Morgan v. Lucaski, 89-613-M
| Decision Date | 31 October 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-613-M,89-613-M |
| Citation | 581 A.2d 714 |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
| Parties | Elizabeth MORGAN v. Rita LUCASKI, d/b/a The Village Cleansers v. Louis SKLAROFF, d/b/a Ocean State Suede & Leather Cleaning Co., Inc. P. |
This case came before a hearing panel of this court on October 16, 1990, pursuant to an order that had directed the defendant Rita Lucaski (Lucaski) to appear and show cause why her appeal should not be denied and dismissed.
The defendant raises several issues relating to the judgment that held her liable for the loss of a fur coat placed in her establishment for cleaning and storage. It appears undisputed that defendant gave custody of the coat to one Louis Sklaroff d/b/a Ocean State Suede & Leather Cleaning Co., Inc. (Sklaroff). While in his custody, the coat was stolen from a truck parked in the Sklaroff driveway. The trial justice found that Sklaroff was negligent and that his negligence was imputed to his principal, defendant Lucaski. The trial justice entered judgment in favor of Elizabeth Morgan (plaintiff) in the sum of $3,300, together with interest and costs. The defendant Lucaski had filed a third-party complaint against Sklaroff. The trial justice entered judgment in favor of Lucaski against Sklaroff in the sum of $1,650 plus interest and costs. He apparently regarded Lucaski and Sklaroff as joint tort-feasors.
After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err in his findings of fact and conclusions of law in relation to the principal claim of plaintiff against Lucaski. As bailee she was responsible for the negligence of her agent. From the facts of the case negligence could appropriately be inferred. The evidence in the case supported the valuation placed on the coat by the trial justice.
However, we are of the opinion that the trial justice erred in his determination that defendant Lucaski was only entitled to one-half the amount of recovery from third-party defendant Sklaroff. Lucaski was only liable to plaintiff because of Sklaroff's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Rhode Island has long recognized the doctrine that an agent or an employee is liable to his principal or to his employer for acts of negligence causing damage to such principal or employer, whether such damage is direct or brought...
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Mainella v. Staff Builders Indus. Services, Inc.
...well settled that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the act of the employee is imputed to the employer. See, e.g., Morgan v. Lucaski, 581 A.2d 714 (R.I.1990). The borrowed-servant rule, however, severs the liability of an employer when the servant is lent to another employer or mas......
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Giamo v. Congress Motor Inn, Corp.
...at the time of this incident. Alexander v. Fujitsu Business Communication Systems, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 462 (D.N.H.1993); Morgan v. Lucaski, 581 A.2d 714 (R.I.1990). Plaintiff argues there exists an apparent or actual agency here. An agent is cloaked with apparent authority when the principal ......
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Providence v. Roger Williams Med. Ctr., C.A. No. PC 07-1450
...liable for the acts of its employees. Mainella v. Staff Builders Indus. Services, Inc., 608 A.2d 1141 (R.I. 1992) (citing Morgan v. Lucaski, 581 A.2d 714 (R.I. 1990)). The borrowed servant doctrine, however, provides that under certain circumstances an employer's liability for the acts of i......