Morgan v. Engles
| Decision Date | 06 April 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 68,68 |
| Citation | 127 N.W.2d 382,372 Mich. 514 |
| Parties | John MORGAN, a minor, by his next friend, Mary Morgan, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. John ENGLES, M. D., Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Albert Lopatin, Detroit, Norman L. Zemke, Detroit, of counsel, for appellant.
Humphreys Springstun, Detroit, for appellee.
Before the Entire Bench.
This malpractice action was commenced by the mother as next friend of John Morgan, who, on June 17, 1958, while 4 years of age suffered a severe fracture of the left elbow. Defendant, a doctor of medicine, engaged in general practice in Richmond, Michigan, set the fracture on the day of injury.
The boy's injury was described by defendant as a supracondylar fracture of the humerus with displacement. It was a comminuted fracture, that is, having more than 2 fragments. The doctor set the fracture in a closed reduction, that is to say, without surgery. After recurrent trouble with the arm, several surgical operations, corrective in nature, were performed by a team headed by Dr. Drompp, an orthopedic surgeon. Pertinent to this review is plaintiff's claim, by way of allegation and testimony, that defendant's failure to refer plaintiff to an orthopedic specialist was contrary to accepted standards of practice in the community and, thereby, caused painful and permanent injury to plaintiff's arm. At the close of all proofs, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendant. From a denial of motion for new trial, plaintiff appeals. Defendant says, and we agree, that 'the only real issue' on appeal is 'whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict for defendant in view of the state of the record at the close of the case.' Defendant's claim, in support of affirmance, is that plaintiff failed to show any causal relation between the 'failure to refer to a specialist' and the injury.
The rule is summed up in the annotation entitled 'Duty of physician or surgeon to advise patient of the possibility or probability of better results from treatment by specialist or by a mode of treatment which he is not qualified to give.' 132 A.L.R. 392. It reads as follows:
'It may be stated as a general rule that, as a part of the requirements which the law exacts of general practitioners of medicine and surgery, or other schools of healing, if, in the exercise of the care and skill demanded by those requirements, such a practitioner discovers, or should know or discover, that the patient's ailment is beyond his knowledge or technical skill, or ability or capacity to treat with a likelihood of reasonable success, he is under a duty to disclose the situation to his patient, or advise him of the necessity of other or different treatment.' Citing Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183 , among other cases. 1
It is obviously the law that in order to recover for the negligence of a physician, plaintiff must show that such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury for which damages are sought. Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75, Ballance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich. 383, 217 N.W. 329, 57 A.L.R. 262. See 59 A.L.R. 884.
It is also applicable law that on review of a directed verdict against plaintiff the proofs and reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Humenik v. Sternberg, 371 Mich. 667, 124 N.W.2d 778.
Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Vann, a doctor of medicine (not a specialist) licensed to practice in the State, testified that the fracture in question required major orthopedic procedures. In answer to a hypothetical question he stated that defendant had not acted according to the customary and usual practice of the ordinary careful and skillful practitioner in the same or similar localities. He said:
'That the usual and customary procedure of the average skillful general practitioner, or doctor, with that type of major orthopedic problem, he should call in a consultant, recognized orthopedic specialist, or work with him, or refer the patient to the orthopedic specialist for his care.'
It is important to note that Dr. Vann's opinion as to defendant's negligence is predicated largely upon the complex nature of the fracture which included damage to the epiphysis or 'growth center' of the elbow, as part of what already has been described as a supracondylar fracture. Dr. Vann testified that an orthopedist would have discovered the epiphyseal damage, treated the fracture by open reduction, and that, as a result the child likely would not have suffered the injury of which complaint is now made.
The following quote from the testimony of Dr. Vann seems significant to his hypothesis:
'Q. Doctor, is it your testimony then, that the standards of practice, medical practice of a community of Richmond, or similar communities, when a general practitioner runs into a fracture of the supracondyl, that this is an orthopedic problem and the standards of practice dictate he consult an orthopedic consultant before attempting to set this fracture?
'A. Yes, that is the usual procedure.
'Q. Doctor, are you familiar with the standards of medical practice wherein a fracture of the supracondyl also involves injury to the epiphysis?
'A. I am.
'Q. You are familiar with it?
'A. I am familiar with it and I have had some experience with it.
'Q. Doctor, does the standard of medical practice and treatment of a supracondylar fracture, is it the same where you have a fracture of the epiphysis and where you don't have a fracture of the epiphysis?
'A. No, it is not the same.
'Q. Does the standard of medical practice and treatment of such a fracture differ, doctor, and how?
'A. A fracture of a supracondylar bone is usually longitudinal, or...
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Ykimoff v. Foote Mem. Hosp.
...accident was "disputed by the physical facts, and seriously questioned by the testimony of one of the defendants...." Morgan v. Engles, 372 Mich. 514, 127 N.W.2d 382 (1964), involved a routine malpractice suit dispute between a doctor who claimed he had not violated any standard of practice......
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Siirila v. Barrios
...consideration (must be given) to the state of the art at the time'). 14 As for consultation with specialists, in Morgan v. Engles, 372 Mich. 514, 516, 127 N.W.2d 382, 383 (1964), we recognized that a general practitioner is not serving the public with due care, even if the medical problem i......
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Koch v. Gorrilla
...a much smaller community, with its own separate identity and its own localized medical needs and services. Contrast Morgan v. Engles, 372 Mich. 514, 127 N.W.2d 382 (1964), cited by appellant. Duluth and Ironwood are not part of the same medical community, nor are they similar medical commun......
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Moore v. United States
...surgeon, and failing to disclose the possible benefits of pursuing specialist medical treatment. Plaintiff relies on Morgan v. Engles, 127 N.W.2d 382,383 (Mich. 1964), which held that doctors who lack knowledge or training in an area have a duty to inform their patients "of the possibility ......