Morgan v. Krook

• Decision Date: 30 December 1929
• Docket Number: Civil 2845
• Citation: 36 Ariz. 133,283 P. 287
• Parties: J. T. MORGAN, Appellant, v. CARL G. KROOK, Appellee
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

283 P. 287

36 Ariz. 133

J. T. MORGAN, Appellant, v. CARL G. KROOK, Appellee

Civil No. 2845

Supreme Court of Arizona

December 30, 1929

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Mohave. Richard Lamson, Judge. Affirmed.

Mr. Ben L. Rudderow, for Appellant.

Mr Carl G. Krook, pro se.

OPINION

McALISTER, J.

This is an action by J. T. Morgan to recover of Carl G. Krook the fees the statute allows a reporter for transcribing his shorthand notes, and from a judgment against him he appeals.

The plaintiff, as official court reporter of the superior court of Mohave county, Arizona, took stenographic notes of the testimony and other proceedings in Rodgers v Arizona Centennial Mining Company, a civil action tried in that court the latter part of 1923, and in his complaint he alleges that at the special instance and request of Carl G. Krook he prepared a transcript of the testimony and one carbon copy thereof between June 5th and July 31st, 1924, and certified to the same, and that defendant expressly agreed to pay the actual reasonable value of said services, which is the sum of $219.80, but at all times since they were performed he has neglected and refused to do so. The answer is a general denial.

It appears from the record that in that case judgment was rendered against the defendant, Arizona Centennial Mining Company which was represented by Carl G. Krook, the defendant in this action, and according to plaintiff that a transcript of the evidence was ordered for the purpose of prosecuting an appeal to this court. The testimony introduced by each side supported the allegations of their respective pleadings, but in view of the disposition we are compelled to make of the case on the record before us it is unnecessary to state it, further than to say that it was very sharply in conflict on the question whether the defendant did in fact order the transcript.

At the close of the plaintiff's testimony the defendant moved for a dismissal of the action, upon the ground that there was no evidence upon which to base it, and in commenting on the motion the court made this statement:

"My recollection is that an attorney is not responsible for matters of this kind in the absence of a special agreement. I would be glad to have counsel furnish me with something on it, if the law is to the contrary. There is no evidence of any special agreement on the defendant's part as to personal responsibility. It is my recollection -- I read this, the general statement in Corpus Juris, this morning just before coming on the bench -- on the theory that the attorney is known to the other party to be acting as his agent for a known principal, and there is no personal responsibility."

After a rather lengthy argument of counsel on the question of the personal responsibility of an attorney who incurs an expense of this character in the absence of special authorization from his client, the court denied the motion to dismiss and the defendant proceeded with his side of the case. When the hearing was over, Judge LAMSON, of the superior court of Yavapai county, who was sitting for Judge BLAKELY, of Mohave county, took the case under advisement, and under date of December 18th, 1928, or about three weeks later, signed a "decision and order," in which he found "the issues herein in favor of the defendant," and ordered that judgment be entered in his favor at the proper time in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 346, Revised Statutes (Civil Code) 1913, which was done.

In his first assignment the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment is attacked, and under it appellant argues quite vigorously that the testimony in his behalf "proved his case, not only by a preponderance of the evidence, but beyond all possible doubt." Even though this be true, it is wholly immaterial on appeal, if judgment was rendered for the other party and the evidence introduced by that party supports it, because it is a rule of this court, announced many, many times, and never departed from, that it will not disturb the judgment of a trial court, or its finding upon any issue of fact, when there is evidence to support its conclusion, whether it appears to us from the printed page it was decided in accordance with the weight of the evidence or not. It appearing, therefore, that the testimony upon the vital issue of fact in this case was sharply controverted, and that that in behalf of each side was sufficient to support a judgment for party introducing it, this court cannot do otherwise than be governed by the action of that court when, in its "decision and order" for judgment, it found "the issues herein in favor of the defendant." Though it be true, as contended by appellant, that there were no findings of the facts upon which this general finding was based, yet under an unvarying rule of this court it must be presumed under such circumstances "that its conclusions on every necessary issue were such as would support the judgment." Blackford v. Neaves, 23 Ariz. 501, 205 P. 587, 588; J. h. Mulrein Plumbing Supply Co. v. Walsh, 26 Ariz. 152, 222 P. 1046; Thomas v. Newcomb, 26 Ariz. 47, 221 P. 226.

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