Morgan v. Medtronic, Inc.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
• Writing for the Court: GEORGE C. HANKS, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Citation: Morgan v. Medtronic, Inc., 172 F.Supp.3d 959 (S.D. Tex. 2016)
• Decision Date: 22 March 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15–CV–32
• Parties: Ronnie Morgan, Plaintiff, v. Medtronic, Inc, Defendant.

172 F.Supp.3d 959

Ronnie Morgan, Plaintiff,

v.Medtronic, Inc, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15–CV–32

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division.

Signed March 22, 2016

Filed March 23, 2016

Barry Cecil Bennett, Bennett Legal PC, Michael R. McGown, Benckenstein Norvell & Nathan LLP, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff.

Julie A. Hardin, Reed Smith LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GEORGE C. HANKS, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant Medtronic, Inc.'s (“Medtronic”), Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“12(c) Motion”) pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt.5). For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Medtronic's 12(c) Motion should be GRANTED in its entirety. Accordingly, Plaintiff Ronnie Morgan's (“Morgan”) claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In this products liability lawsuit, Morgan asserts Texas state-law claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranties against Medtronic.¹ See Original Petition (“Or.Pet.”), Dkt. # 1–1 at 4–14.³Morgan alleges that the SynchroMed II Implantable Infusion System (the “SynchroMed II Pump”) was surgically implanted beneath his skin to deliver medication (i.e ., morphine sulfate or baclofen ).

Morgan alleges that, sometime before October 2013, a SynchroMed II Pump was implanted to address his chronic pain. Or. Pet., Dkt. 1–1, ¶ 6. Morgan was admitted to Clear Lake Regional Medical Center with symptoms consistent with drug withdrawal. Id. at ¶ 7. Morgan alleges that his pump malfunctioned by failing to provide a warning “that the pump no longer had morphine in it,” and as a result, “[Morgan] unknowingly went through morphine withdrawal symptoms.” Id. at ¶¶ 8–9. A week later, Morgan's SynchroMed II Pump was removed and replaced. Id. at ¶ 10. Morgan contends that he suffered “permanent injuries and damages” as a result of these events. Id. at ¶ 11.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Morgan filed suit in state court on January 15, 2015, asserting seven state-law causes of action: (1) negligence (Or.Pet., Dkt.1–1, ¶¶ 12–17); (2) “strict product liability—design defect” (id. at ¶¶ 18–23); (3) “strict product liability—failure to warn” (id. at ¶¶ 24–29); (4) “strict products liability—manufacturing defect” (id. at ¶¶ 30–34); (5) breach of express warranty (id. at ¶¶ 35–39); (6) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (id. at ¶¶ 40–45); and (7) breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (id. at ¶¶ 46–51). Medtronic answered in state court, raising various affirmative defenses (including the defense of federal preemption), and then removed the case to this Court. See Dkt. 1; Original Answer, Dkt. 1–1 at 19–30.

Medtronic has filed a 12(c) Motion arguing that because the SynchroMed II Pump is a Class III PMA device and the affirmative defense of federal preemption is purely a legal matter that can be decided on the pleadings. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360k(a), 337(a). Additionally, Medtronic argues that Morgan's failure to provide pre-suit notice to Medtronic as required by Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 2.607(c)(1) bars his warranty claims as a matter of law. For the reasons detailed below, the Court agrees.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) should be granted if there is no issue of material fact and if the pleadings show that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Greenberg v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 478 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir.1973). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 209 (5th Cir.2010) ; Guidry v. American Public Life Insurance Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir.2007) ; Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir.1999) (per curiam).

The Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001). “When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 997, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002).

To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must allege “ ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Plausibility requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1966 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court will “not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir.2010). “[D]ismissal is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding a required element necessary to obtain relief.” Torch Liquidating Trust ex rel. Bridge Assocs. L.L.C. v. Stockstill, 561 F.3d 377, 384 (5th Cir.2009).

When considering a motion to dismiss, courts are generally “limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir.2000) ); see also C.H., II ex rel. L.H. v. Rankin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 415 Fed.Appx. 541, 545 (5th Cir.2011) (“A district court may look to the pleadings and any documents attached thereto.”); cf. Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir.2002) (surveying the Fifth Circuit's jurisprudence regarding “the documents that a district court may properly consider in deciding a Rule 12(c) motion”).

In addition, the court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, including pleadings filed in state court. See Joseph v. Bach & Wasserman, L.L.C., 487 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (5th Cir.2012) (“[T]he court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. Here, the document referenced is a pleading filed with a Louisiana state district court, and it is a matter of public record.” (citation omitted) (citing Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777 (5th Cir.2011) )); Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n. 9 (5th Cir.2007) (“[I]t is clearly proper in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Hebert Abstract Co., Inc. v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir.1990) (“A motion brought pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.”).

When a party presents “matters outside the pleadings” with a motion to dismiss, the court has discretion to either accept or exclude the evidence for purposes of the motion to dismiss. See McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 410 (4th Cir.2010) (“ ‘As is true of practice under Rule 12(b)(6), it is well-settled that it is within the district court's discretion whether to accept extra-pleading matter on a motion for judgment on the pleadings and treat it as one for summary judgment or to reject it and maintain the character of the motion as one under Rule 12(c).’ ” (quoting 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1371 (3d ed.2010) )); Isquith ex rel. Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 194 n. 3 (5th Cir.1988) (“Rule 12(b) gives a district court ‘complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” ’ (quoting 5C Charles A Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366 (1969) )). However, “[i]f ... matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56” and “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” FED.R.CIV.P. 12(d).

Attached to Medtronic's 12(c) Motion are: (1) the SynchroMed II Programmable Drug Infusion System Premarket Approval Database Listing for P860004/S056 (Dkt. 5, Exhibit A), and (2) the SynchroMed Premarket Approval Database Listing (Dkt. 5, Exhibit B). Because these documents are matters of public record of which the Court may take judicial notice, the Court will consider these documents without converting the 12(c) Motion to a motion for summary judgment. See Van Duzer v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 995 F.Supp.2d 673, 683–85 (S.D.Tex.)aff'd, 582 Fed.Appx. 279 (5th Cir.2014). These documents are also referenced in Morgan's Original Complaint, and they are central to his claims because they show that the SynchroMed II Pump is a Class III, PMA approved medical device.

ANALYSIS

Medtronic argues that the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved the SynchroMed II Pump under its Premarket Approval (“PMA”) process and that Morgan's claims should be...