Morgan v. Kerrigan

Decision Date07 January 1975
Docket NumberNo. 75--1001,75--1001
Citation509 F.2d 618
PartiesTallulah MORGAN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. John J. KERRIGAN et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Francis J. DiMento, Boston, Mass., with whom James J. Sullivan, Jr., and DiMento & Sullivan, Boston, Mass., were on application for stay, for defendants-appellants.

John Leubsdorf, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants, three members of the Boston School Committee, seek to stay the sanctions imposed by a civil contempt order of the district court pending disposition of their appeal from that order. Our inquiries must be directed to the likelihood of defendants' ultimate success and a balancing of harm in the interim to them with the harm suffered by plaintiffs and the public if the stay were granted.

The critical order was issued by the district court on October 31, 1974. It required the School Committee to file a plan for student desegregation by December 16, 1974. Broad guidelines as to objectives, techniques, and implementation schedules were set forth. Defendants were instructed to use the most reliable available data, with allowance for later revisions. The resulting plan was to be approved by the Committee before submission to the court. It was to be distributed to other interested persons and community groups, which should then have the right to submit alternative plans and proposals to all or part of the Committee's plan.

No objection was made to or appeal taken from this order. On the deadline date for reception of the plan, defendants voted against its submission. Hearing was had on plaintiffs' subsequent motion for civil contempt on December 27. The court found that defendants were in contempt and on December 30 issued an order of contempt and imposed sanctions--a coercive daily fine yet to be imposed; non-participation in any Committee discussion, decision or function pertaining to desegregation; and institution of an inquiry into the possibility of suspension of two of the defendants from practice as lawyers before the court. This being a judgment of civil contempt, the defendants may at any time avoid further sanctions by the simple expedient of complying with the order. The court recognized that defendants construed the requirement of 'approval' as offending their personal convictions and conditioned the sanctions on failure to vote to 'authorize' the prompt submission of a plan.

Defendants do not challenge the power or even the wisdom of the court in ordering that the resources of the Boston School Department be used in formulating a plan. But they challenge the power of the court to require that the Committee be identified with any plan. They point to the facts that counsel for the Committee filed a plan with the court, that this action was not disavowed by the Committee, and that copies of the plan were printed for distribution, and assert that there has been a 'ratification by silence'.

The first hurdle confronting defendants is 'The longstanding rule that a contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed . . .. (W)hen it has become final, disobedience cannot be justified by re-trying the issues as to whether the order should have issued in the first place.' Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 69, 68 S.Ct. 401, 408, 92 L.Ed. 476 (1948). Nothing has been presented to us which would suggest that the court's order of October 31 is now open to challenge.

There is a second obstacle to defendants' ultimate success. They...

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12 cases
  • Morgan v. Kerrigan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • June 3, 1975
    ...that the harm to him if a stay is not granted outweighs the harm to the other parties if the stay is granted. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1975); Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 395 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1968). While the initiation of Phase II may be accompanied by disrup......
  • Morgan v. Kerrigan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • January 14, 1976
    ...enrolled in the Boston schools. It, of course, is the rights of the individual students that are in question. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 599, 600 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1975); see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). Even if the court could reliably d......
  • Women's Community Health Ctr., Inc. v. Cohen
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maine
    • September 13, 1979
    ...Levesque v. Maine, 587 F.2d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 1978); Grimard v. Carlston, 567 F.2d 1171, 1173 (1st Cir. 1978); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 618, 619 (1st Cir. 1975); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 390 F.2d 113 (1st Cir.),......
  • I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., CIV. A. No. 97-10427-NG.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • April 2, 1998
    ...of a stay will substantially injure other interested parties and whether the stay is in the public interest. See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 618, 619 (1st Cir.1975). Those factors are in the context of the existing preliminary injunction, a state that creates a presumption in favor of the ......
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