Morgan v. Lehman, Durr & Co.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1891
• Citation: 92 Ala. 440,9 So. 314
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: MORGAN v. LEHMAN, DURR & CO. ET AL.

9 So. 314

92 Ala. 440

MORGAN v. LEHMAN, DURR & CO. ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 18, 1891

Appeal from chancery court, Butler county; JOHN A. FOSTER Chancellor.

Suit by Albey L. Morgan against Lehman, Durr & Co. to remove a cloud on her title to land. From a decree that complainant had a full and adequate remedy at law, and therefore dismissing her bill, complainant appeals.

J M. Whitehead, for appellant.

J C. Richardson, for appellees.

CLOPTON J.

The primary purposes of the bill filed by appellant are to have declared void a judgment rendered by the circuit court in a suit brought by Flexner and Lichten against complainant and the husband, condemning her statutory separate estate to the payment of a debt for articles for the comfort and support of the household; to set aside and vacate a sale of the land in controversy by the sheriff under a venditioni exponas issued on the judgment, and the sheriff's deed to Lehman Durr & Co., who purchased the land at the sale; and incidentally, to have declared void a judgment of the circuit court on the contest of a claim of exemptions; and also a judgment, with the writ of possession issued thereon, which Lehman, Durr & Co. recovered against her in an action of ejectment. The ground of relief is the asserted invalidity of the judgments and other proceedings, and that they constitute a cloud on her title. In the absence of allegations and proof of fraud, a court of chancery will not exercise jurisdiction for the mere purpose of declaring void a judgment rendered by the circuit court. When the nullity is apparent on the record, the court rendering a void judgment has ample power to vacate it, at any time, on the application of any party in interest. Baker v. Barclift, 76 Ala. 414. The well-established jurisdiction of courts of equity to remove a cloud from title, where the estate or interest is legal, will be exercised only when the remedies at law are inadequate. In the absence of circumstances showing the inadequacy of the legal remedy, the court will not interfere for the purpose of establishing the title to land, or quieting the possession, with the appropriate functions of a court of law. Hence the well-settled rule, that the court will not interpose unless the party complaining is in possession, so that he cannot obtain an adjudication of the apparent title of the adverse claimant in an action at law, and extrinsic evidence is necessary to show its invalidity. In Rea v. Longstreet, 54 Ala. 291, the true test, recognized by the authorities in this state, is stated as follows: "Would the owner of the property, in an action of ejectment brought by the adverse party, founded upon the deed, be required to offer evidence to defeat a recovery? If such proof would be necessary, the cloud would exist; if the proof would be unnecessary, no shade would be cast by the presence of the deed. If the action would fall of its own weight, without proof in rebuttal, no occasion could arise for the equitable interposition of the court." The uniform decisions of this court have been that when the deed the party appealing to the court seeks to have canceled is void on its face, or...