr. Jacobson. The three recipients then appealed to the superior court for Jefferson and Thurston counties, respectively.

On Mr. Morgan's appeal, the superior court for Jefferson county held that the deductions made by the department from the forty dollar base, as resources enjoyed by Mr. Morgan, were improperly made, reversed the decision of the director, and remanded the matter to the department, with directions to increase the grant in accordance with the judgment, and to make the grant effective from December 4, 1940. The court allowed an attorney's fee of three hundred dollars. From this judgment, the department of social security of the state of Washington has appealed.

The superior court for Thurston county, on the appeals of Mrs. Camfield and Mr. Jacobson, affirmed the decision of the director, and from the judgments entered in the two appeals, Mrs. Camfield and Mr. Jacobson have appealed.

By stipulation of the parties, the stipulation having been approved by the chief justice, joint briefs have been submitted by Mr. Morgan, as respondent, and Mrs. Camfield and Mr. Jacobson, as appellants, the questions presented in the three cases being practically identical. The attorney general, on behalf of the department, has filed one brief in the three cases. We treat the cases as having been consolidated for argument Before this court, the questions presented are practically identical, and we shall consider the three appeals together.

When we desire to refer to Mr. Morgan, Mrs. Camfield and Mr. Jacobson jointly, we shall refer to them as the recipients. The department of social security will be referred to as the department.

The department awarded Mr. Morgan a senior citizen grant in the amount of twenty-one dollars per month, the department in his case making deductions from the normal assumed standard of forty dollars per month, as follows: Twelve dollars by reason of the fact that Mr. Morgan occupied a dwelling without expense to himself; $1.50 because Mr. Morgan was able to procure water without payment; and six dollars because he was not required to pay for fuel.

Mrs. Camfield was by the department awarded twenty-nine dollars per month, eleven dollars being deducted from the normal forty dollars, due to the fact that she and her husband lived together in a home owned by her, free and clear of incumbrance, and had free water available for household purposes.

The first award made to Mr. Jacobson by the department was in the amount of eight dollars per month, deductions having been made on account of free housing and other items which the department held to be resources which he enjoyed. May 1, 1941, Mr. Jacobson's grant was increased by the department to twenty dollars per month. Upon his appeal, the director reversed the decision of the department, and increased Mr. Jacobson's grant to thirty dollars per month, effective May 1, 1941, holding that the only deductions which should be made were six dollars on account of a saving available to Mr. Jacobson by reason of the fact that he was residing with relatives, and the further item of four dollars because of income which Mr. Jacobson was receiving.

Appellant department assigns error upon the judgment of the superior court for Jefferson county, in that the judgment set aside the grant to respondent Morgan, and directed that the same be increased, and be effective as of December 4, 1940, instead of as of March 1, 1941. Error is also assigned upon the ruling of the trial court admitting certain evidence over the department's objection.

No specific assignments of error are contained in the brief filed by appellants Camfield and Jacobson, but manifestly these appellants contend that the superior court for Thurston county erred in refusing to enter judgments directing that the grants be increased.

Recipients are needy persons, and entitled to grants of the class which they received. The questions to be determined involve the amount of the grants and the date from which the grants should be effective. Recipients argue that they are entitled to grants fixed in accordance with the specific provisions of initiative 141, contending that in making their grants, the department has in certain particulars disregarded this statute and violated its provisions, to the detriment of recipients.

The title to the act reads in part as follows: 'An Act providing a minimum of $40 monthly to senior citizens over the age of 65 years; defining incomes; naming eligibility; conforming state and federal matching funds and age limit * * *.'

The 'declaration of intent' of the act is found in § 2 thereof, the third and fourth paragraphs of that section reading as follows:

'Although a uniform national pension of prosperity proportions, based on the principles embodied in the Townsend and General Welfare Bills, awarded as a matter of right, not need, is the only adequate and just kind of a pension, until such a pension is won it still remains the duty of the State of Washington at least to take full advantage of the maximum in matching funds that the Federal Government is willing to provide under the Federal Social Security Act, for those without resources and income.
'It is therefore hereby declared to be the intention of this measure to provide for Washington's Senior Citizens over sixty-five as liberally as is possible under the terms of the Federal Social Security Act for securing matching funds.' Section 3 defines certain terms used in the act, the following definitions pertinent to this inquiry being found in two subparagraphs, as follows:
'(g) 'Income' shall mean regular or recurrent gains in cash or kind, excepting therefrom:
'(1) The value of the use or occupancy of the premises in which the applicant resides.
'(2) Foodstuffs, livestock, fuel, light or water produced by or donated to applicant or applicant's family exclusively for the use of applicant or applicant's family. * * *
'(h) 'Resources' shall mean any property which the applicant owns legally or beneficially, excepting therefrom:
'(1) The ability of relatives or friends of the applicant to contribute to the support of the applicant. * * *
'(3) The homestead, home or place of residence of applicant or the spouse of applicant. * * *
'(6) Foodstuffs, livestock, fuel, light or water produced by the applicant, applicant's spouse or family, exclusively for the use of applicant or applicant's family.'

Other sections of the act read as follows:

'Sec. 4. Eligibility. Senior Citizen Grants shall be awarded to any person who is without resources and who:

'(a) Has attained the age of sixty-five.

'(b) Has a yearly income which is less than $480 and a monthly income which is less than $40: Provided, That if Federal contributions to Senior Citizen Grants are made payable in excess of $20 per month any applicant shall be eligible whose yearly income is less than twenty-four times the maximum monthly Federal contribution, or whose monthly income is less than twice the maximum monthly Federal contribution.'

'Sec. 5. How and When Grants Shall Be Paid. Senior Citizen Grants shall be awarded:

'(a) To each eligible applicant sixty-five years of age or over in the sum of not less than $40 per month on a uniform statewide basis, minus the income of applicant from other sources Provided, That in the event Federal matching funds shall be available in excess of $20 per month per person, the grants shall be increased to not less than...

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