Morgan v. Hardy

Decision Date07 November 2011
Docket NumberNo. 10–3155.,10–3155.
Citation662 F.3d 790
PartiesSamuel MORGAN, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Marcus HARDY, Warden, Respondent–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Matthew J. O'Hara, Attorney, Hinshaw & Culbertson, James A. Rolfes (argued), Attorney, Reed Smith LLP, Chicago, IL, for PetitionerAppellant.

Sheri L. Wong (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for RespondentAppellee.

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Samuel Morgan was convicted in the Circuit Court of Cook County for the murders of William Motley and Kenneth Merkson and the rape and aggravated kidnapping of Phyllis Gregson. After unsuccessfully seeking postconviction relief in the state courts, Morgan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On the afternoon of January 27, 1982, Samuel Morgan (Morgan) arrived at the apartment of a friend, Elijah Prater (“Prater”), accompanied by William Motley (“Motley”) and Kenneth Merkson (“Merkson”). There, the four men used cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. Later that night Phyllis Gregson (“Gregson”), a friend of Prater's, joined them.

The group spent the night at Prater's apartment. The next day, just before noon, Motley, Gregson, and Morgan were in the apartment's front room. Motley was sitting on a couch, talking on the telephone and looking through a small, black telephone book. While he was making calls, Motley had a .357 magnum revolver tucked under his leg. Morgan was sitting on a chair with a shotgun across his lap, and Gregson was sitting in a rocking chair. Prater and Merkson were both in the kitchen.

Morgan then instructed Gregson to remove her clothing and dance for him. Gregson refused. Motley, still sitting on the loveseat, made an unknown comment to Morgan. Morgan, who was between six and seven feet away from Motley, aimed the shotgun at him and fired. Motley flew off the couch and onto the floor. Morgan then grabbed the revolver from Motley's body and placed it in his waistband.

Morgan went into the kitchen and instructed Prater and Merkson to come into the front room and clean up Motley's body. In the process, Merkson handed over money, marijuana, and the black telephone book to Morgan, who put the book in his pocket. At Morgan's request, Prater and Merkson unsuccessfully tried to fit Motley's body into a dresser drawer. Prater and Merkson then stuffed Motley's body into a laundry bag and wrapped it inside a mattress. Morgan told Gregson to clean Motley's blood from the floor, and she did.

Shortly thereafter, Morgan sent Prater to buy alcohol and fill Prater's car with gasoline. Prater ran the errands and returned to the apartment about fifteen minutes later. At that time, Gregson was washing dishes in the kitchen, and Morgan was sitting in the dining room with the shotgun in his lap and the handgun in the waistband of his pants. Merkson was walking around the apartment making jokes.

The men drank some of the liquor Prater purchased. Merkson continued making jokes until Morgan told him to stop joking and remove Motley's body from the apartment. When Merkson made another remark, Morgan chased him into the front room and hit him in the head with the butt of the handgun. And again, Morgan instructed Merkson to remove the body from the apartment.

Merkson made another remark to Morgan, and Morgan told Merkson to get down on his knees and face the floor. Prater testified that he saw Morgan point the handgun at Merkson's head from a distance of four to five feet. Prater then turned to face the wall, heard a shot, and turned back to find Merkson's body on the floor. Both Gregson and Prater testified that they saw Morgan holding the handgun while standing beside Merkson's body.

Morgan ordered Gregson to clean up Merkson's blood, and instructed Prater to get the body out of the apartment. As Prater began tying up Merkson's body, Morgan approached him from behind and began shooting at him. Prater felt a bullet pass by his head, and he ran out the back door of the apartment.

Still armed with the handgun, Morgan took Gregson out of the apartment by her arm. While this was happening, Prater's downstairs neighbor called the police in response to the shots he heard.

The police arrived and discovered the bodies of Motley and Merkson, a loaded shotgun, a fingerprint on the dresser later identified as Morgan's, a bullet from the floor, and a bullet from the downstairs neighbor's apartment.

After leaving the apartment, Morgan took Gregson to the South Shore Motel, where he checked in under an alias and raped her. After spending about two hours in the motel room, Morgan escorted Gregson by the arm to his car. A motel employee testified that he saw Morgan pointing a gun to Gregson's head. When he noticed the employee, Morgan aimed the gun at him and chased him, but stopped when the employee ran into the motel lobby. Again, Morgan took Gregson by the arm and pushed her head first into the car. After driving away from the motel, Morgan stopped the car, told Gregson to get out, and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened. Morgan then drove off at a high rate of speed.

Morgan was arrested the next day. Later that same day, Prater contacted the police and told them that Morgan was responsible for the deaths of Merkson and Motley. Prater's statements to the police were later confirmed by Gregson.

A. Procedural History

At trial, an expert testified that the handgun recovered from Morgan had fired the bullets police found at the crime. The plastic bag that Morgan dropped contained a black notebook, which Prater and Gregson identified as one Merkson removed from Motley's body.

On May 3, 1983, a jury convicted Morgan of the murder of Merkson and Motley and the rape and aggravated kidnaping of Gregson. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on April 18, 1986. People v. Morgan I, 112 Ill.2d 111, 97 Ill.Dec. 430, 492 N.E.2d 1303, 1306 (1986); a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied on February 23, 1987. Morgan v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1329, 94 L.Ed.2d 180 (1987).

On January 20, 1988, Morgan filed a petition for postconviction relief under 725 ILCS 5/122–1, which was denied. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Morgan's convictions but vacated his death sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing, finding that Morgan had been denied effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing. People v. Morgan II, 187 Ill.2d 500, 241 Ill.Dec. 552, 719 N.E.2d 681, 687 (1999). On March 20, 2000, the United States Supreme Court denied Morgan's petition for a writ of certiorari. Morgan v. Illinois, 529 U.S. 1023, 120 S.Ct. 1429, 146 L.Ed.2d 320 (2000).

Morgan then filed a successor petition for postconviction relief and a petition for relief from judgment; after an evidentiary hearing, the court rejected all of Morgan's claims. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his convictions on September 23, 2004 and ordered that the stay of his new sentence be lifted. People v. Morgan, 212 Ill.2d 148, 288 Ill.Dec. 166, 817 N.E.2d 524, 526 (2004). Another petition for a writ of certiorari was denied on February 22, 2005. Morgan v. Illinois, 543 U.S. 1167, 125 S.Ct. 1346, 161 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005).

On September 19, 2005, the state court sentenced Morgan to natural life imprisonment. The Illinois appellate court rejected Morgan's appeal on August 20, 2007. People v. Morgan, 375 Ill.App.3d 525, 314 Ill.Dec. 627, 875 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1st Dist.2007).

On June 11, 2008, Morgan filed for habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court, which was denied and is the subject of this appeal.

B. Prater's Recantation

Approximately 18 years after the murders took place and after repeatedly giving his account of the events leading to the deaths of Motley and Merkson under oath, Prater changed his story. Under Prater's new version of the crime, which he presented at the evidentiary hearing on Morgan's successive postconviction petition, Motley and Merkson got into an argument while they were at his apartment. Motley struck Merkson in the head with the handgun and then used the handgun to shoot Merkson in the head. Motley then turned to Prater and Morgan, pointing the handgun at them. Morgan then shot and killed Motley in self-defense. Prater now claims that he attempted to tell the same version of the story to the police, but was coerced into changing his story to implicate Morgan.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Morgan argues that the district court erred by finding that the Illinois Supreme Court engaged in reasonable determinations of fact in (1) rejecting Prater's recantation testimony as incredible; (2) denying Morgan's Brady claim regarding a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; (3) rejecting Morgan's Giglio claim; and (4) denying Morgan's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Morgan also argues that the district court erred when it found that the Illinois Supreme Court did not violate 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and reasonably applied Brady and Strickland. Finally, Morgan contends the district court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. We review each issue in turn.

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court's denial of habeas relief de novo. Northern v. Boatwright, 594 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir.2010). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) sets the parameters for our review. Under AEDPA, we may grant habeas relief only if a state-court decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in the light of the evidence...

To continue reading

Request your trial
145 cases
  • Sumpter v. Kansas
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 28 Diciembre 2022
    ...correctness also applies to factual findings made by a state court of review based on the trial record.’ " (quoting Morgan v. Hardy , 662 F.3d 790, 797–98 (7th Cir. 2011) )).Around 1:00 a.m. on January 11, 2011, Mr. Sumpter accosted J.B., a young woman, as she walked to her car in the Old T......
  • Blake v. Hardy, Case No. 10-cv-238-DRH
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
    • 16 Septiembre 2013
    ...probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Morgan v. Hardy, 662 F.3d 790, 802 (7th Cir. 2011)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674); Newman v. Harrington, Case No. 12-3725, --F.3d--, 2013......
  • United States ex rel. Hooper v. Ryan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 12 Abril 2012
    ...The court now turns to the merits of Hooper's due process claim. The relevant decision is that of the Illinois Appellate Court. See Morgan, 662 F.3d at 797 (“The relevant decision for purposes of our assessment under AEDPA is the decision of the last state court to rule on the merits of the......
  • Eichwedel v. Chandler
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 29 Agosto 2012
    ...assessment under AEDPA is the decision of the last state court to rule on the merits of the petitioner's claim [ ]....” Morgan v. Hardy, 662 F.3d 790, 797 (7th Cir.2011). If, however, a claim was not adjudicated on the merits by a state court, we must “dispose of the matter as law and justi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT